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A wide variety of organizations, ranging from churches to governments and corporations, 
now claim that they are transparent. They suggest, furthermore, that this transparency enables 
their members, citizens, customers, or workers to see well and thus act freely. This work 
explores the social and natural factors that give rise to and shape such “individualist 
transparency,” which is conceived as a type of appearance planning that empowers and 
controls individuals by ostensibly enabling them to see well. 
The study’s main argument is that individualist transparency is produced by ideologists 
(professional society builders disproportionately affected by the ruling class) who plan how 
things seem to be, calling this “transparency.” The role of the transparency metaphor in this is 
to suggest direct perception. The claim of direct perception is useful in processing a 
contradiction between top-down ideological socialization and autonomy. This contradiction is 
engendered in part by the fetishistic character of commodity production and exchange. 
The research arrives at three main conclusions. First, while individualist transparency is often 
based on misleading claims, it is not entirely illusory. Although transparency ideologists must 
seem misleadingly neutral with respect to the real conflicts they regulate, they must also 
compromise with the real experience and interests of their audiences. Second, individualist 
transparency is not socially necessary: it may be possible to replace it with a less misleading 
horizontal form that does not contribute to domination and exploitation along class and other 
lines. This will be difficult, however, as long as ideological socialization is needed due to 
deep-seated social conflicts. Third, appearance planning and social transparency would be 
necessary even in a society without ideology. Future research should therefore attempt to 
formulate a positive research program on horizontal, non-ideological social transparency. 
The study builds on empirical studies concerning transparency in livestock welfare 
commodification and the historical development of transparency language. It combines 
functional explanation, a language conception that emphasizes struggle, and a historical 
approach that rises from the abstract to the concrete. 
The dissertation’s theoretical position expands and modifies the so-called Projekt 
Ideologietheorie framework of ideology theory. The Projekt framework combines a theory of 
ideological socialization (top-down invitation into positions of domination and subordination) 
with a materialist interpretation of how everyday life molds people’s thought. The study 





augments this framework with an interpretation of Karl Marx’s conception of appearance, in 
which objects and subjects are not cleanly separable from each other. In this context, the 
work views transparency as a moment of the process of appearance that preserves the traces 
of objects for subjects. 
 
Keywords: transparency, individualism, ideology, fetishism, appearance, socialization, 
Projekt Ideologietheorie, livestock welfare, commodification, video games 
  






Organisaatiot kirkoista valtioihin ja yrityksiin esittävät nyt olevansa läpinäkyviä. Ne väittävät 
myös, että tämä läpinäkyvyys sallii niiden jäsenten, kansalaisten, asiakkaiden tai 
työntekijöiden nähdä hyvin ja siksi toimia vapaasti. Käsillä oleva tutkimus tarkastelee 
tällaista ”yksilökeskeistä läpinäkyvyyttä” aiheuttavia yhteiskunnallisia ja luonnollisia 
tekijöitä. Yksilökeskeinen läpinäkyvyys ymmärretään tutkimuksessa ilmenemisen 
suunnitteluksi, joka voimaannuttaa ja kontrolloi yksilöitä tuottamalla heille väitetysti hyvän 
havaitsemiskyvyn. 
Tutkimuksen keskeisin väite on, että yksilökeskeistä läpinäkyvyyttä tuottavat ideologit 
(ammattimaiset yhteiskunnan rakentajat, joihin hallitseva luokka vaikuttaa suhteettomissa 
määrin), jotka suunnittelevat ilmenemistä ja kutsuvat tätä läpinäkyvyydeksi. 
Läpinäkyvyyskielikuvan tehtävänä on antaa ymmärtää, että ideologit mahdollistavat suoran 
havainnon. Väite auttaa työstämään ristiriitaa, joka syntyy ylhäältä alas toimivan ideologisen 
yhteiskunnallistamisen ja itseohjautuvuuden välille. Ristiriita aiheutuu osin kauppatavaran 
tuotannosta ja vaihdosta kumpuavasta fetisismistä. 
Tutkimus päätyy kolmeen johtopäätökseen. Ensinnäkin, vaikka yksilökeskeinen 
läpinäkyvyys perustuu usein harhaanjohtaville väitteille, se ei ole täysin harhaista. 
Läpinäkyvyysideologien on tosin vaikutettava puolueettomilta suhteessa niihin todellisiin 
konflikteihin, joita he säätelevät, mutta heidän on myös oltava valmiita kompromisseihin, 
jotka huomioivat ideologian yleisöjen todelliset kokemukset ja intressit. Toiseksi, 
yksilökeskeinen läpinäkyvyys ei ole yhteiskunnallisesti välttämätöntä, vaan se saattaisi olla 
korvattavissa vähemmän harhaanjohtavalla horisontaalisella muodolla, joka ei edistä luokka- 
tai muihin tekijöihin perustuvaa alistusta ja riistoa. Korvaamista vaikeuttaa kuitenkin se, että 
ideologinen yhteiskunnallistaminen on tarpeen sikäli, kun yhteiskuntaa läpäisevät syvät 
jakolinjat. Kolmanneksi, ilmenemisen suunnittelu ja yhteiskunnallinen läpinäkyvyys olisivat 
välttämättömiä myös ideologiattomassa yhteiskunnassa. Tulevan tutkimuksen tulisi pyrkiä 
siksi muotoilemaan tutkimusohjelma, joka käsittelisi horisontaalista, ei-ideologista 
yhteiskunnallista läpinäkyvyyttä. 
Tutkimus perustuu empiirisille löydöksille, jotka koskevat läpinäkyvyyttä tuotantoeläinten 
hyvinvoinnin tuotteistamisessa sekä läpinäkyvyyskielen historiallista kehitystä. Se yhdistelee 
funktionaalista selittämistapaa, kamppailua korostavaa kielianalyysia ja historiallista 
menetelmää, joka nousee abstraktista konkreettiseen. 





Väitöskirjan teoreettinen osa laajentaa ja muokkaa niin kutsutun Projekt Ideologietheorie- 
tutkimusperinteen ideologiateoriaa. Lähestymistapa yhdistää käsityksen ideologisesta 
yhteiskunnallistamisesta (ylhäältä alas tapahtuvasta kutsumisesta herruus- ja 
alistumissuhteisiin) materialistiseen tulkintaan siitä, kuinka arkielämä muokkaa ihmisten 
ajattelua. Tutkimus tukee ideologiateoriaa tulkitsemalla Karl Marxin ilmenemiskäsitystä, 
jonka mukaan objekteja ja subjekteja ei voi jäännöksettömästi erottaa toisistaan. Tutkimus 
määrittää tässä yhteydessä läpinäkyvyyden ilmenemisprosessin osaksi, joka säilyttää objektin 
jäljet subjektille. 
 
Avainsanat: läpinäkyvyys, individualism, ideologia, fetisismi, ilmeneminen, 
yhteiskunnallistaminen, Projekt Ideologietheorie, tuotantoeläinten hyvinvointi, 
tuotteistaminen, videopelit  
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1 Introduction: Re-Theorizing Transparency 
“Transparency” is a current buzzword among governments, scholars, corporations, and non-
governmental organizations—even the Pope is talking about transparency. Transparency 
promises to bring about trust and satisfaction, balance budgets, improve the quality of 
government, and reduce corruption. For some, transparency portends a democratic 
“infotopia” of free citizens; for others an unfree dystopia. All of these interpretations 
converge, however, around the notion that transparent social formations allow people to see 
well. A transparent Vatican, for instance, promises more visibility into its money flows, 
resulting in increased accountability.1 
Researchers have explained the emergence and prominence of transparency rhetoric and 
practices with factors such as neoliberalism and 1968 egalitarianism. However, the history of 
transparency and related notions such as publicity, freedom of information, surveillance, 
accountability, and openness begins with the Enlightenment and therefore stretches back 
hundreds of years. Why did many such forms emerge during this period, and why do they 
persist today in a fairly recognizable guise?2 
In this dissertation, I build on three published articles to formulate a novel conception of what 
I call individualist transparency. I understand such transparency as appearance planning that 
empowers and controls individuals by ostensibly allowing them to see well. I am interested in 
why the history of capitalist society is replete with people whose job it is to modify how 
things seem to be while simultaneously claiming that this modification supports individuals’ 
autonomous action. Such individualist appearance planning arguably encompasses most of 
the transparency rhetoric and practices currently in circulation. I create a Marxist 
interpretation of transparency to explain why the pretention of seeing well is so common in 
societies dominated by the capitalist mode of production. Towards the end of my analysis, I 
also consider what role transparency could play in a post-capitalist society. 
The basic argument of this dissertation is as follows: Individualist transparency is a means of 
constructing society by planning appearances in a way that seems to preserve individual 
                                              
1 Service 2015; Cabinet Office 2016; Schnackenberg & Tomlinson 2014; Cucciniello, Porumbescu, & 
Grimmelikhuijsen 2017; Nestlé 2014; Oxfam 2017; Welch, Hinnant, & Moon 2005; Benito & Bastida 2009; 
Kosack & Fung 2014: 79–84; Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes 2010; Fung 2013; Brin 1998. 
2 Levitt 2009: 3–5; Garsten & Montoya 2008: 3; Mehrpouya & Djelic 2014: 2; Habermas 1991: 26; Frederick 
2006: 13; Bentham 1995: 29–35; Bentham 1791: 40–44; Webster 1791: 152. 





autonomy.3 Such planning is needed because the capitalist mode of production generates 
contradictions between experiences of freedom and external regulation: free wage laborers 
produce exchangeable goods and services under the top-down control of capitalists and 
professional society builders. Transparency planning may help alleviate this contradiction 
between freedom and unfreedom. Transparency implies, after all, that people are able to see 
well and can therefore make choices autonomously. The producers of transparency are 
disproportionately influenced by the ruling class,4 however, and tend to be in Marxist terms 
ideologists. These ideologists use transparency to arrange people into relations of domination 
and subordination rather than simply freeing them. Transparency facilitates a misleading 
compromise between class rule and demands for freedom, but it rarely functions without 
struggle and resistance.5 
The above argument challenges many of the assumptions of the existing transparency 
literature. First, it questions the tendency to study transparency in a pragmatic way that limits 
itself to the proximate causes, effects, and uses of the concept and its associated practices.6 
Given that individualist transparency has recurred throughout the history of the capitalist 
mode of production, it must be supported by long-standing, non-proximate factors. Second, 
unless these long-standing causes of transparency disappear, neither an infotopia nor a 
totalitarian dystopia is to be expected. If the transparency metaphor goes out of fashion, 
something similar will replace it as long as the objective need for such a device remains. 
Finally, given that appearance planners direct individual behaviors, it is imprudent to simply 
                                              
3 By constructing society, I mean fitting people’s competences and behaviors with each other. See Section 
2.2.2.3. By appearance planning, I mean consciously manipulating the way things seem to be. See Section 
2.1.3. 
4 Classes exist, in my interpretation, because people occupy antagonistic social positions of exploiter and 
exploitee that stem from their relationship to the means of production. The capitalist mode of production tends 
to somewhat simplify this class antagonism, disentangling classes from things like inheritable estates or castes. 
Feudal landowners are forced to turn into capitalist landowners, sustenance farmers are driven off their land to 
become wage laborers, and craftsmen are outcompeted by factory production, for instance. This does not mean, 
however, that the classes are monolithic, or that all of their members share exactly the same interests or forms of 
consciousness. The capitalist class, for instance, is split into fractions, the lines of which are related many 
historically-variable factors, such as the differences between commercial, finance, and productive capital. The 
same is true of the working class, which contains contradictory positions like hired managers. Class never exists 
in “pure form,” in other words, but only as a terrain of determinations, some of which include race, gender, 
sexuality, and so on. Consequently, the question of class is very complicated in Marx’s original texts, in the 
Marxist reception, and the academic literature at large. See, for instance, Ollman 1968; Andrew 1975; Marx & 
Engels 1975–2005: vol. 37, pp. 870–871; Gimenez 2001. 
5 For analyses of the relationship between capitalist production, individual freedom, ideology, and the ruling 
class, see Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, pp. 336–338; Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 28, pp. 100–101; 
Marx & Engels 2014: 176–179. 
6 Birchall 2014: 77; Schnackenberg & Tomlinson 2014; Cucciniello, Porumbescu, & Grimmelikhuijsen 2017. 
31049380_Vaitoskirja_Sami_Torssonen_Yhteisk_tiet_tdk_sisus_B5.indd   14 5.3.2019   9.15




assume, as some scholars have done,7 that transparency by definition ensures that people see 
well. Transparency must be theorized in such a way that accounts for the possibility that 
transparency may in fact be utterly misleading. 
The dissertation consists of two parts. Chapters 1 and 2 present an overview of transparency 
and an examination of a number of Marxist concepts: appearance, or how things seem to be; 
the ideological, or society building that alleviates social conflicts through professional 
coordinators and compromises; objective thought forms, or systematicities in people’s 
everyday lives that are conducive to specific ways of thinking; and commodity fetishism, or 
the conduct of social relations through exchangeable things, allowing individuals to appear 
free to themselves and to each other.8 Chapter 3 introduces three previously published journal 
articles that conduct empirical inquiries into forms of individualist transparency using 
historical and video game studies approaches. Chapter 4 considers what social transparency 
might mean in relation to a non-capitalist society. 
In the section that follows, I relate my approach to transparency to previous scholarly takes 
on the subject. I begin by outlining the main intuitions, approaches, and results of the social 
transparency literature, after which I describe the research process that led me to question this 
literature in fundamental ways. 
1.1 The Transparency Literature and Seeing Well: A Critique 
Scholars are virtually unanimous in employing social transparency metaphors to suggest that 
people, in some sense, see well. Beyond this similarity, however, scholars disagree on what 
social transparency means, how it works, and when it is desirable. Below, I focus on 
academic texts, but similar notions are also recognizable in European Commission 
documents,9 for example, and in a range of non-academic books.10 I begin with definitions of 
social transparency, after which I outline the causes and effects of transparency that are 
evident in the literature. 
Two recent review articles provide an overview of what social scientists usually mean by 
transparency. According to Schnackenberg and Tomlinson, the business organizations 
                                              
7 E.g., Kuijper 2009: 45–60. 
8 For discussions concerning appearance, the ideological, objective thought forms, and fetishism, see Marx & 
Engels 1975–2005: vol. 1, p. 40; Rehmann 2013: 245–246; Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, p. 83; Marx & 
Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, p. 87. 
9 European Commission 2014. 
10 Brin 1998. 





literature defines transparency as “the perceived quality of intentionally shared information 
from a sender.”11 According to Cucciniello et al., the literature on government or public 
sector transparency conceives of transparency as “the extent external actors are afforded 
access to information about the way public organizations operate.”12 In both cases, greater 
social transparency means that one actor is providing another actor with more or better 
information about something. 
As I show later, this ideal-typical way of conceptualizing transparency is in some respects 
misleading. Social transparency does not really imply that someone sees well. In this respect, 
it resembles physical transparency: while molten glass is typically largely transparent to 
visible light,13 for instance, people generally cannot see through it because it gives off so 
much radiation. Transparency does not always imply “able to be seen through.” Furthermore, 
transparency can also be a characteristic of something that is misleadingly see-through. 
Prisms are transparent but can also invert images, for instance. Social transparency may also 
have misleading and obfuscating qualities, as I show in Section 1.2.1 and Article III. 
Because social scientists associate transparency with better information, they often assume 
that transparency allows the “recipient” to make better-informed decisions. This is nowadays 
particularly common among scholars who apply aspects of the preference theory of 
marginalist economics.14 According to Kolstad and Wiig, for instance, transparency may 
allow “principals” to better control the choices of their “agents,” such as when elected 
officials monitor bureaucrats and punish them for corruption.15 The purpose of such 
rationalist models is usually to discover how the distribution of visibility in social 
environments affects people’s or organizations’ “independent” behavior.16 Birchall attacks 
such transparency by questioning its “neoliberal” underpinnings. She argues that the Left 
should embrace narrative-interpretative forms of disclosure instead.17 
Most scholars construct transparency as a fairly demanding category in comparison with 
related concepts such as accountability, openness, publicity, surveillance, and freedom of 
                                              
11 Schnackenberg & Tomlinson 2014: 5. 
12 Cucciniello, Porumbescu, & Grimmelikhuijsen 2017: 36. 
13 Beder, Bass, & Shackleford 1971. For an experiment, see The Gentleman Physicist 2013. This means that 
things beyond a mass of molten glass may “appear” in the light that passes through it in the sense that they could 
be seen given appropriate faculties of perception. 
14 Prat 2006. 
15 Kolstad & Wiig 2009: 522–523. 
16 E.g., Faust & Svensson 2002: 522. 
17 Birchall 2014; Birchall 2011b. 
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information. For Birkinshaw, transparency means not only that citizens have a right to access 
information held by authorities, as in freedom of information,18 or that they can access 
government processes more broadly, as in openness,19 but that access is made as effortless as 
possible.20 Larsson likewise argues that transparency goes further than openness, requiring 
that information is presented simply enough that its audiences can understand it.21 
Koivisto’s intuitions concerning transparency, which she has sketched out in an outline of a 
future research project, are in several respects similar to mine. She argues, for instance, that 
social transparency metaphors draw on everyday sensory experiences of physical phenomena. 
She also believes that the scope of transparency can be manipulated and argues that the 
negative implications of transparency remain undertheorized. She has not yet carried out such 
theorization, however, having only indicated its broad outlines. This may be why she still 
associates the limits of transparency exclusively with scope, such as with excluding certain 
things from the field of vision. As I show later, however, social transparency may also 
mislead qualitatively by, say, inverting objects (see Section 1.3).22 
Heald offers a nuanced deconstruction of transparency on two axes. When rulers observe the 
ruled, this is “transparency upwards”; when the ruled observe the ruler, transparency is 
“downwards.” When an employee can see beyond her own organization, this is “transparency 
outwards,” whereas visibility within the organization is directed “inwards.” Relations on both 
axes can be either asymmetrical, such as with surveillance or accountability, or symmetrical, 
such as when people see each other.23 
Although I do not associate transparency with seeing well, my approach is similar to Heald’s 
in that I do not seek to define transparency as typologically different from accountability, 
openness, publicity, surveillance, and freedom of information, which in my vocabulary are 
usually forms of individualist transparency, or appearance planning that simultaneously 
empowers and controls individual autonomy. The various forms of social transparency need 
not all have such an element of externally planned individual self-coordination. 
                                              
18 Birkinshaw 2006a: 188–189. 
19 Birkinshaw 2006a: 190–191. 
20 Birkinshaw 2006b: 189–191. 
21 Larsson 1998: 40–42. 
22 Koivisto 2016. 
23 Heald 2006: 27–31. Heald also emphasizes the differences between event versus procedure, retrospective 
versus real time, and nominal versus effective transparency. The odd contradiction concerning the directionality 
of perception between the axes (rulers see downwards because of “transparency upwards,” yet employees see 
outwards because of “transparency outwards”) is in the original. 





The individualist form of social transparency has only become widespread during the past 
three hundred years. To see how individualist transparency differs from other forms, compare 
it with the dictum that government should operate by rote,24—that is, by mechanical 
repetition following non-discretionary rules that eliminate all individual agency. Such 
thinking was common under certain circumstances in ancient China and Greece.25 Under the 
rote system, the law should be transparent only in the sense that the sovereign’s will moves 
through the chain of command unchanged, akin to a row of toppling dominoes. The absolutist 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes, for instance, contends that sovereignty should not be 
transferred to administrators “without express and perspicuous words to that purpose. And 
this kind of public ministers resembleth the nerves, and tendons that move the several limbs 
of a body natural.”26 This is a highly non-individualist form of transparency that emphasizes 
people’s organic interconnection over their fundamental autonomy and individuality. 
As I show in Article III, individualist transparency has risen to great societal prominence 
since the eighteenth century. During this period, transparency and its sibling concepts have 
increasingly come to imply that an observing or observed citizen, consumer, bureaucrat, 
contractor, prisoner, organization, or other individual is empowered or incentivized to choose 
appropriately. This immediately gives rise to the question of why this form of transparency 
has spread. In the section that follows, I review the sparse literature that has attempted to 
answer this question. 
1.1.1 The Causes of Transparency 
There have not been many attempts at explaining the emergence of individualist transparency 
rhetoric and practices. Most of the literature simply assumes that transparency is important 
and pays little heed to why this is so. Hood’s 2006 work is still the most comprehensive 
attempt at explanation.27 Below, I review Hood’s argument and show that it does not quite 
cover the wide historical scope of individualist transparency. 
Hood’s account of the roots of individualist transparency can be condensed to four factors: 1) 
the open covenants doctrine of international diplomacy, which was already present in the 
eighteenth century but was further strengthened by the transnationalization of governance; 2) 
                                              
24 Hood 2006b: sec. 2. 
25 Hood 2006b: sec. 2. 
26 Hobbes 1998: 160. 
27 Cf. Levitt 2009: 3–5; Garsten & Montoya 2008: 3; Mehrpouya & Djelic 2014: 2; Cajvaneanu 2011. 
31049380_Vaitoskirja_Sami_Torssonen_Yhteisk_tiet_tdk_sisus_B5.indd   18 5.3.2019   9.15




demands that private actors should know what the government is doing, which increased after 
absolutism began its decline in the seventeenth century; 3) corporate disclosure, which was 
required by creditors and owners especially with the spread of joint stock companies in the 
seventeenth century; and 4) the development of modern social science, which began in 
earnest in the eighteenth century and promised to render society knowable and controllable.28 
Hood also considers three explanations of the rise of transparency proposed by other 
scholars: the emergence of professional intermediaries that both states and corporations are 
forced to inform; the “egalitarian culture” that has supposedly led the public to demand more 
transparency since 1968; and in recent decades, technological developments such as the 
internet.29 He provides a criticism of these explanations: some transparencies are not 
associated with well-defined outsiders; egalitarian demands for transparency often stem from 
the same sources as demands for what Hood calls “individualist” privacies; and the 
technological explanation he deems too “functionalist.”30 
In Article III, I give examples of several eighteenth- and nineteenth-century texts in which 
transparency metaphors and practices appear in contexts that are in no discernible way related 
to any of the aforementioned factors, yet are already individualist in a manner strongly 
reminiscent of today’s transparency. I interpret this as an indication that Hood’s proposed 
explanations are too specific. Hood overlooks the effects of the consolidation and spread of 
capitalist commodity production that took place during this period and affected peoples’ lives 
much more profoundly than any of the developments he does list. 
To appreciate the wide scope of early individualist transparency, consider the highly popular 
early eighteenth century interpretations of Aesop’s fables by the liberal Whig archdeacon 
Samuel Croxall. Croxall encourages the ugly person to cultivate “beauties of good temper,” 
because this will lead others to “value him, like an oriental jewel, not by a glittering outside, 
which is common to baser stones,” but by “the transparent sincerity of his honest heart.”31 In 
other words, the ideologist Croxall encouraged the ugly person to self-improve his value on 
the marriage market by letting an inner truth shine through. This is hardly an effect of stock 
companies or the decline of absolutism. The commodity metaphor, by contrast, is right on the 
surface of the text: Croxall assumed that his audience would be able to conceptualize love in 
                                              
28 Hood 2006b: secs. 2–3. 
29 Hood 2006a: sec. 2. 
30 Hood 2006a: sec. 2. 
31 Aesop & Croxall 1792: 132–133. 





terms of exchange. He was probably right, given that his book has been republished 
numerous times.32 
Beyond the question of its emergence, there is also the question of why individualist 
transparency persists in fairly recognizable forms today. Ideologists still use exactly the same 
kind of argument as Croxall when they encourage corporations to increase their transparency, 
asserting that transparency will assuage investors and raise stock prices.33 The corporation 
must, as it were, reveal the “sincerity of its honest heart” in order to be valued as an “oriental 
jewel.” Either some of the factors that gave rise to individualist transparency must still 
support it, or new mechanisms must exist that result in recognizably similar outcomes. 
One possible functional explanation would be to say that individualist transparency works—it 
gets the ideological job done, or gets people to do what they should. Although the evidence is 
mixed and limited, on the whole it seems that individualist transparency might indeed 
contribute, all other things being equal, to people and organizations behaving appropriately 
with respect to goals such as “quality of government.”34 Scholars associate transparency with 
increased35 or reduced36 trust and satisfaction, balanced budgets,37 and reduced corruption.38 
Lindstedt and Naurin’s multivariate analysis indicates that transparency as access to 
information reduces corruption, although only under very specific conditions.39 This evidence 
is broadly persuasive. 
The rise of individualist transparency is not, however, satisfactorily explained by pointing to 
its efficacy in achieving desired social objectives. This explanation by itself does not clarify 
why the aforementioned issues should be addressed in precisely this form. What gives rise to 
the notion that people should, but cannot, see through governments and corporations well 
enough to live in an independent manner? Why are there people whose job it is to purportedly 
fix this problem by deploying transparency in particular? In the section that follows, I give a 
summary of my argument concerning this question. 
                                              
32 worldcat.org 2018. 
33 McClure 2003. 
34 Kosack & Fung 2014: 79–84. 
35 Welch, Hinnant, & Moon 2005. 
36 O’Neill 2006. 
37 Benito & Bastida 2009. 
38 Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes 2010. 
39 Lindstedt & Naurin 2010: 302. 
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1.2 Individualist Transparency as Fetishistic Ideology: The Broad 
Outlines 
As already noted, the overall theoretical argument of this dissertation is that individualist 
transparency is a fetishistic and ideological objective thought form that contributes to society 
building by way of ostensibly see-through planned appearances. There are five main Marxist 
theoretical elements here: 1) appearance, 2) ideology, 3) fetishism, 4) society building, and 5) 
objective thought forms. I elaborate on these theoretical elements in greater length in Chapter 
2. Here, I briefly outline how I understand each of these categories, how I interpret the 
connections between them, and how they help to explain the emergence and persistence of 
individualist transparency. The basic idea here is that commodity fetishism explains the 
individualist aspect of recently dominant forms of ideological transparency. 
When Marx uses the word appearance (Erscheinung), he usually means that although things 
seem to be a particular way, there is more to them than meets the eye.40 Appearances are 
emergent results of combinations of “subject-side,” “object-side,” and contextual elements. 
The constellation of these elements gives rise to an appearance that is potentially misleading 
or overly constrained. The appearance is not, however, completely opaque or illusionary. 
While it may not always quite get at the essence (Wesen) of the object, or the relations that 
sustain the object, the appearance still stands in some specifiable relation to the object’s 
essence. This theoretical point of departure is central to understanding ideological 
transparency, which revolves around planning the process through which things are made to 
appear. 
In the present society, the burden of planning processes of appearance tends to fall upon 
ideologists: mental laborers over whom the ruling class (which controls the means of 
production) has disproportionate influence. Such laborers contribute to society building, 
which is to say socialization,41 by working to piece together peoples’ social relations, 
characters, and behaviors despite latent interest conflicts. Individualist transparency emerges 
as a consequence of such ideological socialization, not directly from people’s horizontal 
interactions. People do not usually think of their knowledge of the price of healthcare as 
“transparency,” for instance, although they may indeed wish to have this knowledge. 
Consultants seeking to “empower consumers to shop effectively” on the healthcare market do 
                                              
40 E.g., Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 36, p. 38. 
41 Rehmann 2013: 248. 





think like this, however, and consequently design smartphone apps to “transparently” 
distribute price information.42 Transparency ideologists conduct ideological socialization by 
planning appearances, and they often conceptualize their work with the word transparency. 
The ideological construction of society is not exhausted by such appearance planning, 
however. It is possible to affect people, for instance, by designing how they move through 
physical spaces or by imposing secrecy, which is basically the opposite of transparency. 
Of course, the audiences of transparency ideologists may or may not prove responsive. They 
may or may not learn to see, think, and behave according to plan. The degree to which they 
do so is a question of historical conjuncture. In some cases, audiences may actively adopt 
individualist transparency, such as when they identify themselves as ethical consumers and 
actively seek out “transparent” commodities. Insofar as they do so, they relate to the 
ideological like a layperson at prayer, in active submission to ideological socialization. But 
audiences may also criticize the pretenses of such commodities, forcing ideologists to 
compromise. Furthermore, professional mental laborers may decline to function as 
ideologists, refusing to socialize people into relations of submission and domination.43 
As conceptualized above, neither the theory of appearance nor that of ideology explains why 
modern ideological transparency has taken such an individualist form. The world’s first 
freedom of information legislation in the eighteenth century explicitly aimed to enforce the 
King’s will. 44 Today, the European Commission regularly evokes transparency to suggest 
that Europeans freely consent to its policy because they are aware of what it is doing.45 It 
would amount to political suicide for the Commission to instead take up a transparency 
initiative with the explicit purpose of making European subjects do exactly what Commission 
ideologists want. The question is, then, why is the blatant flouting of individual freedom no 
longer possible? 
I argue that fetishism, and especially commodity fetishism, explains why transparency today 
usually assumes an individualist character. Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism shows why 
commodity production, which the capitalist mode of production spreads, makes relations 
                                              
42 Ginsburg 2016. 
43 This interpretation of the terms ideologist, ideology, and the ideological owes much to the work of the Projekt 
Ideologietheorie, which has produced one of the many Marxist interpretations of these issues (see Section 
2.2.2.3). 
44 Frederick 2006: 8. 
45 European Commission 2014. 
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among humans appear in the guise of relations between the commodities they produce and 
exchange. This happens because commodities have labor values that are expressed in prices, 
and it is as viable for people to accept these seemingly intrinsic properties in their daily life as 
it is to take for granted, say, commodities’ weights. In other words, labor value appears 
fetishistically as an attribute of commodities, while the social character of commodities is 
discernible only through the use of an elaborate scientific apparatus (see Section 2.3).46 
Commodity fetishism tends to give rise to experiences of autonomous individuality. This is 
because fetishism conceals people’s relations behind commodities and thus makes it hard to 
notice how people are affected by and affect others.47 Wage laborers under the capitalist 
mode of production, for instance, sell their labor power as a commodity, choose their 
employers from among willing buyers, and seem to be fully compensated by wages. They 
likewise buy their subsistence in the market. This confers upon laborers a semblance of 
independence from the other laborers who produce their subsistence, as well as from their 
capitalist exploiters. 
As the capitalist mode of production spreads, both ideologists and non-ideologists have more 
experiences of autonomous individuality. The figure of the autonomous individual thus 
becomes increasingly intuitive to ideologists and their audiences.48 Marx uses the expression 
“objective thought form” to designate such forms of consciousness that arise from experience 
within social forms.49 Commodity production and exchange, for example, are objective forms 
of behavior that mold individuals’ thoughts. Furthermore, ideological forms such as law50 
tend to adapt to the intuitive and practical requirements of commodities. This adaptation 
results in individualized ideological forms,51 such as freedom of movement, that reinforce 
experiences of autonomy. In a consolidated capitalist society, many ideological and non-
ideological social forms impart experiences of autonomous individuality. 
If each person were really nothing but a free-wheeling, self-contained individual, society 
would instantly collapse. In reality, as commodities spread, they are accompanied by various 
forms of society building. The corollary of wage laborers freely choosing their capitalist 
                                              
46 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, pp. 82–83. 
47 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 28, pp. 100–101. 
48 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 28, p. 101. 
49 Haug 1995. 
50 Pashukanis 2002: 109–133. 
51 Poulantzas 2000: 65–66. 





employers, for instance, is that the employers enforce a workplace discipline that correlates 
the laborers’ products with market demand rather than with the laborers’ own needs.52 In 
choosing what to purchase with their wages, laborers rely on the advice of friends, consumer 
legislation, advertising, the enforcement of property relations, and so on. Such forms of 
socialization are only ideological to the degree that they pass through specialist ideologists. 
All forms of society building, however, contradict autonomous individuality, whether 
explicitly or implicitly: either one steers oneself from within or one is steered from without. 
This dissertation argues that individualist transparency is a lucrative way to process the 
contradiction between autonomy and socialization. By attempting to alter what their 
audiences perceive, ideologists may exert influence without forcibly overriding individual 
autonomy. Furthermore, by promising that ideological appearances allow people to see well, 
individualist transparency suggests that it is compatible with free agency, since audience 
members ultimately decide how to behave. Transparency is a particularly apt metaphor for 
this purpose, since it makes use of pre-existing physical intuitions. After all, most people 
nowadays have plenty of experience with physical transparency as a property of glass that 
more or less passively allows them to see well, such as windows.53 Resistance to individualist 
transparency is to be expected, however, insofar as it enforces a lopsided compromise 
between seeming freedom and actual domination. Such compromises often run against their 
own claims of direct perception, as well as audience expectations. 
To repeat, individualist transparency denotes a fetishistic, ideological objective thought form 
that builds society by means of planned appearances that can ostensibly be “seen through.” 
The theory of fetishism explains the individualist aspect of recent forms of social 
transparency, while ideology theory explains transparency’s society building aspect. 
Appearance planning is the quintessential individualist form of ideological socialization, 
since it reaches people through their phenomenal environs and thereby seemingly preserves 
their autonomy. The claim of seeing well, finally, emphasizes that the individual knows what 
he or she is doing—that the individual makes choices independently and with a sufficient 
amount of knowledge. 
                                              
52 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, pp. 336–337. 
53 For the historical interconnections between clear glass and capitalist production, see MacLeod 1987. 
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1.2.1 Interlude: Transparent Livestock Welfare 
The cut-and-dry academic definitions of transparency and fetishistic ideology given above 
are not very helpful in understanding how individualist transparency concretely functions in 
society. To put some flesh around the conceptual bones, it is useful to consider a concrete 
case before moving on. In this section, I briefly outline the case of the Welfare Quality 
livestock welfare measurement system, which I also discuss in Articles I and II and which 
represents an important source of inspiration for my interpretation of individualist 
transparency. 
In 2004, the European Commission awarded a substantial 14-million-euro research contract 
to a multidisciplinary project on livestock welfare. The project was titled “Integration of 
animal welfare in the food quality chain: from public concern to improved welfare and 
transparent quality.” Its aim was to develop a livestock welfare measurement system that 
could be applied in cattle, poultry, and pig production. Consumers were to be transparently 
informed as to how their food had been produced. Researchers from forty-four institutes and 
universities from sixteen countries conducted the research over five years. Innumerable other 
organizations and lay people participated as stakeholders or research objects.54 
The project’s outcome was a welfare measurement and certification system for livestock 
production. When this so-called Welfare Quality measurement system was tested in practice, 
however, it turned out that half of all European livestock production units would have been 
graded “unacceptable” using the welfare thresholds proposed by citizen jurors and welfare 
scientists. As a consequence, the project published a less strict set of criteria that 
accommodated the reality of the European livestock system at the expense of citizen and 
scientific views.55 
The researchers promised to tighten the rules after “sufficient progress” had occurred in 
European livestock production.56 In 2013, however, other welfare scientists tested the system 
and noted that “severe welfare problems did not result in herds being classified as 
unacceptable” and suggested that “[t]he role of expert opinion in the WQ-ME [multi-criteria 
                                              
54 Welfare Quality Consortium 2008. 
55 Miele et al. 2011: 115. 
56 Miele et al. 2011: 115. 





evaluation] model requires further investigation.”57 As of April 2017, the protocols available 
at the Welfare Quality Network’s website have not been tightened.58 
The Welfare Quality protocols have been freely available on the internet since 2012 and have 
been implemented and further developed by several different actors. One of the more 
significant adaptations is the WelFur research project funded by the European Fur Breeders’ 
Association. The project used the Welfare Quality protocols as a foundation for constructing 
welfare measures for mink and foxes, but freely adapted the system’s particulars. Their 
approach includes, for instance, novel welfare gas chambers and welfare anal electrocution 
rods for the mass slaughter of mink and foxes.59 WelFur began to be implemented in 
production in 2015, and the industry now uses it for public relations work and welfare 
product labeling.60 Industry lobbyists have deployed it to counter animal protectionists in 
meetings with EU parliamentarians, for instance.61 Animal protectionists, in turn, have 
argued that the system conceals cruelty, forcing industry representatives to respond.62 
The Welfare Quality project epitomizes individualist transparency. The project’s researchers 
were tasked with empowering consumers and producers to choose between welfare and non-
welfare variants of capitalist livestock production. When it turned out that the “welfare” 
people wanted was not implementable within extant production conditions, however, the 
criteria for welfare were loosened, resulting in a compromise. Consumers can now buy 
products that are welfare-labeled, but the welfare production conditions differ systematically 
from consumer expectations as established by research. 
Because of the Welfare Quality project’s research setting, we know that what consumers 
think of when they hear “welfare” is not what they get in the factory. However, the 
misleading character of Welfare Quality can only be discovered through sustained scholarly 
inquiry. Consequently, Welfare Quality works as intended: consumers seem to choose freely, 
producers and retailers earn a welfare premium, and EU bureaucrats and researchers seem to 
have earned their salaries and grants. 
                                              
57 de Vries et al. 2013: 6272. 
58 Welfare Quality 2009: 18–19. 
59 Mononen et al. 2012: 368. 
60 Fur Europe 2015; Fur Europe 2017. 
61 Ingman & Nielsen 2015. 
62 Bale 2016. 
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I give many other examples of individualist transparency in Article III, as well. The basic 
logic is not contingent on the particulars, however: individualist transparency is produced by 
ideologists who claim that their subjects freely do what they should, and the role of the 
transparency metaphor is to suggest that the subjects know what they are doing. After all, the 
very definition of social transparency suggests that its subjects have access to good-quality 
information to back up their choices (see Section 1.1). Irrespective of whether the 
transparency is in fact misleading, however, the claim that a person can see well has powerful 
consequences in itself. It erases the contradiction between freedom (or a consumer choosing 
what she buys) and unfreedom (or ideological socialization). 
Welfare Quality is a form of individualist ideological transparency. There are, however, other 
forms of social transparency as well. In the section that follows, I outline the relationships 
between individualist, ideological, social, and physical transparency. The bottom line here is 
that ideologists tend to base social transparency metaphors on people’s misleading everyday 
experience of physical transparency. It is possible, however, to conceptualize social 
transparency in a way that neither builds on fetishistic individuality nor avoids the 
ideologically inconvenient aspects of physical transparency. Such a conceptualization is a 
necessary element of any non-ideological social transparency planning that relies on 
horizontal socialization rather than on ideologists who are disproportionately affected by 
ruling-class interests. 
1.3 Physical, Social, Ideological, and Individualist Transparency 
I define social transparency as a configuration of human and non-human relations that 
preserves traces of objects across space and time such that objects are able to appear to 
subjects. Social transparency can thus be characterized as a series of events. In an assessment 
of livestock welfare, for instance, a hen may flee from a human assessor who is attempting to 
measure its welfare (the object). The assessor then uses the fleeing behavior as evidence of 
welfare problems when entering scores into a computer system that is used for product 
certification (transparency preserving a trace). When labeled chicken fillets end up on store 
shelves, livestock welfare appears to consumers who have been trained to recognize welfare 
(subjects). 
The same process can be characterized abstractly as follows: First, the object (welfare) has 
some kind of impact on its environment (the assessor). Second, this impact changes the 
environment in a way that leaves some manifestation of the fact that this object has existed 





(the assessor’s computer). Third, these traces are preserved over space and time for subjects 
who are capable of interpreting them (consumers). Social transparencies of this kind are 
present everywhere from language to airport metal detectors. 
Optical transparency also preserves traces of objects, in radiation that travels across space 
and time.63 Social transparencies often contain optical aspects, as well, such as the literally 
transparent dome of the Reichstag building where the German federal parliament convenes. I 
do not mean to suggest, however, that social and optical processes are exact equivalents. I 
only use optical transparency as traction for thinking about the social kind. Below, I outline 
the key concept of trace and discuss the relationships between different forms of 
transparency using schematic diagrams that support the verbal presentation with everyday 
visual intuitions.64 
In macroscopic optical transparency, certain wavelengths of light pass through a medium 
without being scattered or absorbed.65 Transparency thus transmits radiation while preserving 
its consistency. Translucency, by contrast, transmits radiation without this requirement of 
consistency. Bathroom windows, for instance, are often translucent but not transparent to 
visible light. Light does pass through translucent bathroom windows, but their structure is 
purposefully imbued with irregularities that scatter and randomize light (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Light (red arrow) passes through a transparent material (gray), is randomly scattered by a non-
transparent translucent material (blue), and is absorbed and randomly scattered by an opaque material (black). 
Human eyes can only see an object through the transparent material, which does not randomize light. 
                                              
63 Choudhury 2014: 109. 
64 The art in the diagrams has been created by the author using resources from openclipart.com and Wikimedia 
Commons. Both sources allow sharing and remixing. 
65 Fox 2010: 2–7. 
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This means that the light that passes through a transparent material can in principle be used to 
see objects on the other side, although the objects may still seem inverted or distorted to 
seeing humans. Non-transparent translucency, by contrast, effaces the traces of objects such 
that it is no longer possible to reconstruct any object whatsoever on the other side (see Figure 
2). 
 
Figure 2. A transparent Porro prism (left) preserves the traces (red) of an object (green), but inverts the object. 
By contrast, a non-transparent translucent film (right) effaces the traces of the lamp behind it, rendering the part 
behind the film completely invisible while still letting the light shine through. 
As I show in Article III, metaphorical social transparency language has throughout history 
emphasized the possibility of seeing well in a given context. This probably corresponds with 
people’s primary intuition of physical transparency. However, most people are also familiar 
with misleading forms of physical transparency, such as the way a straw seems broken in a 
glass of water. Modern scholars have often uncritically adopted the former intuition into their 
conception of social transparency, giving rise to a widespread ideal-typical understanding of 
social transparency as equivalent to high-quality information.66 Figure 3 depicts this ideal-
typical conception, according to which social transparency replicates the object and allows 
the subject to see it unimpeded (see Figure 3; for literature reviews, see Article III and 
Section 1.1). 
                                              
66 Schnackenberg & Tomlinson 2014: 5–6. 






Figure 3. Ideal-typical social transparency (gray) preserves traces of the object (green), allowing observers 
(orange) to see it well, or even perfectly. 
It is fair, in my view, to use the word transparency metaphorically to characterize social 
phenomena. Everyone is intuitively familiar with optical transparency or the lack thereof, 
which is why it can be employed as a useful source of shared experiential material for 
thought.67 It is also correct to contrast social transparency with secrecy as a kind of 
metaphorical “opacity,”68 since social transparency makes the appearance of objects possible, 
as opposed to blocking them altogether. Secrecy typically involves erasing the traces of an 
object, such as destroying the evidence of a crime, whereas transparency suggests that traces 
of the object are transmitted. 
Contrary to common sense, however, social transparency should not be associated with 
“seeing well.” This association is a misconception that ideologists use to hijack intuitions, in 
a manner of speaking. In reality, social transparency may be just as unreliable as the optical 
variety, giving rise to misleading appearances and unsavory social consequences. Social 
transparency preserves traces of objects, but this does not mean that all subjects can always 
adequately interpret the objects via these traces. One physical example of this is the inversive 
Porro prism (see Figure 2), whereas a social example is the Welfare Quality system, as 
discussed above in Section 1.2.1. 
The concepts transparency and trace, as I use them, only make sense in the context of a 
process that includes a subject side and an object side. To say that a piece of glass is not 
transparent, for instance, implies that a specific kind of observer cannot reconstruct objects 
                                              
67 For similar Marxist interpretations on the use of metaphors, see Harvey 1998; Bartels 1999. 
68 E.g., Birchall 2011a. 
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from the light that passes through it. From the perspective of another kind of observer, 
however, the same glass may be transparent. For instance, a device that has been calibrated to 
compensate for the specific irregularities of the glass might be able to “see through” that 
glass, since the light would not be random relative to the device. For such a device, the 
translucent glass would instead be transparent. The concepts of transparency and trace are 
thus bound up with specific material constellations that extend “beyond” them. 
The concept of social transparency is quite general and therefore does not account for the 
details of any concrete form of social transparency. This is why I have coined the notion of 
ideological transparency to designate specifically those social transparencies in which 
ideologists are involved in planning the processes that preserve traces of an object (see Figure 
4). There are many social transparencies that are not ideological, which is to say cases where 
traces are preserved without the work of appearance planners. 
 
Figure 4. A transparency ideologist (purple) produces ideological transparency (gray) that refracts the traces 
(red) of an object (green) such that it appears inverted to an observer (orange). 
Individualist transparency is a form of ideological appearance planning that empowers and 
controls individuals by ostensibly allowing them to see well. The ideologist works to make an 
object appear in a way that encourages certain modes of behavior over others, but the 
recipient supposedly chooses how to act (see Figure 5). This compromise helps alleviate the 





contradiction of self-coordination and socialization that capitalist commodity production 
tends to engender, but may also give rise to resistance (see Section 2.3.3). 
 
Figure 5. A transparency ideologist (purple) labors to control an observer (orange) by using transparency (gray) 
to invert traces (red) of a leftward turn. Such a turn consequently seems impossible and undesirable, whereas a 
rightward one appears favorably. The observer seems to choose freely, however. 
Any situation in which people should undertake a given, socially determined action is a 
potential site for individualist transparency. “Energy transparency,” for instance, may induce 
laborers to avoid wasting energy, since a visible energy meter continuously displays the 
amount of energy expended.69 “Transparency” about educational achievements may 
encourage students to strive for success (as defined by educators).70 “Market transparency,” 
such as forcing corporations to publish price lists, may speed up the process of price 
formation and increase the efficiency of markets.71 Individualist transparency is thus useful 
not only for socializing people within organizations, but can also be used to socialize 
organizations with respect to other organizations. Organizations of transparency ideologists 
could conceivably even socialize each other. 
To sum up, physical transparency has inspired my conception of social transparency, and 
social transparencies often have aspects of physical transparency. Ideological transparency, in 
                                              
69 Hopf & Müller 2013: 1667, 1670. 
70 Shulman 2007: 25. 
71 European Communities Information Service 1962: 14. 
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turn, is a form of social transparency that operates through mental laborers who are 
disproportionately affected by the ruling class. Individualist transparency is a form of 
ideological transparency that empowers and controls individuals by ostensibly allowing them 
to see well. These conceptual relationships are presented in Figure 6, below. 
 
Figure 6. Physical transparency has inspired my conception of social transparency, and all forms of social 
transparency may have aspects of physical transparency. Individualist transparency is a form of ideological 
transparency, which in turn is a form of social transparency. 
Even solitary animals leave chemical traces related to territory and mating,72 which indicates 
that there may not exist any species without such forms—evolution gives rise to tracing in 
pursuit of survival. Social transparency is also probably fundamental to any conceivable 
society, because it is difficult to imagine how a cohesive society could be established in the 
absence of any traces. Ideological transparency, by contrast, is only necessary in certain kinds 
of societies. We have plenty of evidence of classless societies,73 as well as of societies 
without a division of labor between coordinators and the coordinated74 (see Sections 2.2.1 
and 2.2.2.1). Individualist transparency, finally, is an even more specific form of ideological 
transparency that is especially characteristic of societies dominated by the capitalist mode of 
production but may occur in other societies to some degree as well. 
                                              
72 Shorey 1976: 1. 
73 Hayden 2001: 231. 
74 Shipman 2010: 6. 





Later in the dissertation, I argue that consciously intervening in appearances by targeting 
objects, transparencies, and subjects is necessary in any developed society, but that in certain 
forms of society such appearance planning need not be misleading or conducted by 
professional ideologists (see Section 2.1.3 and Chapter 4). 
Above, I have briefly outlined the overall conception of transparency presented in this 
dissertation. In the section that follows, I discuss my reasons for producing this conception. 
The discussion includes not only the research questions that motivated the work, but also the 
research process that gave rise to the questions themselves. 
1.4 Research Questions and Objectives 
My Marxist interpretation of transparency differs significantly from earlier scholarship. The 
difference is mainly explained by the objectives I have pursued. In this section, I consider 
how these objectives contributed to the theorization outlined above and present several 
research questions that characterize my approach to transparency. 
My conception of transparency is causal, theory-laden, and socio-naturally embedded. 
Previous approaches have tended to proffer less theoretically integrated conceptual 
frameworks,75 less causally oriented descriptive historical genealogies,76 and less socio-
naturally embedded formal models.77 The main reason for these differences between my 
approach and those of others is related to the social struggles that conceptions of transparency 
inevitably participate in. I make a conscious effort to side with the exploited and oppressed 
against exploiters and oppressors, the most important of which are the owners of the means of 
production. This is not the case with most transparency research, which necessarily affects 
the ways the research is conducted. 
Consider, for example, formal models of transparency that draw on neoclassical economics. 
These models usually have objectives such as “underpinning policy” and “informing the 
design of transparency reform,”78 dovetailing Jeremy Bentham’s famous transparency 
conception.79 They adopt, in C. W. Mills’s words, the “perspective of the bureaucrat.”80 From 
                                              
75 Birchall 2014. 
76 Hood 2006b; Cajvaneanu 2011. 
77 Kolstad & Wiig 2009: 522–523. 
78 Kolstad & Wiig 2009: 521. 
79 Bentham thought that transparency forces public officials and prisoners to act as they should. Bentham 1791: 
40; Bentham 1830: 352. He also argued that “publicity,” by which he means roughly the same as with 
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this perspective, the history of transparency and the social reasons for its existence are 
irrelevant: it suffices that transparency prompts people to behave as intended under the given 
circumstances. In reality, however, transparency only functions as expected as long as the 
causal logic of the situation does not change in ways that invalidate the ideologist’s model. If 
one sets out to change this causal logic, a historical and social understanding of transparency 
becomes necessary. 
I am not interested in helping bureaucrats. My normative objective is to understand how 
specific forms of ideological transparency are determined by and contribute to exploitation81 
and oppression,82 and how social transparency might instead help prevent these. The theory 
presented here is therefore necessarily more elaborate than a formal model that postulates 
correlations, since it also identifies the causal structures that explain the correlations. 
For me, the point of studying society is to make it better. The main emancipatory dimension 
of my dissertation is to consider what role transparency might have in the transition to a 
society without the capitalist mode of production, as well as how appearance planning might 
function in a society without exploitation and oppression. It is important to get this right. As I 
argue in Chapter 4, the way in which appearances and their planning is organized constrains 
and enables the organization of society more broadly. 
The research questions outlined above are not the ones I initially set out to answer. In the 
section that follows, I show how I reached this outcome after redirecting my research away 
from livestock welfare questions towards theorizing transparency in a new way. 
1.4.1 Research Process 
The various parts of this dissertation approach the transparency question in different ways. 
While the previously published journal articles are empirical inquiries, Chapters 1 and 2 re-
theorize transparency based on the findings of the articles. Below, I first describe how the 
                                                                                                                                              
“transparency,” ensures the confidence and consent of the governed as well as the expression of correct electoral 
preferences. See Baume & Papadopoulos 2018. 
80 Mills & Gitlin 2000: 114. 
81 I define exploitation as people appropriating, for their exclusive disposal, the outcomes of other people’s 
labor. Exploitation is most importantly expressed as profit under the capitalist mode of production. This is my 
interpretation of Marx’s conception. See, e.g., Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, pp. 227, 279. 
82 I understand oppression simply as a catch-all category for different forms of domination and subordination, 
such as the everyday subordination of women to men. This seems to also be how Marx uses the word. See, e.g., 
Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, p. 9. 





research I conducted for the articles led me to question transparency. I then discuss why I 
came to re-theorize the empirical results in the context of Marxist theory in particular. 
When I started working on Article I in the early 2010s, my plan was to study livestock 
welfare policy. More specifically, I wanted to understand how livestock welfare had become 
commodified—sold on store shelves in the form of certified animal products. This seemed 
like a self-evidently suitable topic for a political scientist interested in the economy, since 
states were, and still are, the main drivers of welfare commodification. 
I started by reading everything I could find on this topic: policy documents, NGO brochures, 
grant decisions, welfare research and its history, animal history, certification protocols, 
advertisements, and so on. I also did a few background interviews with researchers and met 
with animal welfare professionals at the European Commission and Parliament. Everyone I 
met and most of what I read claimed that commodification empowers consumers by giving 
them more information to back up their free choices. The word transparency was 
omnipresent. 
I soon realized that the official version of the story was half-true at best. Examples like the 
Welfare Quality and WelFur systems (see Section 1.2.1) convinced me that the 
commodification process was in fact selective and distortive in its portrayal of livestock 
production. It also seemed to me that this distortive character was difficult to get rid of. For 
instance, if half of European livestock production units were “unacceptable” in terms of 
citizen jurors’ and welfare scientists’ views of welfare,83 surely livestock producers and 
retailers would throw their substantial weight against any attempts to honestly communicate 
this fact. 
There was, in other words, a major obstacle standing in the way of the much-touted welfare 
transparency. This did nothing to obstruct the implementation of welfare transparency, 
however, which simply accommodated the livestock factories by watering down the 
definition of welfare that had been established by research. In Article II, I discovered a 
similar pattern by closely analyzing educational EU-funded video games targeted at welfare 
producers and consumers. I concluded that these games, too, had been designed to 
accommodate the grisly reality of livestock production (see Section 3.2). However, the games 
and the welfare measures were not fantasy without any basis in reality. They were a biased 
                                              
83 Miele et al. 2011: 115. 
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compromise that mediated underlying conflicts, and therefore also carried misleading traces 
of the experiences of livestock in factories.  
As I was writing Articles I and II, it slowly dawned on me that similar processes had been 
going on for a long time, and were also currently going on all around me. Since the days of 
liberalism’s slave-owning, colonialist, genocidal founding fathers, the ideal of individual 
freedom has been based in practice on exploitation and oppression.84 I had documented the 
emergence and specifics of one form of the contradiction between individual freedom and 
unfreedom, but had not really explained why this contradiction exists in the first place, or 
why it is so prevalent. 
I felt that I needed a level of abstraction beyond the question of livestock welfare to properly 
broach the broader contradiction at stake. This is why I started focusing on transparency. For 
Article III, I produced a brief history of ideological transparency. This confirmed my 
suspicion that transparency works in a similar manner in many contexts and was not limited 
to livestock welfare. I had discovered a concept that allowed me to extend and go beyond my 
previous work. 
Working on Article III, I also discovered that much of the existing literature on social 
transparency was nearly useless for my purposes. It was obvious to me, both from the history 
of transparency and from the livestock welfare case, that transparency ought not to be 
theorized in terms of seeing well. This was, however, what virtually everyone else seemed to 
be doing. In reading physics, I also realized that the social-scientific portrayal of transparency 
was completely at odds with the phenomenon of physical transparency. This begged the 
question of why our physical intuition has been mobilized in such a misleading way. I 
increasingly viewed the academic social transparency literature as an ideological form that 
needed to be criticized and explained. 
This is when I started delving deeper into Marx and Marxism. Marx’s conception of 
appearance was obviously relevant to the question of how transparency can simultaneously 
enable vision and mislead the viewer. It also seemed to me that theorizing transparency 
required the clarification of the relationship between commodities and states, which was at 
the center of Marx’s conceptions of fetishism and ideology. I had not managed, however, to 
                                              
84 Losurdo 2011: 32–38. 





properly link these conceptions with each other while drafting the empirical articles, because 
such articles are of necessity theoretically shallow. 
The result of my re-theorization has been presented briefly above and will be discussed in 
more detail below. The chapter that follows is the most substantial part of the dissertation. In 
it, I reinterpret Marx and Marxists and apply their thinking to the transparency question.
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2 A Marxist Interpretation of Transparency 
Marx’s thought is highly suitable for an analysis of transparency. The reason for this is that 
he provides a causally powerful account of how objects appear in societies dominated by the 
capitalist mode of production. In other words, Marx accounts for several widespread and 
efficacious mechanisms that affect the way things seem to be. He also explains how these 
appearances contribute to the way society works. 
Leaning so heavily on Marx and Marxism may seem odd to many contemporary scholars 
who reached their intellectual maturity around the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
For a long time, even left-leaning academics thought that Marxism was a thing of the past. 
The situation is now rapidly changing, and yearly Web of Science mentions of “Karl Marx” 
are at an all-time high.85 It seems prudent, however, to revisit some of the arguments that 
have been used to justify abandoning Marx. 
Perhaps the most common counter-argument to using Marx’s theory is the Soviet 
abomination.86 This counter-argument is mistaken. Marx’s theory remains politically and 
scientifically salient precisely because the Soviet experiment failed miserably—that is, 
because the capitalist mode of production prevailed and remains dominant and unchanged in 
its central aspects. To abandon Marx because of the Soviet Union would amount to 
discarding a powerful scientific theory because of its bad consequences. Few would similarly 
favor abandoning physics because of the atom bomb or biology because of eugenics. Marx’s 
theory is practically and epistemically strong with respect to present society, and this strength 
calls for its application, though with one eye on past failures. 
Of course, many scholars also challenge the explanatory power of Marx’s theory. The main 
argument on this front nowadays is that Marx’s thinking was bound to nineteenth-century 
England.87 His theories are thus supposedly not applicable to our era of robots,88 
environmental catastrophe,89 and the home office90. The problem with such claims is that 
they typically do not show how exactly these developments upend Marx. A robot, for 
instance, replaces present labor with machines (i.e. past labor) in exactly the manner that 
                                              
85 Clarivate Analytics 2018. 
86 von Mises 2007: 133; Hudelson 1993: 189–190. 
87 Sperber 2014: 7–12. 
88 Social Democracy for the 21st Century 2015. 
89 Cole 1993: 37. 
90 Fumagalli & Mezzadra 2010: 238. 





Marx argued capital is inclined to do.91 Marx also knew that a lack of social production 
planning coupled with the competitive pursuit of profit leads to environmental destruction.92 
And just as competition tends to associate the prices of factory products with necessary labor 
time, so too does this tendency affect the products of the home office.93 This is not to say, of 
course, that nothing has changed. It is just that the dynamics that Marx attempted to analyze 
and intervene in remain largely unscathed by time. This is unfortunate for Marx’s politics, but 
fortunate for his explanatory power. 
Many scholars would also claim that they have methodologically eclipsed Marx. Today’s 
academic folk wisdom says Marx’s work is essentialist and teleological,94 reductionist,95 
anthropocentric,96 deterministic,97 and a priori,98 among other criticisms. Usually such 
proclamations stem from outright ignorance of Marx’s thought and his way of conducting 
research.99 I suspect that the main reason for this ignorance is academic competition.100 As is 
well known, academia rewards scholars who publish incessantly and destroys anyone who 
spends years studying dusty tomes.101 Under such conditions, the winning career strategy is 
to dismiss exacting grand theories on the grounds of methodological dogma and to apply 
quick and commonsensical conceptual frameworks instead. 
The proliferation of ignorant critiques presents the unrepentant Marxist with a conundrum: 
On the one hand, sweeping accusations like “essentialism” and “reductionism” also have an 
impact on my work, and hence it would behoove me to rebut such claims. On the other hand, 
taking the time and space to respond to all such charges hinders the positive development of 
Marxist theory. 
My primary response to this challenge is to quote Marx generously, which in itself disproves 
most of the half-baked methodological arguments against him. Second, I present empirical 
                                              
91 Roberts 2018a. 
92 Saito 2016. 
93 Shaikh 2016: 20. 
94 Choat 2010: 2–3. 
95 Barrett 1992: 139. 
96 Dolphijn & van der Tuin 2012: 41. 
97 Heilbroner 1967: 342. 
98 Dolphijn & van der Tuin 2012: 41. 
99 For discussions on Marx’s essentialism and teleology, see Meikle 1985. On reductionism, see Sheehan 2017. 
On determinism, see Resnick & Wolff 1982. 
100 Other possible reasons might be the difficulty of Marx’s texts, the memory of the Soviet Union, and class 
struggle. Properly accounting for this phenomenon would require a historical comparative study of the 
institutional arrangements of professional scholarship. 
101 Edwards & Roy 2016: 2; Fang & Casadevall 2015. 
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and theoretical evidence for Marx’s conceptions as I go along. Third, I explicitly discuss 
some methodological issues that are particularly pivotal to this dissertation and show how 
they have been treated in the history of Marxism (see Sections 2.1.2, 2.2.2, 2.3.2, and Chapter 
3). I only tackle the methodological charges that are most important to my own work, 
however, and leave the rest for others. 
Overall, I consider Marx’s theory widely applicable today. This is because it grasps dynamics 
that are central to societies dominated by the capitalist mode of production. As an added perk, 
Marx and Engels also give some clues for the study of non-capitalist societies. This does not 
mean, however, that everything can be derived from Marx’s theory. The reason why I use 
expressions like “societies dominated by the capitalist mode of production” over “capitalism” 
is precisely to signal that society extends beyond the currently dominant mode of production. 
Although that which is “beyond” will always stand in some relation to production, Marx did 
not theorize everything about all societies. 
I am not attempting to theorize everything, either. I focus on only a few aspects of social 
transparency, but I contend that these aspects are particularly relevant to explaining social 
transparency and changing society. Such a focused and causal approach may seem overly 
simplistic or reductionist to a reader schooled in today’s humanities, which tend to emphasize 
explanatory complexity and theoretical eclecticism over simple, integrated explanations.102 
However, I do not mean to argue that individualist transparency is completely and forever 
accounted for by my conception. I offer the theories of appearance, fetishism, and ideology as 
partial but important explanations for the different forms that individualist transparencies take 
in different historical and social circumstances.103 The articles temper the simplicity of this 
approach by presenting more historically-nuanced and concrete investigations. 
In this dissertation, I lay the groundwork for a Marxist conception of transparency. Neither 
Marx nor Marxists have anything resembling a theory of transparency. Marx commonly uses 
the word durchsichtig in a colloquial way to imply that something can be seen well, 
metaphorically speaking, and a similar practice is widespread among Marxists.104 This 
commonsensical interpretation of transparency, although supported by our everyday 
                                              
102 E.g., Sil & Katzenstein 2010; Kroos 2012; Brković 2018. 
103 In this, I largely concur with Kurki’s critical realist interpretation of causation and explanation. See Kurki 
2008: 168–174. 
104 E.g., Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, p. 90; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.10, p. 78; Adorno 1970–1986: 
vol. 8, p. 467. 





experience, is misleading both physically and socially. I argue that Marx’s conception of 
appearance, which does not necessarily imply seeing well, should also be applied to 
theorizing transparency. 
In interpreting Marx, I mainly read the English Collected Works together with the Marx-
Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA) which Marxologists consider the best source for the 
German originals. If there seems to be a discrepancy that is relevant to my argument, I note it. 
For direct quotations, I give page numbers to both editions.105 
My theory builds on the three major concepts appearance, ideology, and fetishism, as well as 
two minor concepts, society building and objective thought form. Each of the sections in this 
chapter focuses on one major concept; the minor concepts are outlined only alongside the 
major ones. I introduce the major concepts in order of decreasing abstraction: I begin with 
appearance, which is an extremely abstract concept operating at the level of evolutionary 
history; I then move on to ideology, which operates at the level of the history of class society; 
and I conclude with fetishism, which is most relevant to societies in which production for 
exchange is widespread, especially societies dominated by the capitalist mode of production. 
All three sections have a similar structure: First, I introduce the most common connotations 
ascribed to the concept in everyday parlance and in the academic literature. I then interpret 
Marx’s work on the subject, after which I situate my own interpretation within Marxism. 
Finally, I lay out the contribution my interpretation makes to the theory of transparency. 
2.1 What is Appearance? 
According to OxfordDictionaries.com, appearance means “the way that someone or 
something looks, an impression given by someone or something, an act of arriving or 
becoming visible.”106 These everyday connotations of the word have certain theoretical 
                                              
105 A substantially improved English translation is available for parts of the so-called German Ideology 
manuscripts, which I used instead of the Collected Works edition. Although newer translations also exist of 
some of Marx’s and Engels’s other texts, I do not think that the improvements in these newer editions override 
the benefit of consistency that comes with using the Collected Works. This is not to understate the effects of 
poor translations on the English-speaking world’s reception of Marx; see Haug 2017. Since I checked my 
interpretations against the German originals, however, the problem is not urgent here. In cases where the 
Gesamtausgabe edition has not yet published the originals, I used the Werke edition and made note of it in the 
footnotes. 
106 oxforddictionaries.com 2018. 
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advantages.107 First, appearances are always distinct from the objects and observers 
themselves. If someone says that something merely “appears” to be such-and-such, for 
instance, the implication is that you had better watch out for the real thing. Appearances may 
deceive.108 Second, an appearance is not baseless. It is never entirely disconnected from its 
object, like an illusion, hallucination, or fantasy might be: there is always something that 
appears in an appearance. Third, it would be incoherent to discuss something’s appearance 
without assuming that there is an observer or something else to which it appears. 
Appearances imply observers. 
The argument in this section is that Marx’s conception of appearance is largely consistent 
with the three aspects of the dictionary’s everyday, intuitive definition, although Marx also 
expands upon and departs from everyday intuition substantially. My own contribution is to 
add transparency—which occurs between the observer and the object—as an aspect of the 
process of appearance. Transparency preserves traces that objects have left on their 
environment in such a way that subjects can observe them. Transparency does not guarantee 
that a subject is able to access the essence of an object, however. 
No systematic Marxist theory of appearance exists. There is a vast literature on related topics, 
however, such as the history of the concept of appearance within Marx and Marxism,109 the 
role of appearance in specific social forms such as fetishism110 and ideology,111 the Marxist 
philosophy of science and knowledge,112 and the relationship of practice and appearance.113 I 
interpret these as aspects of a more abstract theme of appearance. 
I begin by showing what Marx wrote about appearance, especially in his early work. After, I 
discuss Marx’s conception of trace, or Spur, and show how this relates to transparency and 
appearance. Having discussed Marx, I move on to the treatment of similar issues by Engels, 
                                              
107 Other words that are used to discuss the way things seem to be include illusion, for instance, which suggests 
that things are very different or even detached from what they seem to be. Hacker 1987: 15–16. Construction 
indicates that interpreters are the active party in appearances, perhaps building objects in their thoughts, 
communication, or other social relations. Berger & Luckmann 1966: 13–16. Appearance is more conducive to a 
realist interpretation that nonetheless includes the process of objectification. 
108 The thirteenth-century Old French aparance already has connotations like “pomp.” Online Etymology 
Dictionary 2018. 
109 Haug 1997; Goldway 1967. 
110 Geras 1971: 77–81. 
111 Amlinger 2014: 17–52; Torrance 1995: 46. 
112 Marsh & Tant 1999: 109. 
113 Oittinen 2015: 30–32. 





Marcuse, and Althusser. Their respective works have inspired three highly influential ways of 
conceiving appearance within Marxism. 
2.1.1 Marx on Appearance 
The word appearance, or Erscheinung, recurs throughout Marx’s work. He probably adopted 
it from Kant or Hegel, both of whom use it to discuss comparable issues.114 Marx first makes 
extensive use of the concept in his 1841 doctoral dissertation on natural philosophy, and he 
continued to expand upon his treatment of the topic throughout his life. 
Marx’s approach is peculiar in that he stresses the necessity of getting beyond appearances to 
the essences of objects while simultaneously claiming that objects include their subject side 
process of objectification. In other words, subjects and objects are inseparable. Marx also 
emphasizes the sensuousness of appearances, but claims that sense data requires 
interpretation. Marx’s conception of appearance thus grapples with some of the oldest issues 
in the history of philosophy.115 
I focus here on the way Marx theorizes appearance in his earliest works, which he produced 
during the first half of the 1840s. I pay particular attention to his dissertation, which is the 
longest sustained discourse on appearance in Marx’s entire oeuvre. The dissertation’s focus 
on natural philosophy, especially what we now call physics, is interesting from my 
perspective, since my interpretation of social transparency has been inspired by optical 
transparency. The physics focus also distinguishes the dissertation from Marx’s later 
discussions on appearance, which are primarily related to social topics like ideology and 
                                              
114 Haug 1997: 812. 
115 In order to survive, organisms must act using their senses (locate sustenance, evade predators, and so on). 
This element of reproduction is, in my view, the fundamental reason why the relationship between sensing, 
interpreting, and action—the question of appearance—is a perennial issue. Objects and subjects become 
inseparable, furthermore, because sensing affects its objects. For instance, plants and animals evolve distinctive 
coloration, camouflage, or social signaling that corresponds with a subject’s sensory faculties. In its most 
abstract aspect, the appearance question thus operates at the level of evolutionary history, since inanimate things 
do not have signaling and self-sustenance processes (they need not survive) and thus cannot appear to each 
other. The appearance question was raised to a philosophical level already by ancient Indian and Greek thinkers. 
See Surendranath Dasgupta 1933: IX; O’Grady 2018: sec. 6. One prominent way of categorizing philosophies 
that deal with appearance has been based on, roughly, to what degree things are understood to be as they seem 
to humans. The conventional category of “realism” refers to philosophies that emphasize that although things 
are what they are (“mind-independent”), they may seem different. See, for example, Brock & Mares 2007: 4. 
“Anti-realisms” and “idealisms,” by contrast, emphasize the role that humans, their creations, or extra-natural 
forces play in shaping appearances and focus less on the things that appear. See, for example, Putnam 1981: 49–
74. Another conventional way of categorizing the history of philosophy is along the axis of “empiricism” and 
“rationalism.” Here, the key question is the degree to which philosophers believe that humans know about 
things by sensing (empiricists) or by thinking (rationalists). See Markie 2015. The popularities of these positions 
have varied by location, time, and social sphere, and sometimes questions of appearance have even been 
forcibly suppressed. See Goldway 1967: 428–430. 
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fetishism. I largely disregard these mature works in this section, because I discuss them 
extensively later in connection with the concepts of ideology and fetishism. I argue, however, 
that Marx’s intuition concerning appearance remains recognizably similar throughout his 
works, although his later treatments are more concrete than the early ones. This is a rather 
unusual position within the history of Marxism, which has tended to dismiss Marx’s 
dissertation as a deeply idealist allegory on social issues in the guise of natural philosophy, 
and hence unrepresentative of his later thought.116 
Marx’s 1841 dissertation reads like a prolonged comparison of two interpretations of 
appearance. It contrasts ancient Greek philosophers Democritus (c. 460—c. 370 BC) and 
Epicurus (341–271 BC), who Marx claims are “diametrically opposed” on the issue of 
appearance.117 Marx considers Epicurus’s views on appearance superior, primarily because 
Democritus disconnects sensuous qualities from objects. In my vocabulary, Democritus’s 
process of appearance does not preserve traces of the object for the subject: 
Democritus turns the sensuous world into subjective semblance [Schein], Epicurus turns it into 
objective appearance [objektiven Erscheinung]. And here [Epicurus] differs quite consciously, 
since he claims that he shares the same principles but that he does not reduce the sensuous 
qualities to things of mere opinion.118 
Democritus’s subjectivism stems from his theory of the atom. The Democritean atomic 
substrate consists of lonely blobs of essence that are not discernible to the senses, whereas 
apparent things have manifold relations and qualities.119 Therefore, atoms-in-themselves 
must be self-contained entities that have no qualities contingent on anything beyond 
                                              
116 Lenin 1960–1970: vol. 21, p. 46; Lifshitz 1973: 28–29; Oizerman 1977: 50. One reason for the Marxist 
interpretation of Marx’ dissertation might be that the surviving parts of the dissertation were first published in 
1902, when Marxism was already well underway, and Lenin soon flagged the text as idealist. See Lenin 1960–
1970: vol. 21, p. 46. I find Lenin’s interpretation dubious, however. Marx’s dissertation focuses almost 
exclusively on the behaviors of things like atoms and planets, with nary a word on Hegelian spirits or similar 
apparitions. Marx does theorize atoms and atom theories in interconnection. This is not idealism, however, but a 
necessary feature of any rigorous scientific endeavor. In my view, Marx’s dissertation should be read as a 
natural-philosophical work with a repressed social undertone. By “repressed,” I mean that Marx purposefully 
and explicitly limits his inquiry to philosophy proper, although he does mention that Greek society and thought 
developed in tandem. Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 1, pp. 35, 66. Academic requirements probably motivated 
this restriction. As Marx himself regretfully notes, the work might have been more “scientific” and less 
“pedantic” “if its primary purpose had not been that of a doctor's dissertation” in philosophy. Marx & Engels 
1975–2005: vol. 1, p. 29; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. 1, p. 13. Despite its one-sided philosophical focus, 
however, one would have to adopt a peculiar definition of idealism or anti-realism to subsume this work under 
those terms without consternation. 
117 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 1, p. 38; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.1, p. 25. 
118 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 1, p. 40; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.1, p. 26. Emphasis in original. 
119 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 1, p. 39. 





themselves.120 Atomic essences must be cleanly split from the appearances accessible to 
human senses.121 Democritus breaks the connection between subject and object that 
transparency requires. 
By contrast, Marx interprets Epicurus as arguing that atomic essences and their appearances 
are distinct yet inseparable. Epicurus’s concept of the atom thus includes both disconnected-
hidden and related-apparent aspects.122 In the related-apparent aspect, atoms emanate eidola, 
or images, which “penetrate into the senses and in precisely this way allow the objects to 
appear.”123 Humans cannot directly see individual atoms in their eidola, however, because 
our senses only apprehend atoms in their related state as larger objects. This gives atoms a 
disconnected-hidden aspect, an essence. Thus, to unwitting observers, atoms appear in a one-
sided way, and their hidden individuality must be teased out by reason: 
[In Epicurus’s work,] the nature of appearance is justly posited as objective [objektiv], 
sensation is justly made the real criterion of concrete nature, although the atom, its foundation, 
is only perceived through reason.124 
Although Marx largely approves of Epicurus’s take on appearance, he expresses great 
discontent with his insufficient empirics, epistemic relativism, and atomistic essentialism. 
Marx ridicules Epicurus as an armchair philosopher who disregards evidence and favors 
explanations that do not disturb the thinker;125 he lambasts Epicurus for placing all 
conceivable explanations on equal footing and being indifferent to real causes;126 and he 
criticizes Epicurus for an “atomistic consciousness”127 that projects individuality as the 
fundamental essence of reality, the result being that “all true and real science is done away 
with inasmuch as individuality does not rule within the nature of things themselves.”128 In 
other words, while Marx attacks Democritus as a shallow empiricist, he is not satisfied with 
                                              
120 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 1, p. 61. 
121 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 1, p. 55. 
122 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 1, p. 60. 
123 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 1, p. 65; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.1, p. 50. Marx only mentions this 
concept in passing, which is unfortunate given that it is crucial to the question of transparency. As I show later, 
however, Marx uses the word trace, especially in his mature works, to discuss something that occupies a similar 
position as eidola between objects and observers within appearance. 
124 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 1, p. 64; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.1, p. 49. 
125 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 1, p. 41. 
126 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 1, p. 45. 
127 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 1, p. 61; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.1, p. 46. 
128 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 1, p. 72; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.1, p. 57. 
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Epicurus’s unscientific and atomistic dogma, either.129 Epicurus wishes to objectify 
objectification, but does not actually do this in a sufficiently scientific way. 
It is difficult to situate Marx’s dissertation within conventional philosophical typologies such 
as realism and idealism. He definitely thinks that there is more to objects than human 
categories or perceptual faculties. Marx does not, however, suggest that there is a 
predetermined world of objects “out there” waiting to be discovered by humans, as realists 
often argue.130 Epicurus earns Marx’s praise for including both the essence and the 
appearance as moments of the atom itself, for instance, whereas Democritus “only objectifies 
the one moment.”131 This relational conception is crucial to my theory of transparency, as I 
show in Section 2.1.3. 
The main contours of Marx’s intuition about Erscheinung are visible in his dissertation. One 
way of expressing Marx’s basic idea would be to say that objects and observers give rise to 
appearances together. Object, appearance, and observer are moments or aspects of the same, 
indissociable process or continuum that takes place when an object appears to someone or 
something. This does not mean, however, that object, appearance, and observer are the same 
thing. The essence of an object may not be evident from its appearance to a given kind of 
subject, for instance, and appearances may therefore deceive. Objects are not exhausted by 
their appearances, and only in this sense can they be considered “mind-independent.”132 
A strikingly similar set of issues is still present in quantum physics today. We now know that 
measurement appears to collapse un-objectified wave functions into objects with classical 
characteristics, such as electrons with determinate positions. Physicists even use the word 
appearance here with a decidedly Marxian slant: “Why does the world appear classical to us, 
in spite of its supposed underlying quantum nature?”133 Many different theoretical answers to 
this question have been proposed, but several of them assume that the observer, appearance, 
                                              
129 Certain aspects of Marx’s readings of Democritus and Epicurus have been questioned. I disregard the 
question of the veracity of Marx’s reading here, since I am only interested in Marx’s own views. See Bailey 
1928; Heiskanen 2010: 174–202. 
130 Brock & Mares 2007: 34–35. 
131 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 1, p. 62; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.1, p. 48. 
132 For other examples of Marx’s intuition on this topic, see Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 3, pp. 336–338; 
Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 28, p. 29. In a 1844 manuscript on private property and communism, by way of 
illustration, Marx argues that in a communist society, people would more easily notice that they participate 
actively and socially in objectification, and it would be obvious that “[t]o the eye an object [Gegenstand] comes 
to be other than it is to the ear, and the object of the eye is another object than the object of the ear.” Marx & 
Engels 1975–2005: vol. 3, p. 301; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.2, p. 393.  
133 Schlosshauer 2005: 1268–1269. 





and observed must be thought of as aspects of a whole rather than as independently existing, 
ontologically separable things.134 
For a more everyday example, consider perception. We now know that color perception—
that is, which colors people see and how—is affected not only by evolutionary history and 
physics, but also by learned color words.135 Another example of the relationality of 
perception is provided by experimental evidence that shows that when bilingual people are 
primed in English, they tend to see video footage in terms of the present (e.g., they see a 
person walking). When they are primed in German, they more often see the same video in 
terms of future outcomes (a person walking towards a building).136 
This kind of evidence indicates the importance of maintaining a close connection between the 
subject and the object in the theory of appearance.137 Appearance is neither about teasing out 
the truth about a pre-existing object nor about the subject constructing objects. It would make 
little sense, for instance, to say that it is wave functions, rather than particles, that “truly 
exist,” or that apples are “in themselves” or “independently” red rather than carmine. It would 
be equally foolish, however, to conceive of color in abstraction from the objective process of 
appearance, or to disregard the essential relations that sustain an object’s coloration. 
Marx later expands his focus from abstract philosophical subjects and objects to the broader 
social-natural frameworks within which appearances occur. This shift of focus is evident, for 
instance, in the so-called Feuerbach theses from 1845, in which Marx asserts that “the 
essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the 
ensemble of the social relations.”138 Or, as the tenth thesis puts it, “the standpoint of the new 
[materialism] is human society, or social humanity.”139 To understand appearances, one must 
                                              
134 E.g., Giacosa 2014; Barad 2007. For a Marxist critique of Barad, see Haug 2016. 
135 Regier & Kay 2009. 
136 Athanasopoulos et al. 2015: 5. The researchers argue that the result could be explained by the differences 
between the two languages used in priming subjects: English distinguishes ongoing action with the “-ing” form, 
whereas German does not have this feature: ”ein Mensch geht” literally translates as “a person walks,” and it is 
not possible to emphasize that the person is geht-ing right now. This interpretation could perhaps be 
strengthened by a social-psychological component. 
137 Maintaining a close connection between the subject and the object was quite common in eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century German philosophy, although these conceptions were usually more idealistic than Marx’s. 
See Haug 1997: 812. 
138 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 5, p. 4; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. IV.3, pp. 20–21. Marx’s social analysis 
of appearance distinguishes his approach from pragmatist philosophies, which may be reminiscent of Marx’s in 
some other respects. I delve further into the relationship of Marxism and pragmatism in Section 3.3. See also 
Novack 1975; Koivisto & Pietilä 1996. 
139 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 5, p. 5; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. IV.3, p. 21. 
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expand the analytical framework to study the social circumstances that bring about forms of 
objectification. To extend the example above, it is not enough to show that languages affect 
perception—the point is to show how social differences give rise to linguistic differences. 
The sections on ideology and fetishism show how Marx accomplishes this concretization of 
his analysis of appearance. 
In his dissertation, Marx uses the word Erscheinung to describe processes that link the object 
with the subject.140 In my conception, this linkage between subject and object is established 
by traces left by objects that are preserved for the subject. In the section that follows, I 
outline the textual basis of this conception of trace in Marx’s writings. 
2.1.1.1 Marx on Traces 
Marx often uses the word trace (Spur) to refer to marks that can be interpreted in terms of 
objects. He likewise uses the verb spüren in reference to searching for and interpreting said 
marks, or “tracing.” Marx’s “trace” thus refers to what happens between the observer and the 
object in the process of appearance, where ancient Greeks placed the eidola. In my view, 
transparency resides precisely in this space. It preserves traces of an object such that the 
object may appear to an observer. 
Marx’s first extensive use of trace in theoretical texts on economic appearance141 is in his 
manuscripts of 1857–58, now known as the Grundrisse. Marx notes that “in monetary 
relationships simply conceived, all immanent contradictions in bourgeois society appear to be 
extinguished.”142 The reason for this, we learn, is that “[a]s subjects of exchange, [people’s] 
relation is therefore that of equality. It is impossible to find any trace of a difference, let alone 
of a conflict between them, not even a distinction.”143 Traces of social contradictions are 
erased by exchange, in other words, which is why they cannot appear. Money is opaque, in 
this sense, to the subjects of exchange. 
                                              
140 Marx seems to often (but not always) use Schein without a specified object, as in “illusion,” whereas 
Erscheinung is often (but not always) accompanied by a specification of that-which-appears (misleading though 
the appearance may be). See, for example, Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.10 pp. 269, 484. For a different 
interpretation, see Hanzel 2010: 514. 
141 This is not the first time Marx uses trace to discuss appearance. For instance, in a newspaper article from 
1842, he notes that living organisms function as integrated wholes in the sense that they make “all trace” of the 
separateness of their elements disappear, which Marx argues is an example of nature “appearing” as a “living 
unity.” However, remarks in which the relationship between trace and appearance is so explicit are rare in 
Marx’s early works. Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 1, p. 295; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.1, p. 275. 
142 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 28, p. 172; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.1.1, p. 162. Emphasis in the 
original. 
143 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 28, p. 173; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.1.1 p. 165. Emphasis in the 
original. 





Marx makes numerous similar remarks in his mature works.144 In Capital, volume 1, Marx 
argues, for instance, that “the wage form thus extinguishes every trace of the division of the 
working day into necessary labour and surplus labour, into paid and unpaid labour. All labour 
appears as paid labour.”145 The wage is like an opaque film that is itself readily visible but 
blocks traces of exploitation. This distribution of opacity (between observer and exploitation) 
and transparency (between observer and wage) gives rise to the misleading appearance of 
equal exchange between capitalists and laborers. 
Marx’s conception of trace suggests a comparison with physical transparency: When light 
passes through a physically transparent material, the light’s composition preserves traces of 
things on the other side. The light does not get absorbed, scattered, or otherwise 
randomized.146 This quality is necessary for things to “appear” in Marx’s sense: all labor 
could not appear as paid labor, for instance, if the traces of wages were destroyed alongside 
the traces of exploitation. Radiation that is blocked or randomized cannot give rise to any 
appearances, even inverted ones. 
Importantly, Marx does not consider traces and appearances simply false; instead, it is 
possible to discern objects from them. In Capital, volume 1, Marx notes that that he analyzes 
exchange value “in order to get at [auf die Spur zu kommen] the value that lies hidden behind 
it.”147 The reason such traces are to be found in commodities, furthermore, is that “value can 
only manifest itself [Erscheinen] in the social relation of commodity to commodity.”148 Here, 
Marx’s focus is not on the misleading character of the appearance, but on the fact that the 
value of commodities can be discovered by comparing them in the process of exchange. 
When considered from the point of view of traces, Marx’s critique of the work of political 
economists appears mainly as a description of the distribution of transparencies and opacities 
that is characteristic of the capitalist mode of production. It is beyond the scope of my 
dissertation to fully reconstruct this distribution, but the conceptual interconnections should 
be clear by now: objects appear to observers in traces. 
                                              
144 E.g., Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, pp. 179, 191; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.10, pp. 154, 165. 
145 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, p. 539; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.10, p. 438. 
146 Keating 2001: 13–22; Nair et al. 2008. 
147 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, p. 57; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.10, p. 49. 
148 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, p. 57; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.10, p. 49. 
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I use trace as a theoretical concept.149 In my conception, appearance is only possible if 
transparency preserves traces of objects; consequently, transparency is necessary to 
appearance. It is not a guarantee of adequate perception, however, since transparencies may 
invert objects or otherwise impede perception, and because not all observers can interpret a 
given object from the traces available to them. 
2.1.2 Marxists: Are Objects Mind-Independent? 
One of the main issues that self-described Marxists have disagreed on with respect to 
appearance is the degree to which objects exist independently of observers. Marxists have 
tended to be realists in the sense that they have assumed that there is more to the world than 
human perception and cognition. They have vacillated, however, concerning the specifics. 
Some have defended conventional realist interpretations, while others have proffered more 
subject-heavy models that resemble my own.150 Given the simultaneously subjective and 
objective character of Marx’s conception of appearance (see Section 2.1.1), it is hardly 
surprising that such disagreements have been quite common within the Marxist reception.151 
In the section that follows, I situate my interpretation of Marx’s conception of appearance 
against three key moments in the history of the Marxist reception of Marx. This reception 
history begins with Friedrich Engels, whose emphasis on independent objects greatly affected 
Second International and Soviet conceptions. Next, I review Herbert Marcuse’s 
                                              
149 Marx’s use of trace has been ignored in later Marxism. Many prominent figures of Western intellectual 
history have, however, used the word trace in ways comparable to Marx. See, e.g., Freud 2001: 334–335; 
Derrida 1973: 156; Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 12. 
150 Ruben, for instance, defends a very conventional realist position: he writes about “mind-independent objects” 
that can be grasped by evidence-informed thought. He consequently argues that concepts may “transparently” 
reference reality in the sense that they directly correspond with their objects. Ruben 1979: 19, 150, 160. There is 
some mild textual support in Marx for such a realist Marxism, such as the 1873 afterword to a German edition 
of Capital, which reads: “the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and 
translated into forms of thought [im Menschenkopf umgesetzte und übersetzte Materielle].” Marx & Engels 
1975–2005: vol. 35, p. 19; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.10, p. 17. Marx does not seem to think, however, that 
the human head is completely passive in all of this. After all, his metaphor for appearance is “translation.” 
Subject-heavy Marxisms like Ollman’s seize on this aspect, claiming that reality has “no clear or fixed 
boundaries,” with the result that the labor of “abstracting out” objects from this “loosely structured whole” is 
extremely important. Ollman 2003: 157. This kind of subject-heavy Marxism finds explicit support in, for 
instance, the first of Marx’s 1845 Feuerbach theses. Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 5, p. 3; Marx & Engels 
1975–: vol. IV.3, p. 19. 
151 Colletti 1973; Roberts 1999; Harding 1992; Resnick & Wolff 1982; Araujo 2017. Marx’s conception of 
appearance is scattered across his works, and many of these works have been translated inconsistently, leaving 
plenty of room for interpretation. Translators have often failed to systematically distinguish between Marx’s 
words Erscheinung and Schein (gleam, appearance, sham, pretense), for example. See, e.g., Marx & Engels 
1969: 13. Words directly related to appearance, such as Objekt, Gegenstand (object, item, thing, topic), Wesen 
(essence, being, substance) and Spur (track, trace, trail, sign) have also been translated inconsistently. Marx & 
Engels 1975–2005: vol. 5, p. 3; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. IV.3, p. 19; Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, p. 
57; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.10, p. 49; Fromm 2013: 76. 





phenomenological conception, which rose to great popularity among Western Marxists. I 
conclude by considering Louis Althusser’s interpretation, which contributed to critical 
realism and poststructuralism and is therefore highly influential in today’s social sciences and 
humanities. 
2.1.2.1 Engels: Independent Objects 
Engels’s conception of appearance strongly resembles Marx’s, but differs from it in one 
crucial respect: Engels is a fairly straightforward scientific realist who emphasizes the 
independence of objects from subjects. This realism fed a scientistic attitude in Second 
International Marxism152 and influenced Soviet Marxism153 through Lenin154. Understanding 
Engels’s conception of appearance is thus key to understanding influential strains of 
twentieth-century Marxist thought on appearance. Engels’s conception is also significant for 
my theory of transparency. An Engelsian interpretation of transparency would over-
emphasize truthfulness, but the strength of such an interpretation lies in its rejection of social 
reductionism. 
Engels uses the word Erscheinung to objectivize social processes of appearance in a manner 
reminiscent of Marx: he notes, for instance, that wealth inequality “appears” morally unjust 
only when it is exacerbated to the extreme, but argues that this supposed injustice is actually 
always present to some degree under the capitalist mode of production.155 He also argues that 
although human history “appears” to be governed by chance, it is possible to discover 
patterns that belie this appearance.156 
Engels’s use of trace is likewise recognizable. He uses this word, for example, to characterize 
the way that long-dead forms of family life remain imprinted in the categorization of family 
                                              
152 Oittinen 2015: 30–33. 
153 See Stalin 1975. Thinkers like Nikolai Bukharin and Georgi Plekhanov also incorporated the praxis criterion 
of truth in a fairly recognizable Engelsian form. For an explanation of why Lenin’s antagonist Plekhanov ended 
up influencing later Soviet thought, see Oittinen & Rauhala 2014: 13. 
154 In his Materialism and Empirio-criticism of 1908, Lenin claims that Engels did not “in principle fence off the 
‘appearance’ from that which appears, the perception from that which is perceived, the thing-for-us from the 
‘thing-in-itself.’” He argues, however, that Engels correctly believed that “[t]hings exist independently of our 
consciousness, independently of our sensations, outside of us . . ..” Lenin 1960–1970: vol. 14, p. 103. The riddle 
of appearance can thus be solved by human practice: “For the materialist the ‘success’ of human practice proves 
the correspondence between our ideas and the objective nature of the things we perceive.” Lenin 1960–1970: 
vol. 14, p. 140. It seems that Lenin later developed a more “subject-heavy” interpretation of appearance after 
reading Hegel. Kouvelakis 2007: 181–183; Lenin 1960–1970: vol. 38, p. 212; Lenin 1960–1970: vol. 32, p. 94. 
Lenin’s subjectivist change of heart was largely disregarded by Soviet philosophy, however. 
155 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 25, p. 138; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.27, p. 344. 
156 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 26, p. 387; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.30, p. 151. 
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members.157 Cousins may continue being called “brothers” long after the disappearance of 
actual families in which cousins lived as brothers.158 Today’s category of brother could thus 
be a trace in which the object—an extinct form of family—might appear. Insofar as familial 
categories are not scrambled by the imposition of another language by conquerors, it remains 
possible that extinct family forms (the object) appear in familial categories (the trace) to 
anthropologists (the observers).159 
The main difference between Marx’s and Engels’s conceptions of appearance concerns the 
roles of science, knowledge, and truth. Engels’s position approximates what would now be 
called scientific realism160—that is, the notion that although objects are independent of 
observers, rigorous study produces ever-improving, ever-truer representations of them. He 
further complements this with the view that knowledge is produced in practice.161 The most 
famous of Engels’s formulations on this topic is found in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of 
Classical German Philosophy from 1886. In it, Engels agrees with Feuerbach that “[n]ature 
exists independently of all philosophy.”162 He also argues that nature can be directly grasped 
with the knowledge that emerges from what he calls “practice” and “experimentation and 
industry”:163 
If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural phenomenon by bringing 
it about ourselves, producing it out of its conditions and making it serve our own purposes into 
the bargain, then the ungraspable Kantian “thing-in-itself” is finished.164 
                                              
157 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 26, p. 142; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.29, p. 152. 
158 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 26, pp. 147–148. Engels argued that families took different forms in 
different societies. His conception has been controversial throughout the history of anthropology, but recent 
evidence lends it support. See Knight 2008. 
159 Engels also uses trace to describe many other similar processes. He lauds Bachofen for digging up “traces” 
of old forms of marriage from historical and religious texts. Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 26, p. 142; Marx & 
Engels 1975–: vol. I.29, p. 152. He evaluates “traces” of communal ownership among early Christians. Marx & 
Engels 1975–2005: vol. 25, p. 96; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.27, p. 302. He notes that horrible living 
conditions leave “traces” on the children of English workers, but argues that it is difficult to interpret these 
traces as evidence of capitalist exploitation. Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 4, p. 400; Marx & Engels 1956–68: 
vol. 4, p. 331. And so on. 
160 See, e.g., Psillos 2005: xvii. 
161 Oittinen argues that Marx probably did not conceive of practice as the general criterion of truth, and that this 
criterion is Engels’s invention. Oittinen instead ascribes to Marx a “socio-philosophical” concept of practice, 
which is not as closely associated with questions of knowledge but is “against both Feuerbach's ahistorical 
anthropologism and the subjectivism of Young Hegelians.” I concur with this assessment. 
162 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 26, p. 364; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.30, p. 131. 
163 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 26. p. 367; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.30, p. 134. 
164 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 26. p. 367; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.30, p. 134. 





Engels’s conception of appearance is roughly that although appearances may be misleading, 
practical investigation and experimentation can get at the pre-existing objects that are “out 
there.” If extrapolated into a theory of transparency, transparency would come to mean what 
it currently does in the common academic sense (see Section 1.1), albeit complemented with 
practice: people actively see well. Under the Engelsian conception, transparency as a 
component of appearance planning could thus only concern the degree to which people are 
enabled to see independently-existing objects through practice. Increasing transparency 
would mean overcoming the knowledge barriers set by the likes of commodity fetishism and 
ideology, arriving at the one truth that corresponds with the object. 
Engels can be lauded for emphasizing veracity and the importance of practice. He is, 
however, incorrect in one important respect: his claim that truthfulness means the 
correspondence of conception with the independently-existing essence of an object. This is 
incorrect because a truthful conception presumes a real appearance relation, and abstracting 
objects out of this relation and taking them as “independent” is tantamount to viewing them 
one-sidedly. Appearance relations may or may not be essential to objects, for instance.165 I 
believe that such attention to the details of a concrete process of appearance—rather than a 
focus on the object—is what Marx means by his demand to conceive of truth “practically,” as 
opposed to “abstractly.”166 
Consider, for instance, a livestock welfare certification system (transparency) and consumers 
who have been trained to interpret (subjects) welfare labels (traces) or recognize production 
                                              
165 Marx discusses an essential appearance relation in the context of a plant and the sun: “The sun is the object 
[Gegenstand] of the plant [which is] an expression of the life-awakening power of the sun, of the sun's objective 
[gegenständlich] essential power.” Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 3, pp. 336–337; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. 
I.2, pp. 408–409. Many plants have evolved to sense the sun’s direction and turn towards it because sunlight 
sustains them. The sun is an essential object of the plant, and a plant that senses the sun’s direction incorrectly 
risks perishing. Suns are not sustained by plants, however, and the relation to the plant is therefore not one of the 
sun’s essential relations. 
166 This demand is found in the second Feuerbach thesis. Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 5, pp. 3–4; Marx & 
Engels 1975–: vol. IV.3, pp. 20–21. However, Marx also discusses the relationship of truth and objectification 
in Capital, noting that after the bourgeoisie had conquered political power, it no longer mattered “whether this 
theorem or that was true,” since only the political expediency of theories was relevant Marx & Engels 1975–
2005: vol. 35, p. 15; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.10, pp. 12–13. Marx’s practice theory of objectification is 
therefore somewhat separate from the question of truthfulness: A truthful practice of objectification might 
systematically account for traces, rigorously theorize them, and get at the essence of the object, whereas other 
practices of objectification might not. Prokopczyk is right in arguing that “[t]he entities [between which the 
relation of truth is supposed to hold] enter the notion of truth as much as does the relation between them.” 
Prokopczyk 1980: 66. Other Marxists have been split between positions that roughly approximate traditional 
correspondence (positivist), coherence (structuralist), and pragmatist (interventionist) theories of truth. See 
Binns 1973. The scope of this dissertation unfortunately does not allow me to delve deeper into the question of 
truth. 
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that can output welfare (an object) (see Section 1.2.1). No matter how true or practically 
efficacious the welfare conceptions embedded in this system are, none of them refers to a 
subjective experience of well-being that pre-exists in the livestock. Welfare as an object is 
only conceivable within the process of appearance, which also includes things like state-
funded scientists that study welfare (see Article I). Furthermore, the appearance relation 
between the consumer and welfare is essential to the welfare object, which is to say that the 
appearance sustains the welfare. If no one recognizes and buys welfare, welfare will not be 
produced or measured and it will cease to exist. Finally, scientifically grasping the essence of 
welfare requires investigating not only the experiences of livestock, but also the social-
natural relations that give rise to and sustain livestock suffering and its regulation, such as the 
competition that drives capitalists to torment sentient livestock for profit. 
Alongside Engels’s conception, there have long existed Marxist interpretations of appearance 
that are less optimistic about the knowledge effects of practice. In the section that follows, I 
briefly review some of the key aspects of such conceptions through the example of Herbert 
Marcuse and phenomenological Marxism. 
2.1.2.2 Marcuse: Social Objects 
Herbert Marcuse’s conception of appearance was inspired by Marx’s early works167 and in 
turn greatly influenced the Western reception of Marx. Marcuse’s early treatment of 
appearance can be seen as “vulgar historicist” in the sense that it focuses on short-term social 
issues. All of his work is also “phenomenological” in the sense that he is interested in how 
things appear from specific social vantage points. The phenomenological aspect is important 
to my conception of transparency, whereas the vulgar historicist early aspect is incompatible 
with it. 
Between 1928 and 1932, Marcuse undertook doctoral studies under Martin Heidegger in 
Freiburg and developed what he called “phenomenological” Marxism. Marcuse was opposed 
to the way in which Engels applied his conception of appearance to everything from nature to 
society. He therefore limited the applicability of his own phenomenology to the realm of 
human history. He thought, for instance, that “mathematical physics” may treat its object as 
                                              
167 Marx’s unfinished manuscripts known as the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 and German 
Ideology (with Engels) were first published during the 1920s and 1930s. These contained many formulations 
that seemed to run against the grain of Marxism–Leninism and found an enthusiastic audience among Western 
Marxists. 





abstracted from all historicity, because “the being of nature is simply not historical.”168 
According to Marcuse, the scope of phenomenology should be restricted to the short-term 
conjunctures of humans and non-humans, or the “nature in its active relationship to a 
particular Dasein.”169 This allowed Marcuse to outline a historicist conception of objects that 
focused on the activity and social situations of the people who objectify: 
In being grasped, however, the objects always already stand in historicity. This sphere of 
historicity already begins, as a concrete historical situation, in the development of the question 
as it seeks the object; it includes the unique individuality of the questioner, the direction of his 
question and the way in which the object first appears.170 
Marcuse argues, for instance, that a factory is not “really the same for the workers employed 
in it, for its owners, for the idle traveler who happens upon it, and for the architect who built 
it,” because “such objects [as factories] are only in an abundance of different meanings.”171 
Marcuse claims not only that social objects are perceived and cognized subjectively, 
however, but that they are also entirely social on the side of their non-subjective constitution: 
The factory expands or closes down or is paralyzed by a strike; it is bought out and remodeled, 
a technical or chemical discovery revolutionizes its operation, interest groups struggle over and 
within it . . . all this happens in and to the factory itself and is actually what constitutes its total 
being, its entire reality.172 
Marcuse thus gets rid of Engels’s independent object and replaces it with a dualistic view of 
society and nature that reduces factories to society.173 
Marcuse revised his position somewhat starting in 1932, attempting to overcome the 
aforementioned dualism by incorporating Marx’s views on the “unity between man and 
                                              
168 Marcuse 2005a: 21. 
169 Marcuse 2005a: 21. 
170 Marcuse 2005a: 19. 
171 Marcuse 2005c: 61–62. 
172 Marcuse 2005c: 62. 
173 Recently, varieties of “new materialism” have attacked Marxism for what they identify as dualism and social 
reductionism. See, e.g., Dolphijn & van der Tuin 2012: 100. Such attacks, which ironically often build upon the 
self-described Marxist philosopher Gilles Deleuze, tend to correctly emphasize the continuity of reality and 
correctly conceive of active non-human objects, although some of them also adopt the Engelsian notion of 
“mind-independent objects.” See, e.g., DeLanda, Protevi, & Thanem 2013: 2. They also tend towards an early-
Marcusian vulgar historicism that overemphasizes short-lived conjunctures over longer-term ones. Such 
thinking is always in danger of turning into conservatism. William Connolly, for instance, acknowledges that his 
“politics of the event” tends to be “linked to a cautious politics of modest change” because things are so 
complexly intertwined that it is hard to predict the consequences of changing something. Connolly 2013: 403. 
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nature“174 into his thinking. The human component tended to remain dominant, however, 
such as in Marcuse’s longing for the “transformation of nature into an environment (medium) 
for the human being.”175 Interestingly for my project, however, he also undertook the quest 
for “a reality formed by the aesthetic sensibility of man.”176 This aesthetic component, 
although overly human-centric, resonates with my presentation of non-capitalist transparency 
in Chapter 4. 
Marcuse’s conception of appearance became quite influential when he ascended to the status 
of the “Guru of the New Left”177. As Piccone puts it, “the ‘phenomenological’ qualification 
appended to Marxism” became a marker of “the political confrontation between New and Old 
Left.”178 Arguably, however, Marx’s conception of appearance would have already accounted 
for many of the central questions of the phenomenological tradition.179 
With respect to social transparency, the strength of Marcuse’s phenomenology lies in his 
emphasis of the necessary limits of appearance. Transparencies cannot hope to erase the 
specificities of the observer–observed relation, contra Engels. Young Marcuse was incorrect, 
however, in detaching subjects, objects, and transparencies from their physical, chemical, and 
biological aspects. Later, his conception continued to revolve around humans, but he 
developed an interesting politics of reconfiguring processes of appearance in both their 
objective and subjective components. 
Mature Marcuse brought his work under the banner of “Marxist humanism,” to which many 
Western Marxists rallied.180 This humanism, in turn, gave rise to an “anti-humanist” reaction, 
the most famous proponent of which was the French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser. 
Althusser wished to abolish Marcusian humanism, but ended up introducing a cleft between 
real and knowledge objects. 
2.1.2.3 Althusser: Independent Real Objects, Dependent Knowledge Objects 
Louis Althusser was aggressively critical of the “humanistic” way in which many of his 
contemporaries emphasized Marx’s early works.181 With respect to appearance, however, 
                                              
174 Marcuse 2005b: 97. 
175 Marcuse 1972: 64. 
176 Marcuse 1969: 31. 
177 Farr 2017. 
178 Piccone 1971: 5. 
179 See Araujo 2017: 102. 
180 See Marcuse 1965. 
181 Althusser 2005: 221. 





Althusser’s conception is best read as a mediation between the Engelsian realist and the 
Marcusian New Left phenomenological conceptions. Althusser abandoned Marx’s 
appearance vocabulary, however, in favor of his own reading that disallows the conception of 
transparency that I propose. This reading would contribute greatly to the poststructuralist and 
critical realist conceptions of appearance that were to become dominant during the next two 
decades. 
Althusser most prominently discusses what I call “appearance” in the works For Marx and 
Reading Capital, both of which were first published in the mid-1960s.182 In a sense, 
Althusser’s treatment is recognizably Engelsian: he argues that “the real” is independent of 
“knowledge,”183 departing from young Marcuse’s radical social reductionism. However, 
Althusser also claims that the inverse is true, or that “no relation exists” between what he 
calls “knowledge objects” and “real objects,”184 and that mature Marx likewise “completely 
isolated” knowledge objects from real objects.185 Althusser thus disagrees forcefully with 
Engels’s scientific realism, or knowledge coming to correspond with its real object. 
Althusser argues that knowledge objects are produced entirely in thought. He emphasizes, 
however, that thought is not disconnected from the rest of reality, but forms one part of a 
societal–natural whole (“structure”). The structure’s parts are connected with each other 
(“articulated”), and change at different rates and affect each other to different degrees. The 
way in which thought is connected to the structure affects the motivation and approach to 
knowledge production (“problematic”). The connections also affect knowledge production’s 
raw materials, which consist of elements like sensuous experience and previous ideological 
conceptions.186 
Althusser argues, in other words, that knowledge production and real objects develop 
according to different logics and temporalities because they are differently connected with the 
rest of reality. This is why the real object develops independently of the knowledge object. 
Although knowledge may appropriate the real object (like all production does), the 
                                              
182 Althusser does not use the word appearance in this connection. 
183 Althusser 2005: 246. 
184 Althusser et al. 2016: pt. 4, chap. 4. In a different passage, Althusser disagrees with himself and posits that 
there is an “unreal” relation between knowledge and real objects, namely “a relation of adequacy or inadequacy 
of knowledge, not a real relation.”Althusser et al. 2016: pt. 4, chap. 3. Althusser never really resolves this 
contradiction, but the assumption of no (real) relation dominates Reading Capital. 
185 Althusser et al. 2016: pt. 4, chap. 9. 
186 Althusser et al. 2016: pt. 1, sec. 11. 
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appropriation is such that real objects neither affect knowledge objects nor become changed 
in the process of knowledge. 
Althusser claims, based on repeated citation of one sentence in the Grundrisse,187 that Marx 
likewise distinguished between a knowledge object and an independent real object. This 
reading is mistaken to the point of dishonesty, since the passage in question clearly contains 
no such distinction.188 The fact that Althusser has no other textual evidence to base his claim 
on indicates that the distinction probably does not exist anywhere in Marx’s works. Quite the 
contrary: Marx repeatedly emphasizes that humans can “work only as Nature does”189 as they 
attempt to change objects of labor; that humans are “helped by natural forces”190 in the 
process of production; and that differences in human ways of measuring objects “has its 
origin partly in in the by diverse nature of the objects to be measured, partly in 
convention.”191 In other words, insofar as production (including knowledge production) is 
hands-on rather than contemplative, there can be no mutual independence between 
knowledge and real objects. Unfortunately, Althusser’s idea of the independent real object 
has proven popular among critical realists.192 
                                              
187 See, for instance, Althusser et al. 2016: pt. 1, secs. 7,10, 11. 
188 The passage in question, from the Grundrisse, is directed against Hegel, whom Marx lambasts for believing 
that “the real was the result of thinking synthesising itself within itself.” It reads as follows: “[A] mental 
concretum, is in fact a product of thinking, of comprehension; yet it is by no means a product of the self-
evolving concept whose thinking proceeds outside and above perception and conception, but of the assimilation 
and transformation of perceptions and images into concepts. The totality as a conceptual totality seen by the 
mind [wie es im Kopf als Gedankenganzes erscheint] is a product of the thinking mind [Kopf], which 
assimilates the world in the only way open to it, . . .. The real subject [Subject] remains outside the mind [Kopf] 
and independent of it—that is to say, so long as the mind [Kopf] adopts a purely speculative, purely theoretical 
attitude.” Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 28, pp. 38–39; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.1.1, p. 37. Althusser 
thus gets it exactly backwards: Marx is arguing against the view that there exists a Hegelian independent real 
subject (not object!)—that is, a subject of history outside people’s heads, experiences, and life-situations. 
Marx’s point, in other words, is that the way in which society gives rise to people’s experiences “must always be 
envisaged as the premiss of conception,” rather than assuming a subject of history beyond people’s social lives. 
This has little to do with “real objects” as opposed to “knowledge objects.” 
189 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, p. 53; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.10, p. 45. 
190 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, p. 53; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.10, p. 45. 
191 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, p. 46; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.10, p. 38. 
192 Bhaskar’s 1975 A Realist Theory of Science adopted Althusser’s distinction between knowledge and real 
objects, using Althusser’s exact words without citation, in the guise of “transitive” and “intransitive” objects. 
Bhaskar 2008: 6; O’ Boyle & McDonough 2016: 157. This distinction explains the widespread critical realist 
attempt to “rescue Marxism from philosophy” by insisting on “the separateness of the world and the knowledge 
of the world.” Joseph 2002: 28. I consider this attempt mistaken, since it implies a one-sided conception of both 
knowledge and of real objects. 





The basic problem with Althusser’s conception, which changed only modestly before his 
death,193 is that it overemphasizes the practices and relations of knowledge production as 
opposed to the way in which real objects work. For instance, Althusser attacks Engels for 
thinking that “the theory of political economy is affected even in its concepts by the peculiar 
quality of real history”—as if real history did not affect the concepts of political economy.194 
Relatedly, Althusser refuses to consider how the articulations of the real object connect with 
those of the knowledge object, i.e. how the “external” relations of these objects interact when 
the objects come together. In Marx, most of this work is done by the appearance–essence 
continuum, such that essence refers to the relations that (in Marx’s view) sustain the object, 
whereas appearance describes how the object side interacts with its subject side. Appearances 
and essences develop organically, such as when changes in production involve changes in 
knowledge (and its relations) that reciprocally affect production (and its relations) (see 
Section 2.3.1.1). Althusser abandons this entire problematic together with Marx’s conception 
of appearance and essence.195 This abandonment later inadvertently aided poststructuralists, 
who vulgarized Althusser in their criticism of Marx’s analysis of the essence of the capitalist 
mode of production.196 
                                              
193 This conception is not entirely invariant throughout Althusser’s works. In his later self-criticism, for instance, 
Althusser emphasized the “relative,” as opposed to total, “autonomy of theory“ with respect to its real objects, 
but he still clung on to the strong distinction between knowledge and real objects. See Althusser 1976: 170. 
194 Althusser et al. 2016: pt. 4, chap. 4. Emphasis in the original. 
195 Althusser famously claimed that Marx’s scientific practice underwent a profound “epistemological break” 
around 1845, but that he continued to use some ideological concepts from his youth in his scientific works. One 
example of this would be Marx’s supposedly “ideological” use of the appearance–essence axis, which Althusser 
claims distinguishes “between the two parts of the real object, of which one (the inessential) is the outer part 
which conceals and envelops the other (the essence or inner part).” This, in turn, ostensibly means that Marx 
attempted to “reduce the phenomenon to the essence, or, as [Marx] puts it . . . the ‘apparent movement to the 
real movement.’” Althusser et al. 2016: pt. 1, sec. 10. Althusser’s claim amounts to saying that Marx wished to 
“reduce,” for instance, prices (appearance) to value and labor time (essence), which is blatantly untrue. Because 
of this misunderstanding, Althusser also misconstrues Marx’s theory of fetishism. He thinks that there is a 
contradiction in Marx’s fetishism theory, which supposedly presents fetishism as “an ‘appearance’, an ‘illusion’ 
arising purely in ‘consciousness,’” while at the same time assuring “us that this appearance is not subjective at 
all, but, on the contrary, objective through and through.” Althusser et al. 2016: pt. 4, chap. 9. Here, Althusser is 
projecting his own mistaken distinction between knowledge and real objects into Marx. Marx does not believe 
in independent objects, however, but discusses these issues in terms such as “objective thought form,” which 
could be characterized, in Althusserian vocabulary, as an articulation of non-independent objective and 
subjective sides. See Section 2.3.2.1.  
196 Choat, for instance, uses Althusser as a crutch in his 2010 book Marx Through Post-Structuralism: “For 
Althusser, idealism is a philosophy of Origins and Ends, relying at once on an ontology—defined here as a 
conception of the essential nature of the world—and a teleology—referring all events to a pre-established 
destiny. In seeking to subvert Marx’s ontology and teleology, the post-structuralists push the critique of his 
idealism further than before . . ..” Choat 2010: 2–3. Having thus overcome Marx’s “idealism,” Choat leaves us 
with a “Marx without ideology, with no dialectic, where the economic is not determinant, where class is not 
centre stage.” Choat 2010: 155. 
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My interpretation is that grasping the object’s essence means relating to the object in a way 
that renders some of the relations sustaining the object apparent. Within the appearance 
relation, however, essences cannot be assumed to be independent or pre-existing, since 
appearance involves new real relations into which the object enters (see Section 2.1.1). 
Appearance is not contemplative but productive and practical. Consequently, my concept of 
transparency is only conceivable within a whole that includes subjects, (real) objects, and 
traces in their interaction. The independence of Althusser’s real object is incompatible with 
this conception. 
This is not mere speculation without practical consequences. Livestock welfare ideologists, 
for example, must often simultaneously intervene in both welfare objects and welfare 
observers to make ideological transparency occur. This is what they do when they educate 
producers to produce welfare and consumers to recognize welfare labels. However, such 
interventions do not render apparent the essence of welfare in capitalist production: livestock 
producers compete for profit and are forced to treat animals reductively if doing so is 
profitable. State livestock welfare regulation is essentially an attempt to cope with the 
consequences of this reduction (see Articles I and II). It would be strange to claim, however, 
that welfare as a real object exists in some sense independently in the livestock, in livestock 
production, or in state policy. If consumers could not “see” the welfare, they would not buy 
it. If consumers did not buy the welfare, its production would cease. This appearance relation 
is essential to the welfare object, and the appearance and the welfare develop organically, 
although welfare remains bound to the requirement that livestock production remain 
profitable. 
2.1.3 Appearance and Transparency 
Three aspects of my theorization of transparency draw from Marx’s conception of 
appearance, departing somewhat from the views of important Marxists. First, transparency 
preserves, for observers, traces of objects across space and time. It would be “one-sided,” in 
Marx’s terms, to speak of “transparency” without reference to the other aspects of 
appearance, such as the objects that leave the traces that transparency retains and the subjects 
that read the traces as traces. Social transparency, furthermore, preserves traces within human 
interactions in particular. 
Second, social transparencies are never reducible to their social aspect alone. They are also 
physical, chemical, and biological. Drawing a clear boundary between society and nature 





produces the illusion that it is possible to study these elements in abstraction from each other, 
which would be anathema to materialism. The non-human aspect of appearance is most 
clearly discernible in Marx’s dissertation, but his later works by no means lose sight of this 
aspect even though they become increasingly social-scientific and concrete, as I show later. 
Third, transparency does not guarantee that all observers see well, contrary to the common-
sense conception of transparency (see Section 1.3). All transparencies are not transparent to 
all observers, such as when some consumers can interpret livestock welfare labels while 
others cannot, for instance. Transparencies can also make it hard to grasp the essential 
relations that sustain objects. All of this is in line with Marx’s appearance conception, 
although I depart from Marx’s use of the literal word “transparency.” 
In optical transparency, for instance, image formation is possible because traces of objects in 
light are not effaced by scattering or absorption.197 Not all observers can read objects in all 
traces, however. Anyone who has had their pupils dilated by an optician has experienced this: 
traces pass through the air for other eyes to see, but with dilated pupils, everything seems 
blurred. This is because dilated pupils prevent eyes from properly interpreting visible light for 
traces of objects. Objects may still appear to a different observer, however, and it would 
therefore be fair to say that the transparency of the air preserves traces of objects for those 
observers. Furthermore, if one took a walk with dilated pupils, one might inadvertently run 
into an un-objectified light post, since light posts do not cease to exist if one person stops 
seeing their traces in light. If everyone stopped seeing their traces in light, however, the light 
posts might be removed, because the usefulness of light posts depends on their appearance 
effects. 
On the whole, my interpretation of transparency is distinguishable not only from textbook 
realism but also from idealistic subjectivism and social reductionism. I do not, however, call 
things “objects” in abstraction from their process of objectification, which is why I also avoid 
making a distinction between “mind-dependent” and “mind-independent” objects. Objects are 
inconceivable in the absence of their process of appearance. This process often, but not 
always, includes human minds, and these minds often affect the objects in various ways, as 
well. 
                                              
197 Choudhury 2014: 109. 
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The above account of appearance and transparency remains extremely abstract. It disregards 
important specifics, such as the differences between humans and non-human animals, not to 
mention differences in forms of social organization. Theorization at this level of abstraction is 
by itself insufficient for practical purposes, although it is needed in order to connect concrete 
processes of appearance with their abstract aspects. In the section that follows, I consider the 
more concrete question of why there are people who are professionally tasked with producing 
transparency in order to affect others. Simply put, the answer to this question is that such 
people are ideologists who work, successfully or not, to socialize people across the 
contradictions of the dominating mode of production. Transparency ideologists socialize 
people into relations of domination and subordination through the planning of trace 
preservation, associating this planning with direct perception. 
2.2 What is Ideology? 
If in all ideology men and their relations appear [Erscheinen] upside-down as in a camera 
obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion 
of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.198 
Marx and Engels, the so-called German Ideology manuscripts 
In this section, I lay out an interpretation of Marx and Engels’s conception of ideology. I then 
relate ideology to transparency. In a nutshell, my reading is that ideology tends to emerge if 
people are unable to organize themselves horizontally due to mutual conflict. Ideological 
powers emerge above these conflicts. Ideological powers are institutions made up of 
professionals whose job is to socialize people into relations of subjugation and domination—
that is, to preserve and augment a bedeviled society that would otherwise fall apart. 
Ideological transparency is a form of such socialization that operates through appearance 
planning. The Vatican, for instance, works to assuage fears of financial and sexual 
misconduct through “transparent” reporting.199 
Counterintuitively, however, ideology is also transparent in the sense that it preserves traces 
of objects, although these objects may appear inverted or otherwise be hard to see. Ideology 
is not wanton illusion, but rather a socialization device that produces misleading appearances. 
The Vatican’s transparency ideology, for instance, can be read as an effect of a constant 
                                              
198 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 5, p. 36; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.5., p. 15. 
199 Tornielli 2016; Service 2015. 





stream of evidence of real financial and sexual misconduct that necessitates public relations 
work. 
Merriam-Webster defines “ideology” as “the basic beliefs or guiding principles of a person or 
group.”200 This is probably the first intuition that most people nowadays have: ideology is 
what a group of humans thinks. A similar idea-centric conception underlies much of the 
academic discussion on ideology. One prominent mainstream textbook on “political 
ideologies,” for instance, mentions ten different scholarly definitions that range from ”a 
political belief system” to ”the ideas of the ruling class.”201 All of the definitions emphasize 
ideas, five mention social relations, and two imply that ideology might have bad 
consequences for some people. 
Ideology has not always been conceptualized in such a belief- and idea-centric manner. The 
word was coined in 1796 by the French nobleman Destutt de Tracy, who proposed ideology 
as a new academic discipline. It was to be a “science of ideas” for “regulating” societies as 
religion lost ground as an organizer of thought.202 In other words, his idea was that society 
needed scientific ideological regulation and guidance to replace the old religious regulation. 
This was to be accomplished via a system to produce conceptions, and this system of 
production was called “ideology.”203 
There is one significant advantage to thinking about ideology as a production process, as de 
Tracy did, rather than in terms of shared ideas: If ideology is equated with ideas, scholars of 
ideology tend to become either pollsters who discover variations in what groups think, or 
agitators who try to convince people to accept the right ideas. The purpose of ideology 
research, however, should be to connect ideology theoretically with the rest of our knowledge 
of society, thereby facilitating social change. The production-centric conception leans in this 
direction: it immediately calls attention to why ideology is needed in a given society or 
situation, how it is produced and distributed, what raw materials are used, when production 
started, and so on. 
                                              
200 Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2017. 
201 Heywood 2012: 5. 
202 Kennedy 1979: 354–355. 
203 De Tracy’s positive regulatory connotation of the word was soon overtaken by more pejorative ones. The 
most notable example of this is Napoleon I, who purged republican “ideologues” for threatening his imperial 
ambitions. Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 1., p. 244.  
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The main purpose of this section is to demonstrate that my conception of ideology, which is 
an interpretation of Marx and Engels’s, is production-centric. From such a perspective, 
ideological transparency is a means of society building that uses appearance planning to piece 
together peoples’ social relations, characters, and behaviors despite their interest conflicts. 
My conception of ideology most closely resembles the so-called Projekt Ideologietheorie 
approach, which conceives of the ideological in terms of socialization into relations of 
domination and subordination.204  
My interpretation of Marx and Engels’s conception of ideology differs markedly from the 
one given in most non-Marxist treatments. In such accounts, Marx and Engels are usually 
thought to have defined ideology as false consciousness—understood as untruthful ideas—
while supposedly considering their own ideas to be scientific and non-ideological.205 From 
such a starting point, it is easy to dismiss Marx and Engels as arrogant and sideline their work 
with definitions that are neutral to the point of meaninglessness, painting ideologies as 
“pictures of a desirable society” or the “necessary parts of any society which seeks to move 
people to action and to stimulate discussion of the alternative ways of organising society.”206 
The next section explains how Marx and Engels used the word ideology, as well as how 
readers gained access to their work on the subject. Marx and Engels produced only one 
unfinished manuscript on ideology, which was furthermore published only long after their 
deaths. Later interpreters were therefore swamped in inchoate treatments of ideology and 
developed a wide variety of contradictory conceptions concerning it. Afterwards, I compare 
my interpretation with other Marxist interpretations and reach the conclusion that the Projekt 
Ideologietheorie approach is the most useful of these. Finally, I relate my overall 
interpretation of ideology to the question of ideological transparency and the transparency of 
ideology. 
2.2.1 Marx and Engels on Ideology 
Marx and Engels made their first sustained effort to interrogate ideology between November 
1845 and June/July 1846, in texts that are now known as The German Ideology. The two 
scholars, both under thirty years old, worked together on a number of polemical texts against 
                                              
204 Rehmann 2013: 245–246. 
205 Heywood 2012: 6–7; Schwarzmantel 2008: 26; Freeden 2003: 8–9. 
206 Schwarzmantel 2008: 28. 





a number of contemporary authors207 whom they accused either of overemphasizing ideas as 
movers of history or of detaching nature from society.208 These 1845/46 writings are not 
exclusively polemical, however, but also explain why ideology exists. In my interpretation, 
Marx and Engels make six arguments concerning ideology in the 1845/46 writings.209 These 
are related to the concreteness of thought, reproduction, private property, the division of 
labor, class, and misleading appearances. I begin with the concreteness of thought, and then 
discuss each of the aforementioned themes in turn. 
The basic idea of the 1845/46 writings is that thinking must be studied as a concrete activity 
that takes specific social forms, and that ideology production is one of these forms. This 
starting point implies that ideology cannot be studied in terms of thought in general (i.e. the 
history of ideas), but the focus of the inquiry must be on the social lives of ideologists and 
their audiences. Thought must be subjected to an analysis of the “given social connection” 
and “current conditions of life” under which people live.210 
According to Marx and Engels, the most central factor that explains how people live is the 
way they reproduce themselves—that is, how they procure what they eat, clothe and house 
themselves with, how they procreate, and so on. Without such reproduction there is no life. 
Furthermore, such reproduction always takes specific historical and social forms. Forms of 
reproduction are therefore also the basis for the study of ideology.211 
Marx and Engels mention four specific aspects of everyday life and reproduction that bring 
about ideology. The first of these is private property, which arises as the division of labor 
increases in society, causing particular and common interests to become detached from each 
                                              
207 Marx & Engels 2014: 4–8. Joseph Weydemeyer and, probably, Moses Hess also contributed to the end result. 
See Carver & Blank 2014: 38. 
208 “Ideology” was at the time commonly used in this manner to accuse people of impracticality and idealism. 
Kennedy 1979: 363–364. 
209 Only one part of the 1845/46 manuscripts has been published in a deconstructive edition in English. I quote 
this edition, by Carver and Blank, where possible and use the Collected Works for the other parts of the text. I 
have checked Carver and Blank against the complete deconstructive Marx-Engels-Jahrbuch 2003 edition in 
German and did not notice substantial discrepancies between these. Marx, Engels, & Weydemeyer 2004. The 
emphases and other typographical idiosyncrasies are original in all quotes reproduced here. 
210 Marx & Engels 2014: 56–59. 
211 See, e.g., Marx & Engels 2014: 82–85. 
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other.212 The state then emerges as the embodiment of the common interest over and above 
particular interests.213 
The second everyday aspect that brings about ideology is the division of physical and mental 
labor, which gives rise to professional thought as a form of production. Mental laborers’ lives 
come to revolve around thinking. Their consciousness becomes less constrained by physical 
reproduction, because their everyday experience is freed from it: now “consciousness is in a 
position to emancipate itself from the world & to ascend to the formation of ‘pure’ theories, 
theology[,] philosophy[,] morals &c.”214 
Of course, the consciousness of mental laborers is not really unconstrained. Its limits are 
simply different. Mental laborers seemingly feed and clothe themselves purely through 
mental labor. This is the earthly reason why they are able to fool themselves and others into 
believing in theories uncontaminated by mundane concerns. Marx and Engels mention, for 
instance, that when ideologist judges apply law, it seems to everyone involved as if the 
judgment resulted from a purely technical-conceptual procedure.215 Although the mental 
labor of judges is in fact integral to production (such as through their perpetuation of patterns 
of ownership), judges do not seem to form a part of the relations they regulate. 
Note that Marx and Engels by no means equate the categories of mental labor and ideology. 
In the margin of the passage quoted above, Marx mentions that the division of mental and 
physical labor “[c]oincides with the first form of ideology. Priests.”216 Marx believed that, 
historically, mental laborers emerged simultaneously with ideologists, but considered the two 
distinct. Specialized mental labor is a prerequisite of ideology, but ideology is the product of 
a specific kind of mental labor. 
                                              
212 Marx & Engels 2014: 85–87. 
213 “[O]ut of this very contradiction between particular interest & common interest, the common interest takes 
on an independent form as the state, separated from the actual individual & collective.” Marx & Engels 2014: 
87. 
214 Marx & Engels 2014: 78–79. 
215 Marx, Engels, & Weydemeyer 2004: 99. Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 5, p. 92. These fragments are not 
included in Carver & Blank. 
216 Marx & Engels 2014: 78. The first evidence of a “cognitive or informavore niche” in human societies 
emerges between 77 000 to 34 000 years ago in the form of cave paintings. Shipman 2010: 6. I interpret this as 
evidence of the first, pre-ideological developments that later enabled the emergence of the ideological sphere 
(see Section 3.3). The first specialized ritual buildings date to 12 000–10 000 years ago. Dietrich et al. 2012. 
The emergence of such buildings co-occurs with evidence of a ruling class, which uses devices like ritual feasts 
to make inequality more palatable through limited wealth redistribution. Hayden & Gargett 1990: 16; Hayden 
2014: 2014. 





How, then, does a concretely-situated, bodily-reproduced mental laborer turn into an 
ideologist? One of Marx and Engels’s specifications of ideological labor is that it concerns 
class domination and struggle. Their argument is not, however, as simple as “he who pays the 
piper calls the tune.” Rather, those who control the means by which society bodily reproduces 
itself, which is to say the ruling class, also tend to control the means of mental reproduction. 
Because of this, ruling class perspectives on society tend to dominate: 
The class which has the means of material production at its disposal consequently also deploys 
the means of intellectual production, so that the ideas of those lacking the means of intellectual 
production are on average subordinated. . . . [O]ne part [of the ruling class] operates as the 
thinkers of that class, the active, conceptualising ideologists, who make the production of the 
illusions of that class about itself their main source of livelihood, while the others’ relationship 
with these thoughts & illusions is more passive & receptive, because they are in actuality the 
active members of that class & have less time to produce illusions about that & thoughts about 
themselves.217 
In their emphasis on class, Marx and Engels move beyond a seemingly apolitical sociology of 
knowledge or intellectual history. Ideology is produced by class-bound ideologists who 
perpetuate domination and subordination by “producing illusions,” but not every mental 
laborer is an ideologist. Note, however, that those lacking the means of intellectual 
production are subordinated only “on average.” Marx and Engels are not proposing a 
determinism of abstract economic power. They instead invite readers to consider why some 
ideas overcome others. They suggest, for example, that new ruling classes displace old ones 
by successfully spreading their own particular lived ideas in a universal guise. Marx and 
Engels even argue that some aspects of ruling-class ideologies may contradict the views and 
interests of the non-ideologist members of the ruling class, but that such contradictions are 
suppressed or overlooked whenever the ruling class is under serious threat.218 
Beyond their focus on the lives of ideologists, Marx and Engels argue that ideology occurs 
because some appearances are misleading and thus ripe for ideological meddling. Consider 
the example of idealist German historiography, which Marx and Engels discuss in great 
detail. They argue that the idealist German philosopher-historian is a species of ideologist 
that casts ideas as the moving force of history. The idealist can plausibly do this, they 
                                              
217 Marx & Engels 2014: 176–179. 
218 Marx & Engels 2014: 179, 182–183. 
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continue, because the surfaces of historical documents often support idealist readings. After 
all, there are always ideational elements of past social developments and struggles that can be 
uncritically interpreted as the sole or main causes of events.219 This last point means that 
ideologists do not generate ideology out of thin air, nor are they necessarily purposefully 
deceptive. The traces that ideologists interpret may themselves be misleading relative to the 
means of interpretation that are available to the ideologists or their audiences.220 
To sum up, I interpret Marx and Engels’s 1845/46 conception of ideology as follows: The 
division of labor and the emergence of private property give rise to oppositions, both between 
different private interests and between private and collective interests. This results in 
conflicts, which ideological formations such as states, priesthoods, and judiciaries emerge to 
regulate. Specialized mental laborers play an important part in such ideological formations. 
Mental laborers live in such a way that enables their thought to detach itself from immediate 
physical reproduction. This creates the impression that thought rules the world and develops 
independently, because mental labor often affects the world without rendering its connection 
to physical reproduction apparent. A connection to reproduction must always exist, however, 
and insofar as a ruling class controls the means of physical and mental reproduction, mental 
laborers will necessarily either depend on or be members of this ruling class. They will thus 
tend to disproportionately produce ideology that corresponds with the interests and 
worldview of the ruling class. The specific relationship between the ruling class, ideologists, 
and the audiences of ideologists depends on the historical situation, however. Struggles may 
take place between ideologists, and the audiences of ideology may resist subordination. 
We have a fair amount of evidence from both past221 and contemporary222 societies that 
supports Marx and Engels’s conception. The example of ritual human sacrifice condenses 
                                              
219 For instance, the German idealist conception of history takes “the illusions of the middle ages to be true and 
credible—namely the illusions that serve the king & pope in their struggles with one another.” Marx & Engels 
2014: 200–203. Marx and Engels elevate the methodologies of English and French historians over German ones, 
since the former highlight the political over the ideational in a way that “borders on actuality.” Marx & Engels 
2014: 142. 
220 One important example of misleading appearances would be the ideology of pure individuality. Marx and 
Engels argue that ideologies of individual autonomy start finding support in everyday experience as feudal 
restrictions are increasingly replaced by bourgeois ones. I explore this line of thought more thoroughly later in 
my discussion of fetishism (Section 2.3). Marx & Engels 2014: 303–307. 
221 Humans existed for over 2 million years in a state of equality. The first traces of socioeconomic inequality 
date to roughly 50,000 years ago. More pronounced stratification occurred in a few areas around 30,000 years 
ago, and the explosion of dramatic and widespread inequality began about 15,000 years ago. Many different 
theories of social stratification are compatible with the evidence concerning the emergence of class societies, 
however, which is why it must be complemented with theoretical and empirical evidence from other sources. 
Based on fieldwork in several contemporary non-capitalist societies, the foremost anthropological expert on this 
 





this evidence nicely, however. The practice of ritual human sacrifice was non-existent in 
egalitarian societies. It emerged together with socioeconomic stratification and was used as a 
“divinely sanctioned means of social control” to keep the poor in check.223 In other words, 
while divine reasons seemed to explain human sacrifice, social stratification was its real 
cause (although sacrifice also stabilized stratification once it had arisen).224 “Mental labor” is 
perhaps an overly benign characterization of this gory history of ideology. 
As Marx and Engels toiled at the German Ideology manuscripts in 1845/46, it must have 
become increasingly obvious to them that theorizing and criticizing ideology is inefficacious 
by itself.225 This follows directly from their own arguments: Marx and Engels claim that 
changing thought requires changing life-processes, yet they had only just begun to outline an 
analysis of how given kinds of life-processes come to exist and function. In other words, a 
more thorough criticism of ideology required a more thorough analysis of reproduction. It is 
thus quite understandable that Marx and Engels soon ceased their attempts to get the 
manuscripts published and refocused their attentions away from ideology. 
                                                                                                                                              
topic argues that although ruling classes (“accumulators” in his vocabulary) are socially harmful, they are at first 
tolerated insofar as they make themselves seem to be charitable “big men with big hearts.” A ruling class that 
entrenches itself in this manner is difficult to depose even when its disadvantages become apparent. Hayden 
2001: 231–248; Hayden 2011. 
222 Today, human sacrifice has been replaced by devices such as unemployment, which states actively maintain 
in order to constrain wage growth and inflation. E.g., Shaikh 2016: 730–733. Social control is now mainly 
justified by elections, however—not metaphysics. Elections make it seem as if state policy were sanctioned by 
citizens. This is despite the fact that policy outcomes correspond, at least in the United States, disproportionately 
well with the preferences of the wealthy. Gilens & Page 2014; Branham, Soroka, & Wlezien 2017; Bashir 2015; 
Gilens & Page 2016. One reason for lopsided policy outcomes is probably that, as in the vast majority of 
countries, representatives can be bought with campaign contributions. International IDEA 2018. According to 
one estimate, inducing a fourteen-percent change in the likelihood of a U.S. congressperson’s voting behavior 
cost $100 000. Ferguson, Jorgensen, & Chen 2017: 3. Campaign money also greatly increases the likelihood of 
getting elected. Ferguson, Jorgensen, & Chen 2016. This gives rise to a tendency towards bought legislatures 
that do the bidding of campaign funders. Furthermore, voters themselves reward governments that have 
redistributed wealth towards the top, probably because of “biases in the responsiveness of the news environment 
to the economic welfare of groups located at different points along the income distribution.” Hicks, Jacobs, & 
Matthews 2016: 1092. We also know that members of the capitalist class have successfully funded campaigns to 
manipulate public opinion in various other matters, often stifling reform entirely. Evidence shows, for instance, 
that capitalists funded ideologists who managed to produce a rise in climate change denialism in the U.S. Farrell 
2016. Similar patterns in the histories of acid rain, smoking, and ozone are also well known, of which only 
ozone has been somewhat successfully addressed. Oreskes & Conway 2010; Montzka et al. 2018. Importantly, 
however, there are also structural reasons for lopsided ideological outcomes that are not the effects of intentional 
agency. Poulantzas 1969: 71. If the profits of capitalists plummet, for instance, a variety of adverse social 
consequences and feedback mechanisms follow. See, e.g., Shaikh 2016: 53–54. As expanding upon these 
structural factors would require a sizable foray into Marxist economics, I will not undertake the matter here; 
however, I do not wish to suggest that structural factors are less important than instrumentalist ones. 
223 Watts et al. 2016: 231. 
224 Watts et al. 2016: 229. 
225 As they put it, “[t]he actual, practical dissolution of these [ideological] phrases, the removal of this 
conception from the consciousness of men, as has already been said, is accomplished by altering circumstances, 
not by making theoretical deductions.” Marx & Engels 2014: 148–149. 
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Marx and Engels continued to use the word ideology throughout their later work, and they 
consulted the 1845/46 texts when writing these.226 However, only small fragments of the 
1845/46 formulations were published before the 1930s.227 Consequently, early Marxists did 
not have access to an important interpretative key to Marx’s and Engels’s later remarks on 
ideology. They had to parse the meaning of ideology from remarks scattered throughout 
Marx’s and Engels’s writings, which probably contributed to the substantial contradictions228 
that emerged between various Marxist understandings of ideology already during the 
nineteenth century. 
In the section that follows, I scrutinize the long history of Marxist thought that lies between 
my interpretation and Marx and Engels’s original work on ideology. My basic contention is 
that Marxists have not made a great deal of theoretical progress on these issues, and some 
have even taken steps backwards. The main advancement I do acknowledge is Engels’s 
explicit analysis of ideology in his mature anthropological works. In particular, he elaborates 
on the historical emergence of “ideological powers,”229 which the Projekt Ideologietheorie 
later conceptualizes in terms of “vertical socialization.”230 
2.2.2 Marxists: Is Ideology Consciousness? 
Because the field of Marxist debate on ideology theory is so fragmented,231 outlining its 
current state is an extremely difficult task. However, I must show how my interpretation 
departs from the major positions within the literature. To limit the discussion somewhat, I 
                                              
226 Marx & Engels 2014: 23. 
227 Carver & Blank 2014: 8–9. Most of Marx and Engels’s 1845/46 work was first published in the 1920s and 
1930s. The earliest extensive editions came out in 1932. One was edited in the Soviet Union, another in 
Germany. The first extensive English translation, a slightly modified version of the Soviet edition, only came 
out in 1964. The editors of both the Soviet and German editions heavy-handedly compiled and completed the 
fragments that Marx and Engels had left behind. The Soviet version emphasized the systematic exposition it 
provided of Marx and Engels’s materialist conception of history. The German, by contrast, painted Marx and 
Engels as idealist philosophers who were not much concerned with mundane things such as the ownership of the 
means of production. These interpretations relate to societal struggles that endure to this day. Carver & Blank 
2014: 25–41, 67. 
228 E.g., Liguori 2015: 146–155. 
229 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 26, p. 392. 
230 Rehmann 2013: 301. 
231 As Larraín puts it, “disagreements affect almost every aspect of the concept [of ideology]: its content, its 
effectivity and its epistemological status which is manifest in a range of questions. Is ideology subjective and 
ideal (created by and existing in the minds of individuals) or objective and material (existing in material 
apparatuses and its practices)? Is ideology a determined and epiphenomenal superstructure or an autonomous 
discourse with its own effectivity capable of constituting subjects? Is ideology negative and critical (a distortion 
or inversion) or neutral (the articulated discourse of a class, fraction or party)? Do ideological elements possess 
an inherent class character or are they neutral and capable of being articulated to various classes?” Larraín 1996: 
46. 





focus on whether ideology is mainly a phenomenon of consciousness or whether it also has 
non-conscious components. Furthermore, I pay special attention to situating my own 
interpretation within those previous interpretations that include non-conscious components. 
Existing reviews have used representations of varying complexity to lay out the differences 
between various Marxist theories of ideology. At the one end are contributions like 
Rehmann’s, which does not seek to classify Marxist approaches to ideology. Instead, 
Rehmann builds a critical chronology that lays bare the plurality of conceptions of ideology 
that has reigned throughout the history of Marxism.232 At the other end, Eagleton simply 
splits Marxist ideology theories into two orientations, one of which emphasizes ideology’s 
epistemic falsity, and the other, its social function.233 A useful middle-ground between 
extreme complexity and typological simplicity is Pietilä and Koivisto’s suggestion, which 
situates Marxist ideology theories on two axes: critical–neutral and contents-of-consciousness 
versus making-of-consciousness (Table 1).234 
 Contents of consciousness Making of consciousness 
Neutral Competing worldviews Discourses, institutions, etc. 
are sites of struggle 
Critical False consciousness Ideological socialization 
reproduces domination 
Table 1. Marxist ideology conceptions, paraphrased by the author from Koivisto and 
Pietilä. 
On the top left are conceptions akin to the now-dominant common-sense view, in which 
ideologies are simply worldviews—that is, different contents of consciousness. Lenin, for 
instance, holds that proletarian ideology competes with bourgeois ideology.235 He is thus 
“neutral” towards ideology in the sense that he is not trying to defeat ideology as such (which 
would be impossible), but only its bourgeois variety. On the bottom left is the “false 
consciousness” view of ideology, which is in my experience what non-Marxist social 
                                              
232 Rehmann 2013. 
233 Eagleton 1991: 3. 
234 Koivisto & Pietilä 1996: 43. The table contains my paraphrases of Koivisto and Pietilä’s characterizations, 
which are elaborate to the point of defeating the simplifying purpose of the typology. 
235 Lenin 1960–1970: vol. 1, p. 298. 
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scientists usually expect from Marxist ideology theory. Erich Fromm, for example, associates 
ideology with illusionary thought: it is a misconception in people’s heads.236 The top right 
cell resembles social constructionism, with an extra dose of struggle. Stuart Hall, for instance, 
takes ideology to mean the language and representations that people use for making sense of 
the world, including their conflicts.237 For Hall, ideology thus includes unconscious 
discourses—but it is also unavoidable, since sense-making is a universal human 
characteristic. 
My interpretation closely resembles the Projekt Ideologietheorie conception of the 
ideological, which occupies the table’s bottom right cell. The Projekt conceives of the 
ideological as a vertical dimension of the process of socialization into relations of 
domination, not as a general description of human sense-making or consciousness.238 In this 
tradition, ideological socialization is taken to extend beyond both individual and collective 
consciousness. Consequently, ideology cannot be changed or eliminated by changing 
people’s minds, but only by rendering it obsolete through profound social reorganization. I 
concur with the Projekt in considering ideology deleterious. The main reason it is deleterious 
is not that it is false, however, but that it stabilizes and is an element of social problems such 
as class divisions. I believe that this interpretation is not only most consistent with Marx’s 
and Engels’s texts, but also with evidence concerning the history of ideology (see Section 
2.2.1), including that presented by my own articles. 
For the purposes of my work, the Marxist debate on the extent to which ideology is a 
phenomenon of consciousness is central. This is because transparency clearly has a weighty 
non-conscious aspect consisting of things like paper trails and optical arrangements. Since I 
include such things in my conception of “ideological transparency” (Section 2.2.3), I must 
show that ideology is not exclusively a phenomenon of consciousness. 
I begin by outlining the views of Friedrich Engels, who was the first Marxist to study 
ideology. After, I discuss some prominent consciousness-centric Marxists. I conclude by 
outlining some of the less consciousness-centric positions, including that of the Projekt 
Ideologietheorie. The Projekt is of special importance to the dissertation as a whole, because 
my understanding of ideological transparency is deeply influenced by the Projekt’s views. 
                                              
236 Fromm 2009: 9. 
237 Hall 1996: 25–26. 
238 Haug 1987: 91. 





2.2.2.1 Engels on Ideological Powers 
The first Marxist to tackle the ideology question was Engels. He co-wrote the so-called 
German Ideology manuscripts with Marx (see Section 2.2.1), and further developed a similar 
train of thought in his own later writings. The most important concept developed by Engels is 
that of ideological power (ideologische Macht), which characterizes institutions that develop 
to alleviate social divisions.239 Of equal importance are Engels’s attempts to trace the 
emergence of social divisions in pre-capitalist formations.240 Engels’s conception of ideology 
explains why ideological transparency so often adopts the guise of neutral, impartial vision 
when it is discussed within ideological powers such as universities. 
In his 1884 Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, Engels develops the ideas 
presented in the German Ideology manuscripts by making use of anthropological evidence 
and Marx’s notes. The main argument of this work is that “[t]he first class antithesis which 
appears in history coincides with the development of the antagonism between man and 
woman in monogamian marriage.”241 The result was a society in which a patriarchal class of 
property-owners lorded over women, slaves, and poor males:242 
[A] society had come into being that by virtue of all its economic conditions of existence had to 
split up into freemen and slaves, into exploiting rich and exploited poor; a society that was not 
only incapable of reconciling these antagonisms, but had to carry them to extremes. Such a 
society could only exist either in a state of continuous, open struggle of these classes against 
one another or under the rule of a third power which, while ostensibly standing above the 
conflicting classes, suppressed their open conflict and permitted a class struggle at most in the 
economic field, in a so-called legal form.243 
Later, in his 1886 Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Engels 
explicitly links the above analysis with the concept of ideological powers.244 Ideological 
                                              
239 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 26, pp. 392–393. 
240 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 26, p. 268. 
241 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 26, p. 173; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.29, p. 179. According to Engels, 
the process that gave rise to this social cleft went roughly as follows: People first discovered ways of 
accumulating wealth in means of production, especially cattle and later slaves. Men then took control of these 
accumulating means of production, whereas women were confined to consumptive household management. 
Inheritance started being traced through the male line, giving rise to hereditary patriarchy. Hereditary patriarchy 
coincided with the need to control women’s sexuality, because female polygamy hides male parentage. 
Religious and legal prohibitions and competences then consolidated these social positions. Marx & Engels 
1975–2005: vol. 26, pp. 162–173. 
242 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 26, pp. 214–215. 
243 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 26, p. 268; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. 29, p. 262. 
244 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 26, pp. 392–393; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. 30, pp. 157–158. 
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powers are the organizational and institutional forms within which professional ideologists 
operate. They are the formations, such as states and religions, that develop atop social 
cleavages and within which a latent civil war is constantly waged. The institutionalization of 
ideology makes it hard to notice that the conflicts waged within ideological powers in fact 
extend beyond them. However, ideological powers also have emergent dynamics that are not 
reducible to the conflicts underlying them: 
Every ideology, . . . once it has arisen, develops in connection with the given concept-material, 
and develops this material further; otherwise it would not be an ideology, that is, occupation 
with thoughts as with independent entities, developing independently and subject only to their 
own laws. That the material conditions of life of the persons inside whose heads this thought 
process goes on in the last resort determine the course of this process remains of necessity 
unknown to these persons, for otherwise all ideology would be finished.245 
The causes that bring about the independent appearance of ideology receive increasing 
weight in Engels’s later texts. He probably emphasized these causes because he recognized 
that Second International Marxists were starting to overstress economic determination 
relative to the emergent qualities of ideological powers and wished to oppose this 
development. The most famous indication of this is in a letter Engels wrote in 1893, in which 
he chastises himself, Marx, and Franz Mehring for “placing the main emphasis on the 
derivation of political, legal and other ideological conceptions, as of the actions induced by 
those conceptions, from economic fundamentals.”246 He argues that it is precisely the non-
derivational aspects of ideology that give rise to “false consciousness.” This is because the 
misleading tendencies of ideology are an effect of its degrees of freedom: 
Ideology is a process which is, it is true, carried out consciously by what we call a thinker, but 
with a consciousness that is spurious [falsches Bewusstsein, false consciousness]. . . . [T]he 
historical ideologist, then, possesses in every sphere of science a material which has originated 
independently in the thought of previous generations and has undergone an independent course 
of development of its own in the brains of these successive generations. . . . What has above all 
deluded the majority of people is this semblance [Schein] of an independent history of political 
constitutions, legal systems and ideological conceptions in each individual sphere.247 
                                              
245 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 26, p. 394; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. 30, pp. 158–159. 
246 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 50, p. 164; Marx & Engels 1956–68: 96. I cite the Werke because this text 
has not yet been published in the Gesamtausgabe edition. 
247 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 50, pp. 164–165; Marx & Engels 1956–68: 97. 





To sum up, Engels’s original contribution to Marxist ideology theory is to show historically 
how society divided into the conflicted realms of private interest and seemingly independent 
ideological powers. He coins the concept of ideological powers to characterize these 
formations. Engels also expands upon the social analysis of why ideology is misleading: 
Ideological powers ostensibly stand above the conflicts that they feed on. In doing so, they 
develop institutional-organizational forms and ideational logics with a semblance of 
independent history relative to conflicts. In spite of his recognition of such emergent 
dynamics, Engels claims that if the underlying class antagonisms cease to exist, so will 
ideological powers.248 
The concept of ideological powers suggests an interpretation of ideological transparency 
rhetoric and practices: Transparency as direct vision seems to neutrally bind society together, 
such as when subjects supposedly see their king’s intentions in order to follow his orders (see 
Section 1.1) or when voters ostensibly see their governments. Ideological transparency is thus 
a way of addressing the contradiction between the ostensible universality and actual 
particularity of ideological socialization. Ideological transparency’s pretense of direct 
perception is misleading, however, in that it conceals the active, potentially misleading 
element of ideological socialization. This does not necessarily result from conscious 
deception on the ideologists’ part, however, but flows from the ideologists’ task of standing 
impartially above social antagonisms. 
In Engels’s work, it is still clear that ideology is not first and foremost about what people 
think. Engels emphasizes “the material conditions of life of the persons inside whose heads 
this thought process goes on” as well as the “actions induced by those conceptions.” 
Although consciousness does play a role in the emergent dynamics of ideological powers, 
these powers also tend to overstate the significance of consciousness. Furthermore, ideology 
is sustained by social conflicts that go beyond the ideological powers themselves. None of 
these propositions has been self-evident to later Marxists. In the section that follows, I present 
Marxist conceptions that overemphasize consciousness relative to Engels’s view. 
2.2.2.2 Consciousness-Centric Conceptions of Ideology 
The Marxism of the Second International articulated two main strands of consciousness-
centric ideology conceptions. One strand viewed ideology in an unfavorable light, as Marx 
                                              
248 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 26, p. 272. 
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and Engels had, but centered it around consciousness. In his 1893 On Historical Materialism, 
for instance, Franz Mehring views Christianity as “ideological clothing” for the “extension of 
state power,” such that misleading religious conceptions are defined as ideological but the 
state itself is not.249 By contrast, another strand of Marxist thought viewed ideology as a 
concept without connotations of domination or illusion. Lenin in 1894 sees himself as an 
“ideological leader of the proletariat” in that he formulates and spreads socialist theory while 
also leading the workers in practice.250 This supposedly domination-free ideological 
leadership role was later eagerly assumed by Soviet ideologists.251 
Both the neutral and critical variants of the consciousness-centric understanding of ideology 
have remained prominent throughout the history of Marxist theory. On the neutral side, in 
1923, Lukács identifies the “doctrine” of Marxism as “the ideological expression of the 
proletariat.”252 In 1980, McCarney proclaims that “the general definition implicit in Marx’s 
practice is that forms of consciousness are ideological if, and only if, they serve class 
interests” (including proletarian ones).253 On the critical side, according to Larraín in 1988, 
“the concept of ideology was defined by Marx in a negative, or critical, fashion and meant a 
distorted kind of consciousness, which conceals contradictions in the interest of the ruling 
class.”254 For Torrance in 1995, “an ideology is a prescriptive theory whose prescriptions 
result from illusions engendered by social barriers to knowledge.”255 
It is not possible to square my conception of ideological transparency with any 
consciousness-centric interpretation of ideology. This is because I argue that ideological 
transparency consists of such elements as video games, measurement devices, and buildings. 
In the consciousness-centric conception, such things are viewed as non-ideological since they 
are external to consciousness. 
                                              
249 Mehring 1975: 44. 
250 Lenin 1960–1970: vol. 1, p. 298. 
251 Rehmann 2013: 69–75. 
252Lukács 1968: 258. Lukács is sometimes seen as defending a false consciousness theory of ideology in History 
and Class Consciousness. See, e.g., Haug 1993: 234. This is incorrect, however. Lukács argues, for instance, 
that Rosa Luxemburg campaigned for the “ideological emancipation” of the proletariat, although he does not 
view Luxemburg or Marxism more generally as forms of false consciousness in these passages. Lukács 1968: 
44. Lukács associates fetishism directly with ideology, however, and emphasizes the falsity of fetishistic 
ideology (see Section 2.3.2). This probably explains the aforementioned misinterpretation. 
253 McCarney 1980: 8. 
254 Larraín 1988: 52. 
255 Torrance 1995: 191. 





Given that Marx and Engels were fairly clear that ideology is not exclusively a phenomenon 
of consciousness, it is surprising that Marxists have so often interpreted it as such. However, 
there have also been variants of Marxism that come closer to my interpretation of Marx and 
Engels. In the section that follows, I introduce Althusser’s ideology theory, which has been 
extremely influential. I also summarize the position of the Projekt Ideologietheorie, which 
critically builds on Althusser’s and Engels’s work and is essentially similar to my own. 
2.2.2.3 Depreciated Consciousness: Althusser and Projekt Ideologietheorie 
One of the most prominent Marxist proponents of a less consciousness-centric conception of 
ideology has been the French philosopher Louis Althusser.256 His most substantial 
contribution to ideology theory is contained in his 1969–1970 work on ideological state 
apparatuses.257 Althusser’s work later served as an important target of criticism as well as a 
source of inspiration for post-structuralist treatments of similar topics.258 
Althusser distinguishes between two sorts of state apparatus: ideological and repressive. The 
repressive state apparatus includes entities like the police and the army, which function 
“predominantly by repression,” whereas ideological apparatuses such as schools and political 
parties function “predominantly by ideology,” such as when they invite or “interpellate” 
people into pre-figured subject positions.259 Transparency ideologists might invite people into 
the pre-figured role of the “ethical consumer,” for example. 
According to Althusser, ideology is both epistemically distorting and material.260 Religious 
apparatuses, for instance, often accurately represent the believers’ subjugation through 
submissive prayer practices or church architecture, but rather than explaining this subjugation 
with reference to the relations of production, religions point to a divine cause. 
                                              
256 Althusser was not the first to take steps in this direction. In his 1929–35 prison writings, for instance, the 
Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci already resumed the less consciousness-centric conception of ideology. 
Although Gramsci’s use of the word ideology usually suggests consciousness association, he also theorizes the 
“forms of cultural organisation which keep the ideological world in movement,” including schools, the Church, 
newspapers, the book industry, universities, doctors, the army, and law. Gramsci 1971: 341–342. In his 
conception, “ideologies . . .‘organize’ human masses, they form the terrain on which men move, acquire 
consciousness of their position, struggle, etc.” Gramsci 2000: 199. Gramsci vacillates, however, between critical 
and neutral conceptions of ideology, ends up subsuming the ideology question within his theory of hegemony, 
and disregards the relationship between fetishism and ideology. See Rehmann 2013: 144–145. 
257 Althusser 1971: 142. 
258 Rehmann 2013: 179–180. 
259 Althusser 1971: 143. 145. 
260 Althusser 1971: 164–166. Althusser later changed his mind about the misleading character of ideology, as is 
evident from his self-criticism. Althusser 1976: 119. 
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Although Althusser’s basic intuition concerning ideology resembles that of Marx and Engels, 
he departs from them in postulating an “omni-historical . . . ideology in general,” meaning 
that “man is an ideological animal by nature.”261 He formulates this argument as follows in 
For Marx: 
[I]n every society we can posit, in forms which are sometimes very paradoxical, the existence 
of an economic activity as the base, a political organization and “ideological” forms (religion, 
ethics, philosophy, etc.). So ideology is as such an organic part of every social totality.262 
Later interpreters have had difficulties squaring this notion of a “natural” ideology-in-general 
with the historical development of ideological apparatuses like religions.263 How can “social 
totalities” always contain religion, for instance, when we have evidence pinning down the 
historical emergence of religion? Are egalitarian societies not social totalities? One 
prominent interpretation considers this aspect of Althusser’s thought a capitulation to Soviet 
or bourgeois notions.264 Althusser does indeed eternalize ideology in a manner that has been 
typical of ruling-class domination. 
The Projekt Ideologietheorie also developed a less consciousness-centric conception of 
ideology, which I consider the most refined Marxist treatment of these issues. The Projekt 
formed at the Free University of Berlin in the latter half of the 1970s around the philosopher 
Wolfgang Fritz Haug265 and inspired studies ranging from general theory to inquiries into 
specific topics like fascism and academic philosophy.266 The connecting thread of these 
studies is a broadly Althusserian–Engelsian approach to ideology as a material, partially non-
conscious axis of socialization. The Projekt abandons Althusser’s omni-historical aspect, 
however, instead viewing ideology as a historically grounded social form. The Projekt’s 
theoretical results are based on extensive historical and theoretical evidence,267 yet they have 
remained surprisingly marginal in English-speaking academia. 
The Projekt argues that social clefts such as gender and class antagonism are difficult to 
reconcile in horizontal interactions but coexist with “socialization” (i.e. society building), 
                                              
261 Althusser 1971: 161, 171. 
262 Althusser 2005: 232. 
263 In his subsequent self-criticism, Althusser himself expresses unease about this. See Althusser 1976: 141. 
264 Resch 1992: 225–226. 
265 Rehmann 2013: 11. 
266 Rehmann 1986: 6–11. 
267 Koivisto & Pietilä 1996: 41–42. 





which upholds the antagonisms while cultivating cohesion across them.268 One form of 
cultivating cohesion is the layer of specialist instances, or “ideological powers”269—such as 
states, priesthoods, academies, and judiciaries—within which professional ideologists labor. 
These powers “rise above” the antagonistic relations that they regulate270 by adopting 
postures of representation, divinity, objectivity, neutrality, and so on. The powers are reliant 
on the conflicts they regulate, however, and tend to maintain and build on these conflicts 
rather than abolish them.271 The powers thus solidify into a seemingly permanent axis of 
vertical socialization that permeates everyday life .This is what the Projekt calls “the 
ideological.”272 
From their elevated vantage points, ideological powers work to organize people’s 
competences into complementary relations of labor, exploitation, domination, and 
subordination (i.e. to “socialize,” vergesellschaften),273 such as with gender roles, morals, or 
taste. The powers also enable individuals to actively socialize themselves over the vertical 
axis by adopting ideological aspects into their self-understandings and daily life—although 
the audiences of ideology may choose to resist instead.274  
In order to gain traction in people’s everyday lives, ideologists must take into account their 
audiences’ preconceptions and practices, and work to reorganize them. Everyday life is never 
completely infused by ideology, however, because people’s conceptions and practices are 
shaped by all sorts of things, many of which are non-ideological. For instance, even in the 
absence of ideological socialization, people who exchange commodities would have to 
acknowledge each other’s freedom to dispose of property. This objective thought form 
                                              
268 Haug 1993: 48, 81. This description of the Projekt position is presented in roughly similar form in Article III. 
269 Haug 1993: 57, 100. 
270 Haug 1993: 85. 
271 Haug 1993: 49. 
272 Haug 1993: 17. By contrast to the Projekt, I do not strictly distinguish between “ideology” and “the 
ideological.” I consider this distinction an unnecessary and jargon-inducing complication. Since ideology is 
defined as ideology by virtue of its participation in ideological socialization, drawing a line of demarcation is 
impossible. Should a Bible be considered “ideology,” for instance, or an aspect of “the ideological”? What about 
subordinating beliefs that result from reading the Bible? Rather than systematically distinguishing between 
ideology and the ideological, I simply use whichever word seems more appropriate from a stylistic perspective. 
Individual pieces of ideology are inconceivable in the absence of a broader ideological sphere. 
273 Haug 1993: 130. 
274 Haug 1993: 83. 
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therefore stems from a non-ideological source.275 The Projekt analytically distinguishes 
between such forms of horizontal socialization and the ideological.276 
Ideology is thus a compromise between practices of vertical socialization and the complex 
non-ideological sphere of everyday experience and resistance. This also means that although 
all ideologists work to socialize people over vertical dimensions, the ideological powers are 
not a monolith. They are themselves influenced by their audiences and often split by internal 
struggles along class and other lines.277 
I am aware of three main criticisms directed against the Projekt, all of which concern the 
notion of vertical socialization that the Projekt introduces into Marxist thought. First, 
consciousness-centric ideology theorists accuse the Projekt of downplaying consciousness-
shaping mechanisms that operate beyond ideological powers, such as commodity 
fetishism.278 I believe this to be an incorrect portrayal of the Projekt’s position, which 
recognizes the importance of commodity fetishism as an objective thought form that 
ideologists attempt to mobilize for their own purposes (see Section 2.3.2.1).279 The Projekt 
refuses to call such thought forms “ideological,” however, unless they are elements of 
vertical socialization. I consider this correct; it is indeed important to distinguish ideology, a 
mechanism that produces vertical socialization, from other consciousness-shaping 
mechanisms. 
Second, the Projekt’s critical characterization of ideology supposedly disregards the 
progressive potential of the ideological and the disagreeable aspects of horizontal 
socialization.280 The Projekt indeed characterizes the ideological as something that needs to 
be abolished together with its underlying social divisions, and the Projekt indeed strives 
towards the strengthening of horizontal socialization. This does not mean, however, that 
vertical and horizontal socialization can be associated with a pure normative content—that is, 
that horizontal socialization is always “good” and vertical “bad.” The Projekt argues, for 
instance, that commodity exchange is a non-ideological, horizontal form of socialization,281 
but exchange can obviously be simultaneously progressive and detrimental in its different 
                                              
275 Haug 1993: 55. 
276 Haug 1993: 53. 
277 Haug 1993: 100–110. 
278 Seppmann 2012: 85. 
279 Haug 1993: 56; Rehmann 2013: 253. 
280 Metscher 2012: 78. 
281 Haug 1993: 55. 





aspects. Ideological powers can likewise house resistance to exploitation and domination, 
such as calls for intellectual autonomy.282 
Third, critics argue that the Projekt downplays the epistemic dimension of ideology, which is 
to say its truth or falsity.283 This is because the Projekt emphasizes the functioning of 
ideological socialization over the false consciousness of those involved in it. I agree on this 
point, at least partly. The Projekt does not sufficiently outline the epistemic consequences of 
its conception, and the epistemic dimension is much stronger in Marx and Engels than it is in 
the Projekt (see Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.1). The likely reason for the Projekt’s weakness here 
is that in their struggle against the false consciousness interpretation of ideology (see Section 
2.2.2.2), they end up overstating their case. Another reason may be the Projekt’s 
Althusserianism, which pulls them away from questions of appearance and essence. Although 
I agree with the Projekt’s critics that ideology is inherently misleading, my main interest lies 
with causal rather than epistemological analysis. 
I have now outlined my conception of ideology, which draws a line from Marx and Engels 
through Althusser to the Projekt Ideologietheorie. In the section that follows, I explicitly 
integrate this theoretical development with the question of transparency. 
2.2.3 Ideological Transparency 
Most people are familiar with the phenomenon of physical transparency, which their senses 
tend to misinterpret as direct perception.284 This non-ideological everyday experience is the 
basis of the transparency metaphor that is often used in connection with ideological 
transparency (see Article III). I define ideological transparency as socialization into relations 
of domination and subordination that operates by planning the preservation of traces and 
associating these traces with direct perception. 
Transparency is useful for ideological purposes because ideology is a false universal. 
Transparency ideologists use the promise of direct vision to “neutrally” bind together society, 
                                              
282 Haug 1993: 110. 
283 Metscher 2012: 77–78. 
284 Unlike sound waves, light waves do not bend perceptibly around corners, and they move so fast that it is hard 
to notice that they move at all. With a few exceptions, such as refraction in water, vision therefore seems to 
provide unmediated access to objects. This everyday appearance of transparency is misleading, however, since it 
abstracts from the process of transparency (e.g., propagation of light), which may include inversive or otherwise 
obfuscating aspects. The misleading character of physical transparency with respect to human sensuousness is 
the non-ideological everyday anchorage of ideological transparency. Widespread misleading experiences of 
direct perception are excellent material for ideological socialization, probably explaining why ideologists have 
used transparency language to suggest direct perception since antiquity (see Article III). 
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addressing the contradiction between the ostensible universality and actual particularity of 
ideological socialization. While ideologists may not actually enable direct perception, they 
often benefit from seeming to. This pretense of direct perception is misleading in that it hides 
the social particularity of the ideologists who conduct the appearance planning. The 
deception is not necessarily conscious on the ideologists’ part, however, but instead emerges 
from the ideologists’ efforts to stand impartial above social antagonisms. Their job is to seem 
neutral, and they may well believe themselves to be such. 
Judges, for instance, are particular individuals who tend to be disproportionately affected by 
the interests of those who control the means of production.285 For judges to properly perform 
their job, however, they must appear to be impersonal, impartial bearers of the law. Justice 
systems that are believed to be corrupt my find it difficult to function, and ideological 
transparency can help alleviate such problems by avoiding or responding to accusations of 
secret bias.286 This is not automatic, however, and ideological transparency is open to 
contestation by audiences or producers. 
Contrary to dictionary definitions, ideology is not mainly a matter of what people think. 
Judges are not ideologists because they, as a group, have certain ideas about law. They are 
ideologists insofar as they transcend and regulate social contradictions in favor of the ruling 
class (and non-ideologists insofar as they do not). Ideological transparency is likewise not 
ideological because of anything that transparency ideologists think, but because (and insofar 
as) it socializes people across their antagonisms while simultaneously maintaining those 
antagonisms  
Despite its misleading character, ideological transparency can reveal much about the society 
in which it operates because it bears traces of said society. For instance, in Article III, I read 
ideological transparency rhetoric and the associated practices historically to find out what 
                                              
285 It is a well-known, worldwide phenomenon, for instance, that criminal justice systems tend to 
disproportionately convict the poor. Bagaric 2015: 1. As Reiman and Leighton put it, “the rich get richer and the 
poor get prison.” Reiman & Leighton 2010. From a Marxist perspective, this is hardly a surprise: Acts 
characteristic of the ruling class tend to be decriminalized or less severely punished and members of the ruling 
class are better able to afford litigation. Furthermore, most capitalist states offer constitutional protection for 
private property. Such protections directly privilege the owners of capital over their workers, who usually have 
comparatively little to protect. Lawyers therefore work for the benefit of the ruling class without any conscious 
intent to do so, simply by enforcing seemingly equal property rights. 
286 A recent United Nations Development Program report on judicial systems in poor countries “calls on Chief 
Justices to promote transparency and accountability,” because this will “build public trust” in the justice system. 
Schütte, Reddy, & Zorzi 2016: 3. The report’s point is that judicial systems in poor countries are often perceived 
as corrupt and opaque, which makes their job harder. Introducing transparency could help to alter this 
perception. 





social developments they participate in. This is possible because ideological transparency, 
like all ideology, is constrained and enabled by the structure of society, and this connection 
can be objectified using the right means of observation. Ideology must work with and through 
the everyday life experience of ideologists and their audiences, and is therefore affected by 
everyday life, bearing traces of it.287 
Ideological transparency is not necessary in all forms of society. Contrary to Althusser’s 
claim, ideology is only necessary as long as people cannot socialize themselves without 
ideological powers. Even if ideological transparency disappears, however, the social problem 
of appearance probably will not. All societies must contend with appearances and determine 
which traces to produce, preserve, and perceive—and how. I return to this question in 
Chapter 4. 
Marx and Engels continued to use the word ideology throughout their later works. These 
works increasingly concretize the abstract treatment of the 1845/46 writings by grounding 
ideology in the particulars of the capitalist or other modes of production. Of these 
concretizations, the analysis of fetishistic ideology is, in my view, the most pertinent 
explanation for why individualist ideological transparency in particular is so prominent today. 
In the section that follows, I broach the question of fetishism and its relationship to ideology 
and transparency. 
2.3 What is Fetishism? 
[In the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world,] the productions of the human brain 
appear [scheinen] as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with 
one another and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men's 
hands. This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they 
are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of 
commodities.288 
Marx, Capital, volume 1 
                                              
287 One may learn a great deal about old social forms by reading the Bible alongside other evidence, for 
instance. Even seemingly random art can be read in this historical manner, such as with Islamic geometry that 
emphasizes the unity of the universe by using mathematical discoveries to replicate common natural patterns. 
Dabbour 2012: 382. 
288 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, p.83; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.10, p. 72. 
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In this section, I outline my interpretation of Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism, which is 
Marx’s most developed social-phenomenological conception. Commodity fetishism means, 
roughly, that production for exchange displaces social relations into relations between things. 
One of the consequences of this is that people misleadingly appear to be independent from 
each other. This is the main component of my explanation of the individualism that is 
inherent in most contemporary ideological transparency. 
To see what Marx means by social relations appearing as relations between things, consider a 
serf who is bound to his landlord and must work the landlord’s fields. It would be hard for the 
serf not to sense the nature of his social relation to his lord. The exploitation he endures is in 
plain sight, and the social differences between serf and lord are codified and manifest. In the 
act of exchange, by contrast, each participant is nominally free and equal, and the social 
relation between them seems incidental. Even if the relation is exploitative, such as 
exchanging labor power for less money than the laborer’s output is worth, only the 
commodities being exchanged seem to have fixed relations, such as relative prices. 
Fetishism is analytically separate from ideology. Fetishism stems from commodity 
production and exchange and thus includes a powerful element of horizontal socialization. 
Ideology, as discussed above, is a result of vertical socialization (see Section 2.2). In 
principle, no ideologists are necessary for people to participate in exchange or to believe 
themselves to be autonomous. In practice, of course, some form of a judiciary usually 
emerges atop exchange to deal with fraud, keep the poor in check, and so on. In other words, 
ideological formations are entwined with fetishism, but they have also often existed without 
it. 
In my interpretation, individualist transparency combines fetishism and ideology. 
Individualist transparency builds on real experiences and practices that stem from the 
horizontal exchange of commodities. It suggests that people coordinate themselves like all-
seeing, free-market agents while operating within environments that have been ideologically 
modified. This mode of ideological socialization is compatible with the experiences of 
autonomy that individuals have in exchange. It also fits with other individualist forms of 
ideological socialization, such as individual rights. 
The concept of fetish emerged on the West African coast in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, when Portuguese expeditions began to explore and settle the region in pursuit of 
trade. These colonialists used the word Fetisso to characterize certain practices of the locals 





they encountered. The word had its roots in the Portuguese feitiço, meaning “folk magic,” 
and the Latin facticius, meaning “manufactured.”289 Fetisso, however, acquired an important 
new connotation: the word came to signify an institutionalized quasi-religious delusion that 
maintained the social fabric of African nations through the mediation of tangible things.290 
This interpretation was probably based on Christian commodity traders’ lopsided 
interpretations of West African social practices, but it began to spread virulently in the 
theories of European scholars. 
One of the most famous early interpretations of fetishism was by the French philosopher 
Charles de Brosses. Marx probably picked up the word fetish from de Brosses’s 1760 work 
Du Culte des Dieux fétiches. In this work, de Brosses compares evidence from several 
societies of people endowing animals or objects with divine or spiritual properties. He argues 
that fetishism is a primitive stage in the development of religion that appears at different 
times in various parts of the world. De Brosses considers fetishism a form of “brute 
stupidity”—and possibly a form of divine punishment—that could nonetheless be corrected 
by educating the “savages.”291 
The concept of fetishism appears in Kant, Rousseau, Smith, Destutt de Tracy, Hegel, and 
Comte, among others. By the early twentieth century, however, fetishism as a theoretical 
concept was going out of fashion. Marcel Mauss could at that point characterize it as an 
“immense misunderstanding” between Europeans and Africans. Today, the word is often 
associated either with Freud’s theory of sexual fetishism292 or Bruno Latour’s crusade against 
“anti-fetishisms” like Marx’s.293 
I begin by discussing Marx’s analysis of fetishism in Capital, volume 1, and combine this 
with the interpretation of ideology that I outlined in the previous section. The result is a 
conception of fetishistic ideology, which I finally use to theorize individualist transparency. 
                                              
289 Pietz 1987: 24–39. 
290 Pietz 1988: 6. 
291 Leonard 2016: 57–59. 
292 Leonard 2016: 75–78. 
293 Latour 2010: 8. Latour includes Marx among “the Moderns” who associate fetishism with “naïve beliefs.” 
According to Latour, Marx fails to understand that “[i]f merchandise loses its seeming autonomy, no human 
regains mastery as a result, and certainly not the tireless worker.” Latour 2010: 11. This is beside Marx’s point. 
As I show below, Marx’s fetishism theory is not about beliefs or utopias of direct perception, but the appearance 
effects of exchange. For a critique of Latour’s ignorant use of Marx, see White 2013. 
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2.3.1 Marx on Fetishism 
[I]n the act of seeing, there is at all events, an actual passage of light from one thing to another, 
from the external object to the eye. There is a physical relation between physical things. But it 
is different with commodities. 
Marx, Capital, volume 1294 
From early on, Marx’s treatment of fetishism differs from that of many of his 
contemporaries: Marx analyzes fetishism in his own society. He does not project fetishism as 
a feature of Europe’s Other. According to young Marx, wood is the Rheinlander’s fetish,295 
Germany is comparable to a fetish worshipper,296 and so on. Indeed, Marx often uses the 
concept in a comparative-pejorative manner to make sense (and fun) of his compatriots.297 
Marx appended a preliminary treatment of commodity fetishism into the first edition of 
Capital, volume 1, in 1867, and reworked it into a full sub-chapter in the 1873 second 
edition. This ten-page sub-chapter is Marx’s most extensive, mature, and original discussion 
of fetishism, and it is explicitly integrated into his critique of political economy. The sub-
chapter presents an economic analysis of the way in which things appear: it features the word 
Erscheinung (appearance) nine times and Gegenstand (object) fourteen times in different 
permutations.298 Importantly for my interpretation, however, Ideologie does not appear in the 
fetishism chapter at all, although it does appear multiple times in Capital, which suggests that 
this analysis is not directly related to Marx’s conception of ideology. 
Marx’s basic premise is that although production for exchange (i.e. commodity production) 
has existed for a long time, it is particularly central to the capitalist mode of production. This 
mode of production revolves around wage laborers selling their labor power to capitalists 
who, in turn, sell the worker’s products as commodities. Only a portion of the receipts are 
used to pay wages and cover other costs, with the capitalists keeping the rest as profit. 
Once capital establishes itself as a stable part of society, it is inclined to replace or integrate 
non-capitalist ways of producing things. The most important reason for such expansion is that 
capitalists need profit to continue being capitalists. To make a profit under competition, they 
                                              
294 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, p.83; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.10, pp. 71–72. 
295 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 1, pp. 262–263. 
296 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 3, p. 183. 
297 E.g., Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 3, p. 290; Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 29, p. 77. 
298 Marx & Engels 1975–: II.10, pp. 70–81. 





must fight for markets by cutting prices and increasing productivity.299 In doing so, they tend 
to seek business opportunities extensively across the world and intensively in their own 
societies.300 As capitalist commodity production spreads, so does commodity fetishism, 
which is part and parcel of commodity production.301 
Fetishism is associated with commodities in particular because of the specific way in which 
production for exchange mediates social relations through things. Marx notes that in order to 
exchange products, people must first privately produce different, mutually useful goods.302 
People would not participate in exchange if they had no use for each other’s products—if, for 
example, they could more easily produce the same thing themselves. They would also not 
exchange if they could procure the commodities from each other in some other way, such as 
if property was not privately owned in the first place. Thus, there is a sense in which private 
property and differences between production units cause exchange.303 
In exchanging products, people equate them. In exchanging coats for linen, to use Marx’s 
example, I render my x coats commensurate with your y yards of linen. Exchange necessarily 
bridges irreducible qualitative differences in this way. As a result, things develop social 
relations, or relations “between people expressed as a relation between things”:304 
[To commodity producers], the relations connecting the labour of one individual with that of 
the rest appear [erscheinen], not as direct social relations between individuals at work, but as 
what they really are, material relations between persons and social relations between things.305 
When a coat equals a quantity of linen, for instance, the coat’s value begins to seem like an 
inherent property of the coat. The coat now has a value relative to linen. It is as viable for 
people to take this property for granted in their daily life as it is the coat’s weight, for 
instance. The appearance of value as a thing is thus correct in the sense that this is indeed 
how social relations work under commodity production. From a rigorous scientific 
perspective, however, it is nonsensical to treat value exclusively as an attribute of things, 
                                              
299 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 37, pp. 192–193. 
300 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, pp. 751–761. 
301 Since commodity production and developed markets have existed prior to the capitalist mode of production, 
forms of exchange and labor values as well as commodity fetishism must also predate it. Marx argues, however, 
that such fetishism only becomes practically important when exchange has spread far and wide. Marx & Engels 
1975–2005: 84. 
302 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, pp. 57, 69. 
303 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, p. 103. 
304 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, pp. 85, footnote 1; Marx & Engels 1975–: II.10, 73, footnote 27. 
305 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, p. 84; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.10, p. 72. Emphasis added. 
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because nothing about coats explains why x coats are worth y linen. As Marx notes, “no 
chemist has ever discovered exchange value either in a pearl or a diamond.”306 
The point of Marx’s fetishism theory is that in order to “see” the real origins of value, a 
scientific interpretative apparatus is required. Commodity production and exchange usually 
take place without such an apparatus, however. Value has its real origin in privately-
conducted but socially-oriented labor,307 yet the practices of commodity production and 
exchange reveal nothing of this origin. This is why commodity production is accompanied by 
fetishism. 
In addition to the fetishistic character of value, Marx mentions many other dimensions of 
commodity fetishism that are less fundamental to his analysis.308 The most important of these 
here are fetishistic forms that resemble commodity fetishism but are not reducible to it. I call 
these forms revenue fetishism because they stem from the various sources of revenue that 
people have access to: 
The form of revenue and the sources of revenue are the most fetishistic expression of the 
relations of capitalist production. It is their form of existence as it appears [scheinen] on the 
surface, divorced from the hidden connections and the intermediate connecting links. Thus the 
land becomes the source of rent, capital the source of profit, and labour the source of wages. 
The distorted form in which the real inversion is expressed is naturally reproduced in the views 
of the agents of this mode of production. It is a kind of fiction without fantasy, a religion of the 
vulgar.309 
To sum up, my interpretation of Marx’s argument concerning commodity fetishism is as 
follows: People privately produce different, mutually useful things and then equate them. 
This results in fetishism because the social relations underlying commodity production and 
                                              
306 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35 p. 94. 
307 Profit rate equalization causes prices to deviate slightly from labor values, as Marx well knew. Shaikh 2016: 
422. This is an important economics issue in its own right, but has no bearing on the argument of my 
dissertation. 
308 For instance, commodities tend to exchange in proportion to the amount of abstract labor expended in their 
production (presuming developed markets). Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 37, p. 176. People who produce 
commodities often do not meet each other, but rather labor for each other without knowledge of each other. 
Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, pp. 83–84. Commodity values are often expressed only in money prices and 
not linen and must be exchanged via this intermediary, not bartered. Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, pp. 
80–81. Prices fluctuate in proportion to labor values in a seemingly impersonal market process that disciplines 
its participants. Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, pp. 85–86. 
309 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 32, pp. 449–450; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.3.4., pp. 1450–1453. This 
passage is to be found in a preparatory manuscript for Capital that was written before the first volume’s 
fetishism chapter. 





exchange are not evident in these practices. Furthermore, because people’s social 
embeddedness is not evident, they misleadingly seem to be independent of each other. In 
addition to commodity fetishism, the capitalist mode of production also spreads forms of 
revenue fetishism deriving from profit, rent, and wages. 
All fetishistic forms resemble ideology in the sense that they stem from social relations that 
are mediated in a way that tends to produce misleading appearances. Fetishism is not 
ideology, however, because it is caused by commodity production, exchange, and revenue 
rather than ideological powers and vertical socialization. Fetishism is a religion “of the 
vulgar,” as Marx puts it—not an actual, literal religion. 
In the section that follows, I examine Marx’s understanding of the relationship between 
ideology and fetishism by giving examples of what I interpret as discussion of fetishistic 
ideology in Marx’s works. This question is of particular relevance to my dissertation, since I 
argue that individualist transparency is a form of fetishistic ideology. 
2.3.1.1 Fetishistic Ideology in Marx 
Though fetishism and ideology stem from different sources, they often appear together in 
developed capitalist societies. This is because fetishism provides ideologists with resources 
that can be mobilized by a wide variety of ideological forms. One such fetishistic ideological 
form is individualist transparency, which mobilizes fetishism by creating circumstances in 
which atomistic individuals freely choose between appearances that have been planned by 
transparency ideologists. 
My conception of individualist transparency, laid out above, relies on an analytical distinction 
between fetishism and ideology, which are nonetheless interconnected. It seems to me that 
Marx himself distinguished between fetishism and ideology in a similar manner. Many 
Marxist interpretations, however, have instead seen fetishism as a form of ideology (see 
Section 2.3.2). I must therefore produce evidence for my conception in Marx’s texts. I concur 
with Rehmann, however, that it is probably impossible to conclusively resolve this 
disagreement by reading Marx, simply because there is nowhere that he unequivocally states 
his view.310  
                                              
310 Rehmann 2013: 49. 
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There are, however, passages in Marx that I think exemplify fetishistic ideology—that is, 
cases where fetishism and ideology come together concretely, but where their generative 
mechanisms are different enough that the two dimensions should be distinguished 
analytically. In identifying relevant passages I focus exclusively on Marx’s writings after 
1857, for it is only in this period that he begins to discuss the appearance effects of 
commodities in a way that corresponds with the interpretation of fetishism that I have given 
above. 
In the 1857/58 writings, the question of fetishistic ideology is best discernible when Marx 
discusses the history of theories of money. He notes that many sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century bourgeois economic thinkers defined wealth as money. The reason for this 
misconception, Marx argues, was that capitalist production had not yet become all-
encompassing, and subsistence production was common. Subsistence producers did not 
participate in the commodity circuit, which used money, and thus did not contribute to wealth 
accumulation in the bourgeois sense. International trade, by contrast, was conducted in 
commodities via money. Because it was possible to extract surplus value from this money-
denominated trade, money seemed to characterize wealth creation, which led theorists astray: 
As to the special attention paid by the monetary and mercantile systems [i.e., theories] to 
international trade . . ., one has to remember that in those times national production was for the 
most part still carried on within the framework of feudal forms and served as the immediate 
source of subsistence for the producers themselves. Most products did not become 
commodities; they were accordingly neither converted into money nor entered at all into the 
general process of the social exchange of matter; hence they did not appear [erscheinen] as 
objectification [Vergegenständlichung] of universal abstract labour and did not indeed 
constitute bourgeois wealth.311 
In my view, this passage is an exemplary account of fetishistic ideology. The ideological 
aspect consists of mental laborers idealizing commodity-based money wealth as universal, 
although it was still rather marginal in actual society. The fetishistic aspect is evident in the 
idea that wealth was inherent to the money commodity—a notion that loses sight of wealth’s 
social character. Fetishism affected ideology, giving rise to fetishistic ideology. 
                                              
311 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 29, p. 389; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.2, p. 218. 





In his 1861–63 Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx considers the 
connection between wages and fetishistic ideology, noting that workers’ “labor capacity” 
(“labor power,” Arbeitskraft, in Capital) can be used to produce more value than what 
capitalists return as wages. Despite this, the fetishistic appearance of wages gives both parties 
to the exchange the impression that the laborer is fully compensated, in the sense that he 
receives the value of his labor. Marx calls out the “vulgar” political economists as the 
ideologists having a field day with wages’ fetishistic appearance: 
It is already contained in the term wage of labour, in which the wage of labour=the price of 
labour=the value of labour. This form lacks conceptual rigour; but it is the form which lives 
both in the consciousness of the worker and in that of the capitalist, because it is the form 
which directly appears [erscheinen] in reality; it is therefore the form vulgar political economy 
sticks to, making the specific difference which sets the science of political economy apart from 
all the other sciences the fact that the latter seek to uncover the essence which lies hidden 
behind commonplace appearances . . ..312 
Again, the fetishistic ideology of vulgar economists can be disaggregated into the ideological 
component (economists) and the fetishistic component (the experience of exchange). This 
distinction is important: By “the form” which “lives . . . in the consciousness of the worker,” 
Marx cannot possibly mean the ideology of vulgar economic theory, which most workers 
must have been ignorant of. Rather, Marx’s point is that a real fetishistic aspect of the life-
process and experience of laborers corresponds with such ideology because of the shared 
generative mechanism of fetishism. It is the capitalists’ experience of the wage that vulgar 
economists universalize, but the workers’ experience happens to resemble this because 
workers and capitalists are parties to the same exchange. The “realism” of the ideology 
produced by vulgar economists consists precisely in its fetishism, because fetishism is a part 
of most people’s everyday lives. In Capital, volume 1, Marx expands this argument to cover 
all of bourgeois ideology: 
[T]he money-relation conceals the unrequited labour of the wage labourer. Hence, we may 
understand the decisive importance of the transformation of value and price of labour power 
                                              
312 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 34, p. 86; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.3.6, p. 2117. In Capital, Marx 
likewise mentions “the capitalist and his ideological representative, the political economist.” Despite holding 
Ricardo in high scientific regard, Marx then goes on to cite him as an example of such an ideological 
representative. Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, pp. 572–573. This shows that Marx did not establish a clear 
boundary between science and ideology, but thought that ideology and science could exist side-by-side within 
one person or text. 
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into the form of wages, or into the value and price of labour itself. This phenomenal form 
[Erscheinungsform], which makes the actual relation invisible, and, indeed, shows the direct 
opposite of that relation, forms the basis of all the juridical notions of both labourer and 
capitalist, of all the mystifications of the capitalistic mode of production, of all its illusions as to 
liberty, of all the apologetic shifts of the vulgar economists.313 
Marx treats even the bourgeois notion of liberty, which has long been elevated to a lofty first 
principle in law and political theory,314 as fetishistic ideology. Again, fetishism explains the 
“realistic” part of these ideologies: the commodity form of the worker’s labor power indeed 
implies that she has the juridical right to sell her labor power to different employers, move 
house, or shop with wages earned. Ideology often even naturalizes such rights of the sphere 
of exchange as people’s innate characteristics or born rights. In reality, however, the capitalist 
also disciplines the worker in the workplace, appropriates part of her product, and sends his 
judges and police after her if she attempts to appropriate it back. Oppression and exploitation 
are no less features of the capitalist mode of production than is market freedom. Unlike 
market freedom and sociopolitical liberty, however, bourgeois ideologists rarely sanctify 
oppression and exploitation as the universal values of capitalist society. 
In other words, bourgeois fetishistic ideology is “true” and pragmatic with respect to the 
domain of exchange and ideological liberty, but it is also misleading in its partiality: it leaves 
out the oppression and exploitation that are necessary aspects of market freedom and 
ideological liberty. In his 1861–63 Contribution, Marx explains this partiality through the 
disproportionate sway that the ruling class holds over ideology: 
In fact, the vulgar economists . . . translate the concepts, motives, etc., of the representatives of 
capitalist production who are held in thrall to this system of production and in whose 
consciousness only its superficial appearance [Schein] is reflected. They translate them into a 
doctrinaire language, but they do so from the standpoint of the ruling section, i.e. the capitalists, 
and their treatment is therefore not naïve and objective [objektiv], but apologetic.315 
To sum up, my interpretation of fetishistic ideology in Marx is as follows: Fetishism is an 
important resource that ideologists can mobilize in societies dominated by the capitalist mode 
of production. This is because capitalist production tends to spread commodity-mediated 
                                              
313 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, p. 540; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.10, p.484. 
314 E.g., Locke 2003: 101. 
315 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 32, p. 450; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.3.4, p. 1453. 





social relations across people’s everyday lives. Both ideologists and their audiences tend to 
share fetishistic horizontal experiences and practices that affect the production and reception 
of ideology. Since ideologists operate in a society dominated by production for exchange and 
attempt to alter the way in which people interpret their fetishistic experiences, ideology and 
fetishism entwine into an organic whole, which is why it is difficult to distinguish between 
them. In a sense, Capital is a gargantuan attempt at making precisely this analytical 
distinction: it asks how the widely-circulating ideological categories of bourgeois political 
economists relate to the non-ideological forms of thought and action that emerge within lived 
experience amidst the fetishized appearances that are characteristic of the capitalist mode of 
production. Or, as Marx puts it in Capital, volume 1, 
[Forms of appearance, Erscheinungsformen,] appear directly and spontaneously as current 
modes of thought; [their hidden substratum] must first be discovered by science. Classical 
political economy nearly touches the true relation of things, without, however, consciously 
formulating it. This it cannot so long as it sticks in its bourgeois skin.316 
There are ways to move beyond fetishism, however, even within the capitalist mode of 
production. One might, for example, take stock systematically of all the traces left by 
capitalist commodity production and circulation, not only those that are immediately evident 
from within the practice itself. It is difficult to do this, however. As long as the bourgeoisie 
controls the means of mental reproduction, ideologists will tend to underplay oppression and 
exploitation, often focusing on freedom instead. This is clearly evident in individualist 
transparency, which is propagated by professional socializers who suggest that individuals 
see well and therefore make choices autonomously. However, even non-ideologists may 
demand ideological transparency to bolster their own apparent autonomy—or they may resist 
ideological transparency because they perceive its misleading character as detrimental to their 
autonomy. 
As indicated earlier, many Marxists have considered fetishism to be a form of ideology. 
Although I think this view mistaken, its prominence in the history of Marxism warrants brief 
discussion. In the section that follows, I outline the emergence of the Marxist controversy 
concerning the relationship of ideology and fetishism, and the main lines of Marxist 
disagreement on this topic. 
                                              
316 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, p. 542; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.10, p. 485. 
31049380_Vaitoskirja_Sami_Torssonen_Yhteisk_tiet_tdk_sisus_B5.indd   94 5.3.2019   9.16




2.3.2 Is Fetishism Ideology? 
The Marxist controversy concerning fetishism is closely related to the controversy over 
ideology theory (see Section 2.3.2): If ideology is a form of consciousness, then fetishism can 
be a form of ideology, since fetishism undeniably involves consciousness. If, on the other 
hand, ideology is a process of production, then fetishism cannot be a form of ideology, since 
fetishism stems from commodity production and exchange rather than ideological 
socialization. 
Fetishism was theoretically fairly marginal in Marxism before the First World War.317 And as 
long as fetishism remained out of sight, the relationship between fetishism and ideology 
could not be interrogated, either. One culprit in fetishism’s fringe position is probably Engels, 
who used the concept only rarely318 and never as the basis of any of his own theoretical 
developments. Fetishism was likewise absent or sidelined in the writings of other major early 
Marxists.319 Marxist discussion of fetishism picked up only during the early twentieth 
century. 
As fetishism rose in prominence, the question of whether fetishism is ideology also emerged. 
One way of dealing with this problem was to simply ignore it. Isaak Rubin’s 1924 Essays on 
Marx’s Theory of Value, for instance, argues against equating Marx’s ideology and fetishism 
conceptions.320 Rubin does not explain what the relationship of these conceptions is, 
however, but instead decides to entirely “leave aside . . . the laws of development of 
ideology.”321 He recognizes the problem, but leaves it unresolved. 
                                              
317 Howard & King 1989: 17; Marxhausen 1999: 348. 
318 The only instance I am aware of is in Engels’s synopsis of Capital, volume 1, in which he mentions the 
concept in passing but does not quite do justice to Marx’s treatment. Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 20, p. 268. 
The concept does not appear in any of Engels’s published works. It does appear, of course, in volumes 2 and 3 
of Capital, which Engels edited on the basis of Marx’s manuscripts. 
319 This includes at least Bernstein, Plekhanov, Lenin, Hilferding, and Luxemburg. Kautsky is the first 
exception: He argues in 1887 that the chapter on fetishism is among “the most important” in Capital. Kautsky 
1925: 11. He briefly outlines the concept, but does not use it in his analysis in any way. In 1894, von Tugan-
Baranovsky likewise argues that the theory of fetishism is “one of Marx’s greatest services,” but does not do 
anything with it. von Tugan-Baranovsky 1901: 15. Howard and King claim that Bernstein argued against 
Marx’s fetishism conception, but the word fetishism does not occur in Bernstein’s Evolutionary Socialism, 
which they cite, and the discussion therein is only indirectly related to questions of fetishism. Howard & King 
1989: 74; Bernstein 1911. 
320 Rubin 1990: 55–56. 
321 Rubin 1990: 2. 





Another common Marxist way of dealing with fetishism has been to view it as a form of 
ideology,322 as in Karl Korsch’s Marxism and Philosophy from 1923.323 The main danger in 
this approach is that ideology becomes a simple typological device for categorizing 
conceptions that stem from different sources but share certain defining characteristics. 
Another problem is that ideology may begin to seem omnipresent because commodity 
production and exchange are virtually omnipresent. György Lukács’s famous 1923 book 
History and Class Consciousness, for instance, argues that fetishism unavoidably produces 
ruling-class ideology (understood in terms of consciousness) in everyone who partakes in 
capitalist production and exchange.324 
By contrast, some Marxists have stressed ideology to the exclusion of fetishism. In his 1929–
35 notebooks, for instance, Gramsci uses the word fetishism only to refer to how churches 
and other collective organizations create the impression that they exist independently of their 
members.325 Gramsci disregards entirely Marx’s description of the way in which production 
for exchange affects ideology. Other Marxists have since followed Gramsci in disconnecting 
their ideology conceptions from fetishism.326 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the most important Marxist conception of the 
relationship of fetishism and ideology is that of the Projekt Ideologietheorie. In the section 
that follows, I discuss recent criticism that has been levelled at the Projekt’s conception in 
order to illustrate what it currently at stake in this debate. 
                                              
322 According to Eagleton, Marx's theory of the fetishism of commodities concerns “ideology” that consists in 
“false or deceptive beliefs” that arise from “the material structure of society as a whole.” Eagleton 1991: 30. 
Larraín argues that Marx, in his later works, “is no longer merely concerned with philosophical and theoretical 
forms of ideology, but turns his attention to ideological forms which arise in the spontaneous consciousness of 
men and women as a result of their daily practice.” Larraín 1983: 33. Brown, Fleetwood, and Roberts argue that 
commodities “invoke a social compulsion, a compulsion whose ideological form Marx terms ‘commodity 
fetishism’.” Fleetwood, Brown, & Roberts 2002: 11. 
323 Korsch notes that Marx and Engels do not seem to count fetishism under ideology, yet he himself does 
include commodity fetishism within the “basic ideology of bourgeois society.” Korsch 2008: 84. He defines 
ideology as “a false consciousness, in particular one that mistakenly attributes an autonomous character to a 
partial phenomena [sic] of social life.” Korsch 2008: 83.  
324 Lukács argues that there are “unmediated concepts that have been derived from the fetishistic forms of 
objectivity,” and that these concepts are themselves the “ideology of [the] ruling class.” In other words, ruling-
class ideology tends to spontaneously emanate from fetishism. Furthermore, such fetishistic ruling-class “ideas 
[are] necessarily held by the agents of the capitalist system of production.” Lukács 1968: 13–14. 
325 Gramsci 2000: 243–245; Gramsci 1971: 95. This would be better conceived of as a consequence of the 
consolidation of ideological powers. 
326 Laclau, for instance, discusses the relationship between economics and ideology exclusively in terms of 
class, and never mentions fetishism. Laclau 1977: 128–132. 
31049380_Vaitoskirja_Sami_Torssonen_Yhteisk_tiet_tdk_sisus_B5.indd   96 5.3.2019   9.16




2.3.2.1 Fetishism, Ideology, and Projekt Ideologietheorie 
The clearest recent statement of the problem of fetishism and ideology is Thomas Metscher’s 
criticism of the Projekt Ideologietheorie, which he presented in an article and exchange of 
letters with Jan Rehmann in the journal Zeitschrift Marxistische Erneuerung. Rehmann 
participated in the Projekt Ideologietheorie and continues to be strongly influenced by it, 
whereas Metscher has long worked on his own interpretation of Marxist ideology theory.327 
My approach to ideology and fetishism is very similar to Rehmann’s, so Metscher’s criticism 
directly concerns my work. 
Metscher’s basic argument is that ideology should not be conceived of as entering people’s 
lives “from above.” This would be a form of “priestly deception theory.” Rather, he 
postulates the existence of everyday “elementary forms of the ideological,” which include the 
“commodity fetish,” “idols of the market,” and “fetishes of everyday life.”328 These 
elementary forms of the ideological give rise to forms of ideological consciousness, meaning 
that ideology mainly comes into being from below. For Metscher, the Projekt 
Ideologietheorie’s mistake therefore lies in identifying ideology with socialization through 
ideological powers. He claims that this move underplays the “primary socialization” that 
already stems from elementary forms of the ideological such as commodity fetishism.329 In a 
recognizably Marxist fashion, Metscher hopes to derive ideological socialization from the 
base rather than the superstructure. 
The dangers of conflating fetishism and ideology become evident upon an expanded reading 
of Metscher’s works. For instance, Metscher argues in his 2010 book Logos und Wirklichkeit 
that the “fetishes of everyday life,” mentioned above, consist in “effort, success, acceptance, 
representation and prestige, sex, youth, beauty, and sport.”330 These fetishes are said to be 
forms of “primary socialization” before any input by ideological powers. The obvious 
problem with this conception is that there is no causal connection between pre-ideological 
“acceptance” and “youth,” which renders Metscher’s theory a simple typology without much 
explanatory power. 
                                              
327 Metscher 2010; Rehmann 2013: 241–270. All of Metscher’s formulations here are my translations from the 
German original. 
328 Rehmann & Metscher 2012: 103. 
329 Rehmann & Metscher 2012: 103. 
330 Metscher 2010: 327. “Zu den Fetischen des Alltagslebens . . . gehören Leistung, Erfolg, Akzeptanz, 
Räpresentanz und Geltung, Sex, Jugend, Schönheit und Sport.” 





Metscher also conceives of ideology (as opposed to its “elementary forms”) as a form of 
consciousness and therefore believes that it can be overcome by mere “critical reflection,”331 
rather than requiring the removal of the reasons for its existence. This is, in fact, a logical 
result of Metscher’s theory of elementary forms of the ideological: it would be foolish to 
attempt to undo the causes of “acceptance,” “youth,” or “sport” (prior to intervention by the 
ideological powers, remember), but it is surely possible to reflect on these “fetishes” critically 
in order to avoid their ideological effects. Metscher’s Marxism thus devolves into a project of 
criticizing fetishisms rather than abolishing their causes. 
In the Projekt Ideologietheorie conception, by contrast, fetishism is one of many objective 
thought forms in people’s everyday lives, and no attempt is made to equate or explain all of 
these forms.332 Fetishism only becomes an element of ideological socialization when it is 
articulated vertically. Such articulation can be performed by professional ideologists or by 
non-ideologists, as long as the socialization passes through an ideological power. The Projekt 
therefore greatly limits the scope of both ideology and fetishism relative to Metscher, but in 
doing so, gains the possibility of a rigorous analysis that actually explains ideology and 
fetishism rather than simply categorizing them. 
Metscher is also mistaken in associating socialization through ideological powers with the 
Enlightenment-era conception of priestly deception.333 Vertical socialization does not imply 
that ideologists knowingly deceive people. This is particularly evident in the Projekt’s 
conception, which focuses on socialization rather than truthfulness. While my own 
conception emphasizes the epistemic aspect of ideology more, I nonetheless argue that 
ideological socialization results in misleading appearances irrespective of whether ideologists 
engage in conscious deception. This is because ideological powers have emergent dynamics, 
and because their posture of neutrality makes them seem to be independent from the rest of 
society (see Section 2.2.3). 
In sum, I argue that Marxists must distinguish fetishism from ideology. The Projekt 
Ideologietheorie approach is the most developed attempt at tackling the question of fetishism 
and ideology in the entire corpus of Marxism, which is why I have chosen it as a source of 
                                              
331 Metscher 2012: 67–69. 
332 Haug 1993: 55–56. The Projekt prefers to call fetishism “the objective thought forms of commodity-money-
relations” (die objektiven Gedankenformen der Ware-Geld-Beziehungen”). The idea is the same as my own, but 
I have chosen to stick with Marx’s simpler vocabulary. 
333 See Sloterdijk & Huyssen 1987: 29–30. 
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inspiration for my work. In the section that follows, I consider the implications of the theories 
of appearance, fetishism, and ideology that have been outlined above for the theory of social 
transparency. 
2.3.3 Fetishism and the Individualism of Ideological Transparency 
It is difficult for commodity producers and exchangers to interpret prices as traces of social 
relations. Commodities are, in this respect, typically socially opaque. The exploitative 
capital–labor relation, for instance, does not appear in wages. Instead, wages give rise to 
certain degrees of freedom in occupation and consumption. Individualist ideological 
transparency builds on and reinforces such fetishistic experiences of autonomy: its promise of 
direct perception makes ideological socialization through appearance planning seem 
compatible with individual autonomy. In other words, fetishism is the reason why ideological 
transparency so often takes an individualist form in present society. 
Commodities are opaque to exchangers because seeing the social in commodities is far from 
simple, and human eyes are certainly not up to the task. Prices are simply there, and if you 
ask what causes them, you are likely to get ideological answers (e.g., “supply and demand,” 
the mainstream economist’s parable334) rather than accounts of non-ideological everyday 
experience. Commodities are also opaque with respect to the division of value into profit, 
wages, rent, interest, and taxes, as well as the social distribution of wealth. Freedom of 
consumption and occupation, by contrast, are inscribed clearly on the surfaces of 
commodities. Exchange thus emphasizes autonomy and makes it difficult to notice the social 
relations underlying it, which is why the figure of the autonomous individual tends to become 
increasingly articulable for ideologists and increasingly understandable to their audiences as 
commodity production and exchange spreads. 
Beyond their appearance effects, commodities also create the practical possibility—and 
indeed need—for autonomy-emphasizing ideological socialization. Exchange implies, for 
instance, that the exclusivity of the respective properties of the exchangers will somehow be 
maintained, such as with legal and police protection of private property. Private property 
implies that owners get to decide what they will do with their property. Such ideological 
forms maintain and reinforce the experiences of autonomy that stem directly from exchange. 
                                              
334 Varian 2005: 289–291. 





Commodity production and exchange not only require certain ideological forms directly, but 
also affect ideological forms that are not directly related to exchange. Ideology is, after all, 
fundamentally incompatible with autonomy due to its top-down character. One way for 
ideologists to circumvent this conundrum is to work with fetishistic individuality—by 
orchestrating ideological socialization in such a way that it is seemingly grounded in 
subordinates’ inner selves, preferences, or desires, for example.335 This latter kind of 
individualist ideological socialization suffers from an inherent contradiction, however: in 
actuality, ideologists are an influence that stands outside the individual, but in principle, the 
individual’s inner self is used to justify ideological socialization. 
Individualist transparency is one attempt to cope with the contradiction of bourgeois 
ideological socialization while retaining its causes.336 People ostensibly see things directly 
and make choices autonomously, but the appearance planning functions through ideologists. 
Individualist ideological transparency socializes vertically, but not with the authority of an 
omnipotent patriarch. It does not require that believers kneel in prayer, nor does it strike 
down or scare evildoers. It does not take the form of displays of power, but of self-
coordination through ostensibly direct perception. 
                                              
335 It must be noted, however, that ideological socialization does not always take misleadingly individualist 
forms in societies dominated by commodity production. On the one hand, ideologists may ignore fetishism and 
instead base ideological socialization on experiences that are compatible with explicit hierarchy. Indian castes, 
for instance, are still often justified using metaphors of purity and contamination that draw on normatively 
structured everyday experiences to construct caste distinctions based on inherent personal characteristics rather 
than individual choice. Harrison & Channa 2005: 54. On the other hand, national socialist authoritarianism 
articulated fetishistic experiences in an anti-individualist way in claiming to oppose the dissolution of social 
bonds by individualism—although it did little to abolish the economic causes of that dissolution in practice. 
Gasman 1971: 47–48. Society is never a totality of fetishism, instead containing many contradictory elements. 
Fetishist experiences are also articulable in many ways, although the individualist articulation is the most 
straightforward. Individualism is a lucrative tenet for ideologists in capitalist societies, but it is also possible to 
win over audiences by articulating fetishist experiences in a non-individualist way or by appealing to other 
systemic or widespread aspects of everyday experience, such as the tortures of the workplace, intimate familial 
relations, or experiences of camaraderie and solidarity. 
336 Individualist transparency is far from being the only form of individualist ideology, of course. Fetishism has 
contributed to ideological socialization revolving around autonomous individuality throughout the history of 
commodity production. For instance, cultural historians recognize a decidedly modern discourse on individual 
authenticity, genteel self-control, sincerity, honesty, and autonomy in the face of external social pressure, 
oppression, and alienation. Berman 1971: xiv–xvii; Halttunen 1986: 93, 121. One prominent example of this is 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who in the eighteenth century argued that interpersonal relations tend to become less 
honest and authentic in societies in which competition and inequality are rampant. Rousseau et al. 2002: 123. 
Today, political scientists and economists often model society as a collection of decision-making agents. The 
optimizing behavior of these autonomous agents amidst external structures supposedly underlies (or should 
underlie) everything from the invisible hand of the market to the global anarchy of the state system. Varian 
2005: 1–19; Waltz 1988: 619. Perhaps the clearest contemporary example of fetishistic ideology is organization 
studies, which comes up with a new individualist terminology for justifying corporate hierarchy every decade or 
so. Starbuck 2006: 124–125. 
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For a concrete example, consider educational psychologist Lee Shulman’s argument during a 
debate on education reform in the United States in the first decade of the 2000s. Shulman 
argued that 
the progress students are making needs to be as accessible to them as it is to teachers or 
policymakers. Such transparency can empower students to take greater control of their own 
destinies. It is, after all, ultimately the student who must own her or his understanding and 
progress. Systems of assessment that are opaque, secretive, and slow-responding cripple 
students’ sense of responsibility.337 
In my interpretation, Shulman, who was then a university professor and President of the 
private Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, promoted the idea of getting 
students to independently pursue extrinsic goals by suggesting an ideological system of 
appearance. However, he inverted the causal structure of the situation by claiming that 
students would choose freely in pursuing skills that assessors deem beneficial—including 
“fundamental concepts of science and technology that are needed in the 21st century 
economy.”338 
Importantly, fetishism’s individualism-enabling effect only prevails within the exchange 
relationship itself. Prices appear differently, for instance, to Marxist economists such as 
Anwar Shaikh, who uses statistical tools to translate price data into indirect measures of labor 
values.339 Prices therefore appear proportional to wage costs and, by assumption, unmeasured 
labor time.340 It follows that cars are more expensive than hairpins because making them is 
more laborious, not because of supply and demand, preferences, or individual choices. 
Marxist economists can also disaggregate prices into their wage and profit components. 
For Marxist economists, then, prices are not necessarily opaque, but may instead be socially 
transparent with respect to traces of things like labor and exploitation. However, this requires 
complex theoretico-empirical maneuvers that confound novices and are (and must be) open to 
criticism.341 It is therefore difficult to popularize this form of social transparency into 
everyday life under the present circumstances. 
                                              
337 Shulman 2007: 25. 
338 Shulman 2007: 22. 
339 Shaikh 2016: 395–422. 
340 Shaikh 2016: 212–256. 
341 Roberts 2016b. 





I have now outlined my interpretation of Marx’s concepts of appearance, ideology, and 
fetishism. I have also discussed how these are helpful for understanding and explaining 
individualist transparency. The chapter that follows presents the previously published articles 
that inspired my re-theorization of transparency, focusing on the articles’ most important 
methodological questions and the implications of these questions for my conception of 
transparency.
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3 Publications and Their Methodologies 
As the methodological components of the three previously published journal articles are 
somewhat different from each other, I will not construct a single methodological conception 
for all of the articles in this chapter. Instead, I will expand upon the methodological 
considerations that are most significant for each of the articles individually. 
The first article is a materialistic history of livestock welfare commodification. The most 
pertinent methodological issue here concerns the ascension from the abstract to the concrete. 
Article II, by contrast, is a video game analysis of two EU-funded games that are intended to 
educate livestock welfare consumers and producers. Here, the main question concerns the 
functional mode of explanation that I employ to understand the differences between the 
games. The third article is a conceptual history of transparency, which calls for a clarification 
of the Marxist analysis of language. 
In the context of this dissertation, the first two articles provide empirical illustrations of how 
forms of ideological transparency have emerged, functioned, and developed in the domain of 
livestock welfare. The third, by contrast, compares different domains of ideological 
transparency to facilitate broader theorization. 
Overall, I have identified five main analytical ways to approach social transparency. Each of 
the articles, as well as the earlier chapters of this dissertation, emphasizes some of these ways 
more than others. Any concrete process of appearance planning must, however, take into 
account all of these perspectives in order to succeed at producing the intended appearances. 
1. Transparency can be objectified “from the side,” such that it is viewed as an aspect of 
a broader process of appearance that also includes a subject-side that interprets traces 
and an object-side side that imprints the traces. The earlier chapters of this dissertation 
comprise one of the few attempts I am aware of at a treatment of transparency from 
the side and, I hope, the most elaborate.342 
2. A “bottom-up” approach describes how the retention of traces comes about—that is, 
what mechanisms preserve traces and why these mechanisms exist. In a bottom-up 
approach, transparency conceptions and regulation attempts are appear to be affected 
                                              
342 Heald’s work comes closest to a sideways account, although he does not really consider objects at all. Heald 
2006: 27–31. 





by factors that are causally prior to them. This approach dominates Article I, in which 
I study how livestock welfare certification emerged. The bottom-up approach is easily 
bogged down by details, however, insofar as it focuses on a single causal complex at 
one level of abstraction. 
3. A “top-down” investigation focuses on people’s conscious attempts at introducing 
trace retention and their beliefs concerning this process. Any study that focuses 
exclusively on transparency ideologists or ideology, such as Article II, must follow 
some variant of this approach. The inherent voluntarism of this approach makes it 
insufficient by itself, however. No appearance planner simply decides to impose 
transparency out of thin air, since appearance planning is also an effect and 
component of a broader reality. 
4. A “temporal” reading emphasizes the development or fluctuation of transparency over 
time. This is a necessary component of any Marxist approach and is omnipresent in all 
three of my articles. However, it is often useful to “stop time” for purposes of 
abstraction, as I have done in Article II and in many sections of this dissertation. 
5. A “comparative” approach differentiates between various types of transparencies and 
sets them side by side. This is necessary for purposes of abstraction and was the 
motivation behind Article III. The problem with the comparative approach, however, 
is that different causal mechanisms may explain different transparencies, which is 
why a comparative analysis risks remaining typological rather than deeply causal. 
In the three sections that follow, I discuss the articles in greater depth in the order of their 
publication. My theoretical and methodological outlook has evolved during the dissertation 
process, with the result that the first article is most dissimilar to the conception laid out 
above, whereas the third one closely aligns with the positions taken here. Each of the three 
treatments has a roughly similar structure: I begin by outlining the article’s main contents and 
findings, after which I discuss the methodological issue at hand. 
3.1 Article I: From Abstract to Concrete 
The premise of Article I is that the commodification of livestock welfare, which is often 
conceptualized as “transparency,” has risen rapidly on the agendas of state, private, academic, 
and third sector actors since the turn of the century. The article outlines the historical 
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emergence of such commodification, which I call sellfare, by reading secondary research 
alongside policy and other documents. 
The article investigates several aspects of sellfare that originated in the past but remain 
effective today. It begins by outlining the evolutionary connection between humans and non-
human domesticates, which partially explains the emotional reactions people sometimes still 
have with respect to the suffering of certain non-human species. The article then outlines the 
emergence of purposeful state- and civil-societal manipulation of (and struggle around) the 
appearance of animal suffering and thriving, aspects of which are already recognizable in the 
eighteenth century. The early twentieth century bears witness to the emergence of livestock 
factories, which hide livestock from consumers and later develop into sites of welfare 
production. Scientific welfare policy develops after the Second World War, but the 
conception of welfare as a scientifically-measurable quality of livestock products only 
becomes consolidated during the 1990s. 
As I was working on the article, I noticed that many of the people working on “animal 
welfare” seemed to think that people have always been concerned about it. Much of the 
scholarship I read, for instance, projected animal welfare concerns backwards into nineteenth 
century Britain343 or even onto the entirety of human history from medieval to ancient 
times.344 I quickly realized that this was incorrect: the present concern with animal welfare 
refers to a different object than previous formulations. 
The term animal welfare is now commonly understood as meaning “the quality of an 
animal’s life as it is experienced by an individual animal.”345 This conception has really only 
become dominant during the second half of the twentieth century, although it already 
emerged in the nineteenth.346 Comparable issues were previously approached with concepts 
like cruelty347 or the German Artgerechtigkeit (species-appropriateness),348 which have 
implied different objects. Artgerechtigkeit, for instance, was concerned with species traits 
rather than individual animal experience, and it has only recently been replaced by more 
individualist notions such as Tiergerechtigkeit, (animal-appropriateness).349 Nineteenth-
                                              
343 Kean 1998: 21. 
344 Preece 2002: 38, 62. Marx, too, supposedly commented on “animal welfare.” Gunderson 2011. 
345 Blokhuis et al. 2013: 91. 
346 Woods 2012: 15–16. 
347 Kete 2011: 4–7. 
348 von Gall 2015. 
349 von Gall 2015: 50. 





century anti-cruelty regulation was often concerned primarily with controlling the working 
class rather than the well-being of non-human animals for their own sake. One purpose of 
cruelty regulation was to prevent workers from being desensitized to violence, lest their 
brutality turn against the ruling class.350 I do not believe this to be the case any longer. 
Welfare regulation is now drafted to soothe public outrage, which has flared up around 
livestock factories regularly for as long as they have existed.351 
Having realized the historical specificity of welfare, it also occurred to me that the case for 
historical specificity should not be overstated to the point of vulgar historicism. Something 
comparable to a concern for animal welfare has indeed existed in many societies beyond our 
own. Cicero, for instance, explains how spectators were emotionally thrilled and appalled by 
the suffering of animals in the circus,352 and Pythagoras condemns beating animals and eating 
meat because souls migrate between humans and non-human animals.353 Such descriptions 
are nothing like the factory-bound utility calculi of modern animal welfare science,354 but 
these phenomena are surely related in some way. 
In struggling with the question of historical specificity, I turned to Marx. In the Grundrisse, 
Marx notes that political economists tend to project the modern atomistic individual 
backwards in time, expecting to find self-sufficient and selfish men of commerce everywhere 
and throughout history. According to Marx, these economists consequently misunderstand 
the social ontology of the human species and see history as the product of the action of 
atomistic individuals, although in actuality, individuality takes on atomistic aspects only 
under specific historical circumstances.355 We now know that Marx was right: comparative 
studies of different societies show great variance in social behaviors and notions of social 
embeddedness, and the selfishness of the “economic man” is actually quite rare.356 
However, historical specificity should not be confused for vulgar historicism, by which I 
mean the refusal to abstract from a single temporal or scalar level of conjuncture. It is 
possible to discover broad patterns in history by abstracting away specificities, and moving 
                                              
350 Kete 2011: 4–7. 
351 E.g., Torssonen 2015: 35. There is good evidence that desensitized slaughterhouse workers are indeed more 
prone to violent crime. Fitzgerald, Kalof, & Dietz 2009. Animal handlers are nowadays too few to instill much 
fear in the ruling class, however. 
352 Preece 2002: 49. 
353 Preece 2002: 38. 
354 Blokhuis et al. 2013: 96–100. 
355 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 28, pp. 17–18. 
356 Henrich et al. 2004: 23. 
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between levels of abstraction is helpful to understanding and changing the world. Exchange 
has existed much longer than capitalist production, for instance, but with different forms of 
production, exchange has taken different forms.357 This abstract “exchange-as-such” must be 
nearly devoid of substantial content, however, because its concrete details have varied from 
society to society. This suggests that the most abstract and trivial theoretical concepts often 
have the broadest historical purchase, but this purchase should emphatically not be confused 
with the intellectual or practical worth of trivial concepts.358 
The above methodological considerations led me to conceptualize three different levels of 
abstraction for use in Article I.359 With the concept fare, I attempted to capture a maximally 
abstract notion of human anxiety about the well-being of non-humans. I also gave a social 
and biological evolutionary explanation360 for why this anxiety has tended to occur in 
societies with domesticated non-human animals. With welfare, by contrast, I indicated the 
scientific regulation of the well-being of industrially-produced non-human subjects within a 
state-civil society dynamic. This phenomenon rose to prevalence during the twentieth 
century. And with sellfare, I meant commodification as an instrument of livestock welfare 
regulation, which been prevalent since the 1990s. 
To express it differently, rather than accepting the ideological over-generalization of welfare 
that I detected in my source material, I attempted to show how welfare could be 
disaggregated into historical layers, some of which were of broader scope than others. This is 
an important part of the methodological dictum that Marx describes as movement from the 
abstract to the concrete.361 In this movement, abstract and simple categories, like welfare, are 
laboriously “concretized” as elements of the complex societal developments within which 
they operate. 
                                              
357 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 28, pp. 38–40. Marxists disagree as to what degree Marx intended his 
conception of value to be specific to societies dominated by the capitalist mode of production. See Wayne 2005; 
Milios & Dimoulis 2004; Bryceson 1983; Turner 2008; Cockshott 2018. On Marx’s own views on this topic, 
see Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 28, p. 411. 
358 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 28, pp. 39, 23. For a discussion of high-level abstractions, see Hall 2003: 
118. 
359 In this respect, my approach also resembles Gramsci’s conception of the non-contemporaneity of the present, 
as well as Koselleck’s conception of the layers of history. See Thomas 2009: 282–284; Koselleck & Gadamer 
2000: 19–24. Due to space constraints, I do not attempt to discuss the differences and similarities of these 
conceptions here. 
360 I argued that domestication presupposes and produces both brutal violence and empathy, giving rise to a 
variety of anxieties and regulation attempts. See the section “The Animal Connection and Domestication” in 
Article I. The real historical perseverance of this aspect of the domestication relation allows ideologists to find 
modern welfare in situations that are only remotely related to it. 
361 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 28, p. 38. 





I have since followed a similar path of “ascension” with several concepts that are central to 
this dissertation. Most importantly, I ascend from transparency to social transparency, then to 
ideological transparency, and finally individualist transparency. I also concretize the abstract 
category of appearance into the more concrete categories of ideology and fetishism, which 
need to be taken into consideration in any effort to understand social appearance in today’s 
society. 
The meanings of the words abstract and concrete that I employ here are obviously quite 
different from colloquial language. In everyday use, concrete connotes something like 
“tangible” or “material,” whereas “abstract” is close to “intangible.” Marx, by contrast, writes 
about the “mental concrete” and says that “abstraction” also happens non-consciously. For 
Marx, abstract is closer to “simple,” whereas concrete means something like “complex.” In 
the Grundrisse, for instance, he states that exchange value emerges as an abstract or “one-
sided” aspect of a complex concrete: 
the method of advancing from the abstract to the concrete is simply the way in which thinking 
assimilates the concrete and reproduces it as a mental concrete. This is, however, by no means 
the process by which the concrete itself originates. For example, the simplest economic 
category, e.g. exchange value, presupposes population, population which produces under 
definite conditions, as well as a distinct type of family, or community, or State, etc. Exchange 
value cannot exist except as an abstract, one-sided relation of an already existing concrete 
living whole.362 
Concretization does not simply add nuance to abstract concepts, such as exchange value. 
Concretized abstractions lose their original meaning (e.g., “an axis of commensurability”) 
and become different entities (e.g., “an effect of private production”).363 The purpose of 
ascending from the abstract to the concrete is therefore not to project finished abstractions 
into the concrete, but to constantly re-theorize abstractions through concretization. In this 
                                              
362 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 28, p. 38; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.I, pp. 36–37. Ilyenkov characterizes 
Marx’s view as follows: “This conception of unity in diversity (or concreteness) . . . approaches that of the 
concept of integrity or wholeness.” “The ‘abstract’ . . . assumes the meaning of the ‘simple’, undeveloped, one-
sided, fragmentary, ‘pure’ (i.e., uncomplicated by any deforming influences).” Ilyenkov 1982: 20–21. 
363 Marxists have disagreed on whether Marx later changed his mind about methodology. For instance, Haug 
argues that Marx came to see the Grundrisse as a “failed text” because it starts from finished abstractions, 
whereas the correct procedure is to proceed “in the direction of the process.” Haug 2006: 582. My position is 
akin to that of Ilyenkov and Rosdolsky, who do not find evidence of such a profound break in Marx’s work. 
Rosdolsky 1977: 27; Ilyenkov 1982: 20–21. There is an important sense in which Marx’s mature work Capital 
is still an attempt to “concretize” the work of bourgeois political economists, or to explicitly connect such work 
with the social relations within which it operates. 
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dissertation, I attempt to reconfigure social transparency alongside Marxist theory in a similar 
way. 
3.2 Article II: Functional Explanation 
In Article II, I took a more detailed look at the present situation of livestock welfare 
commodification by comparing two EU-funded educational video games about livestock. 
One of the games is intended for children,364 who are treated as consumers for whom 
livestock welfare should appear to be transparent, while the other teaches livestock producers 
how to manufacture welfare. The article’s main result is that although both games concern 
“welfare,” they are in fact referring to two different entities corresponding to particular 
moments of the commodity circuit. The children’s game rewards players for supporting 
“welfare,” i.e. making animals happy via consumption, whereas the producer game rewards a 
“welfare” that maximizes profit via efficiency gains. My theoretical interpretation of the 
causal complex underlying this finding is as follows: 
[T]he social roles of end consumers and capitalist producers are dissimilar. If a game persuaded 
capitalist producers to inefficiently cuddle livestock, for instance, it would ruin them. No 
similar pressure exists for consumers, who do not compete for profit. Yet if a consumer game 
was honest about mass welfare slaughter, it would probably hinder welfare sales and hence 
function as a procedure of decommodification overall. The designers of commodification 
games must take such things into account if they wish to remain employed.365 
Certain aspects of the two games can thus be explained by the characteristics of the capitalist 
mode of production. Two central assumptions are at work here: first, that livestock welfare 
producers compete for profit in the dog-eat-dog world of cost-cutting that capital tends to 
create for itself366 while consumers purchase their products for personal consumption, and 
second, that the games that welfare ideologists produce tend to correspond with the 
aforementioned positions in the commodity circuit.367 The games’ function in the commodity 
circuit explains their features, in other words. 
                                              
364 I establish intent by showing that both games were funded during a period when the European Commission 
had an explicitly articulated strategic goal of creating a European livestock welfare market. Torssonen 2017: 7. 
365 Torssonen 2017: 11. 
366 See Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 29, pp. 38–39. 
367 A similar logic underlies my explanation of individualist ideological transparency as a whole: one important 
reason why individualist transparency recurs in capitalist societies is that it contributes to ideological 
socialization in a way that corresponds with commodity fetishism (see Section 2.3.3). 





Functional explanation has been important in many disciplines,368 but it has been particularly 
prominent within sociology under a broader approach known as “functionalism.” One of the 
discipline’s most important textbooks defines functionalism as the view that “social events 
can best be explained in terms of the functions they perform—that is, the contributions they 
make to the continuity of a society.”369 This kind of sociological functionalism is often 
criticized for downplaying conflict, instability, and creativity while attributing needs and 
purposes to societies as if they were individual people.370 
The textbook definition of functionalism is indeed questionable. While the function of the 
heart may be said to be circulating blood for the survivability of the organism, hearts also 
contribute to strokes, arrhythmia, and a multitude of other complications—just like workers 
can also turn their collective efforts against capital. It is necessary to theorize both aspects, 
not just the integrative one. I consider myself a proponent of “functional explanation,” but not 
a “functionalist” in the above sense. 
This raises an important, general methodological question: When may I interpret the 
contributions things make to each other as evidence of a wholeness existing amidst them? 
When should I instead see their relationship as evidence of tendencies of disintegration? 
What about reconfigurative, disintegrative integration, which replacing the capitalist mode of 
production would arguably entail? 
In the video game analyses of Article II, I approached this problem by differentiating 
between integrative and disintegrative game elements. I called the former procedures of 
commodification and the latter procedures of decommodification. 371 By procedures of 
commodification, I meant game features that lead players towards in-game behaviors that 
                                              
368 E.g., Levin 2017. 
369 Giddens 2009: 1119. 
370 Giddens 2009: 24. Sociology textbooks usually present Marx as the binary opposite of a functionalist. The 
reason is that Marx’s “conflict theory” focuses on antagonisms that disintegrate and change societies, whereas 
“functionalism” presents society’s parts as fitting together under normal circumstances. O′Leary 2007: 44–45, 
94–95; Giddens 2009: 24–25. This textbook interpretation is a half-truth. Although Marx emphasizes social 
antagonism, he simultaneously emphasizes the order that emerges from and sustains the selfsame antagonism 
(see Section 2.2.1). He also repeatedly explains things by their contribution to other things, most commonly 
using the word correspond, entsprechen, to characterize such relations. For instance, Marx discusses “the 
capitalist mode of production, and the conditions of production and exchange corresponding to that mode.” 
Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 35, p. 8; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. II.10, p. 8. Marx is obviously a proponent 
of functional explanation in the sense that he explains things in terms of their contributions to other things. I 
cannot think of any examples, however, in which Marx would argue that said contributions are exclusively 
towards “the continuity of a society.” 
371 Torssonen 2015: 11. 
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correspond with the intended audiences’ moment in the commodity circuit according to 
Marx. The consumer game awarded points for purchasing welfare products, for instance. By 
procedures of decommodification, I referred to features that inhibited players from behaving 
according to their role as consumer or producer. This mode of analysis arguably answers the 
charge that functionalist inquiry disregards instability and treats everything in terms of its 
positive contribution to socialization (although I still defined the negative in terms of the 
positive, as de-commodification). 
My conclusion was that the video games corresponded quite well with the respective 
economic functions of consumers and producers. Commodification was everywhere; 
decommodification was rare. But this only gives rise to another question: Why is this so? 
Why did the ideologists make games that correspond with the categories of economic theory? 
EU ideologists could have instead churned out games with features that contravene the 
Commission’s welfare strategy and discourage commodification, or the strategy could have 
been formulated without commodification goals. 
The question of causal mechanisms has tended to recur with respect to functional explanation 
in many fields of scholarship, and various answers have been proposed.372 Among Marxists, 
however, one prominent response has been to assert that functional explanations are valid 
even without knowledge of the underlying causal mechanisms. As analytical Marxist Gerald 
Cohen famously puts it in his 1978 Karl Marx’s Theory of History, “we may have good 
reason for thinking that a functional explanation is true even when we are at a loss to 
conjecture by what means or mechanism the functional fact achieves an explanatory role.”373 
Cohen’s example, borrowed from Charles Darwin, is that giraffes evolved long necks 
because they provided access to high-up leaves and therefore contributed to survival. Cohen 
argues that Darwin was justified in using giraffes as an example of natural selection even 
though he was not yet capable of articulating the genetic mechanism underlying the 
inheritance of traits.374 In fact, we are still today fairly ignorant as to how exactly genes and 
the expression of traits are related to adaptation, or the process by which populations of 
animals change with their environment.375 Despite this, the concept of adaptation is 
considered basic biology, and it is indeed reasonable, as Cohen argues, to explain giraffes’ 
                                              
372 E.g., Levin 2017: sec. 5.2. 
373 Cohen 2000: 266. 
374 Cohen 2000: 269. 
375 Orr 2005: 119; Waldron 2015. 





necks by their functional contribution to adaptive advantage even in the absence of precise 
knowledge about the underlying mechanisms. 
The problem with Cohen’s example, however, is that scientists have since observed that 
giraffes do not graze high very often, which suggests that long necks might not be explained 
by feeding after all.376 This has led to a proliferation of revisionist theories on the subject, 
ranging from male combat advantage to temperature regulation.377 Perhaps all of these 
explanations describe parts of a causal complex, or perhaps some factors have been more 
salient in certain conjunctures during the evolutionary history of the giraffe. 
In my view, the giraffe example indicates that there is good reason to remain suspicious of 
functional explanations in the absence of evidence concerning the causal mechanisms that 
underlie them.378 This does not mean, however, that functional explanations should not be 
attempted, or that they should be summarily disbelieved. In the giraffe example, for instance, 
many of the new revisionist explanations are variants of the adaptive advantage explanation, 
which is in itself functional. It is just that new evidence has given rise to the question of what 
contributions long necks might make to the survival of giraffes beyond feeding. Therefore, 
scholars who present functional explanations should put forward evidence concerning 
underlying causal mechanisms if possible. 
In Article II, the main evidence I provide regarding underlying mechanisms is that the 
Commission’s strategy explicitly mentioned consumers and producers as separate targets that 
needed to be influenced in order to create livestock welfare markets. I also pointed out that 
Commission ideologists studied how best to influence the games’ intended audiences through 
focus group research. Both of these factors suggest that the Commission understood how the 
social positions of welfare producers and consumers differed and designed the games 
accordingly. This does not yet explain, however, why the Commission simply acquiesced to 
the pre-existing demands of the commodity circuit rather than attacking it.379 
                                              
376 Simmons & Scheepers 1996. 
377 Mitchell et al. 2017. 
378 Here, my interpretation approaches that of critical realism, though I am more optimistic about functional 
explanation. See Agar 2003: 300. 
379 Torssonen 2017: 7. Interestingly, however, the plan ran into some obstacles: members of the European 
Parliament argued that the scantily-clad female main character of the consumer game was sexist. The 
Commission was then forced to add clothing to the character after the game had already been released. The 
Commission’s attempt to integrate children into the welfare commodity circuit simultaneously gave rise to 
disintegrative resistance, as often happens. 
31049380_Vaitoskirja_Sami_Torssonen_Yhteisk_tiet_tdk_sisus_B5.indd   112 5.3.2019   9.16




A more thorough accounting of the mechanisms underlying the video games I analyzed 
would require a more in-depth study of Commission ideologists and the factors affecting 
them. Evidence from such a study might well refute or recalibrate my conclusions about the 
mechanisms by which the games came to correspond with the economics. 
3.3 Article III: Marxism and Language 
While working on Articles I and II, I came to wonder why everyone from researchers380 to 
state bureaucrats381 and industry lobbyists382 constantly used the word transparency when 
talking about livestock welfare. I had also noticed that this word was being used everywhere 
else in a recognizably similar manner. I decided that this similarity would be a good way to 
abstract my findings beyond the case of livestock welfare. I set to work on Article III, in 
which I wanted to discover how and why the social connotations of the word transparency 
have varied across time. 
The basic argument of Article III is that transparency has been used as a metaphor for direct 
social perception since antiquity. However, I show that what I call individualist ideological 
transparency language only became prominent with the spread of commodity production in 
the eighteenth century. Up until the twentieth century, this ideological individualization was 
mostly associated with people’s personal characteristics, such as when priests exhorted 
traders to strive for “transparently sincere” personality. It was only in the mid-twentieth 
century that transparency adopted connotations of assuring accountability. Through this 
development, planned individualization became associated with masking, legitimizing, and 
facilitating bureaucratic control. The European Commission, for instance, has started 
transparency initiatives to defend trade treaty negotiations against citizen opposition.383 
By the time I started working on Article III, my previous research had convinced me of the 
necessity of studying language as an element of non-conscious and non-human processes. My 
reading of paleoanthropologist Pat Shipman’s work on the coevolution of animal 
domestication and human symbolic behavior,384 in particular, had rendered me sensitive to 
                                              
380 Blokhuis et al. 2003. 
381 European Commission 2012: 7. 
382 The Milk Producers’ Organisation 2017. 
383 Due to space constraints, I have not fully theorized this individualist-bureaucratic turn of transparency here, 
and have focused instead on the more abstract form of individualist ideological transparency. The basic outlines 
of my theory of the bureaucratization of transparency are already discernible in Article III, however. 
384 Torssonen 2015: 27–30. 





the long-standing non-symbolic dimensions of symbolic behavior. I therefore could not resort 
to the academic commonplace of studying texts as if they existed in an autonomous domain 
of language and human consciousness.385 Instead, I had to try to triangulate the causes and 
effects of the texts by interpreting language corpus data through a theoretical apparatus that 
showed how developments in the texts related to non-textual developments. 
Again, I found Marx’s treatment of these issues very illuminating. His basic conception of 
language is roughly as follows: As humans (and perhaps other animals) act together in 
reproducing themselves as parts of the world, they simultaneously tend to produce 
conceptions both in mental and externalized forms, such as human speech and writing. In 
other words, language is a fundamental aspect of social-natural production, and it also bears 
the stamp of such production. Language must therefore be studied in terms of theories of 
social-natural production—that is, of fetishism, ideology, and so on—rather than as a closed 
system.386 
The aforementioned view of language makes its first clear appearance in the German 
Ideology manuscripts (see Section 2.2.1), in which Marx and Engels discuss language as 
“practical consciousness,”387 berate philosophers for making “language into an independent 
realm,”388 and show the degree to which “language itself is a product of the bourgeoisie.”389 
Marx’s language conception is perhaps most clearly expressed, however, in his marginalia on 
Adolph Wagner’s Lehrbuch der politischer Öekonomie. He wrote these notes towards the end 
of his life between 1879 and 1880: 
[M]en, like animals, also learn “theoretically” to distinguish the outer things which serve to 
satisfy their needs from all other. . . . [T]hey will linguistically christen entire classes of these 
things which they distinguished by experience from the rest of the outside world. This is bound 
to occur, as in the production process—i.e. the process of appropriating these things—they are 
continually engaged in active contact amongst themselves and with these things, and will soon 
also have to struggle against others for these things.390 
                                              
385 E.g., Sawyer 2002: 434–435. 
386 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 24, p. 539; Marx & Engels 1956–68: vol. 19, pp. 362–363. 
387 Marx & Engels 2014: 75. 
388 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 5, p. 446. 
389 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 5, p. 231. 
390 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 24, p. 539; Marx & Engels 1956–68: vol. 19, pp. 362–363. 
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Whereas in Article I, I applied Pat Shipman’s conception of language, in Article III, I added 
components from Marx’s. In what follows, I compare these two ways of thinking about 
language to consider their implications for conducting research. At the same time, the 
comparison illustrates my own intellectual trajectory from a more pragmatist orientation 
towards a Marxist one. 
Both Shipman and Marx agree that language is inextricably social in the sense that it cannot 
be understood in terms of an individual language-user grappling conceptually with her 
environment. Furthermore, language stems from both production and experience. Shipman 
argues, for instance, that communicating hunting experiences was probably the main way that 
symbolic behavior, such as cave painting and language, initially contributed to human 
reproduction.391 Both Shipman and Marx also emphasize the processual nature of language, 
rather than treating it as a stable system. 
From a Marxist perspective, however, the main deficiency in Shipman’s account is the 
absence of struggle, especially over wealth. According to Engels, this struggle was 
exacerbated by the emergence of non-human animals as private property (see footnote 241), 
which suggests that class struggle should also be part of Shipman’s account. As a 
consequence of disregarding this struggle, Shipman’s discussion elides the class character of 
symbolic specialists.392 She explicitly notes that symbolic specialists must somehow extract 
their upkeep from others, but never elaborates on how this can be done.393 
From a Marxist perspective, Shipman also overemphasizes the communicative and 
instrumental benefits of symbolic behavior. She argues that symbolic behavior emerged as a 
tool for transferring information about how to best appropriate non-human animals.394 As her 
critics have noted, however, evidence indicates that some of the adaptive benefits of symbolic 
behavior are instead related to rituals, which are not exclusively or even mainly 
communicative.395 
A Marxist Projekt Ideologietheorie interpretation of the paleoanthropological evidence would 
emphasize socialization over communication. In this interpretation, one adaptive benefit of 
symbolic behavior is that it helps contain struggle by socializing people into relations of 
                                              
391 Shipman 2010: 6. 
392 Shipman 2010: 6. 
393 Shipman 2010: 6. 
394 Shipman 2010: 7. 
395 Shipman 2010: 10. The critiques by multiple scholars have been published as a part of Shipman’s article. 





domination and subordination (see Section 2.2.2.3). Such socialization often works by 
making it harder for certain people to behave in certain ways. This Marxist interpretation 
thus runs directly counter to Shipman’s vision of symbolic behavior as a tool for 
appropriating the world.  
Shipman subscribes to a variant of what the Marxist linguist Jean-Jacques Lecercle calls the 
“dominant philosophy of language.” The basic intuition underlying this kind of philosophy 
(which may vary substantially in the specifics) is that individuals use language to achieve 
communicative-instrumental goals.396 Lecercle recognizes aspects of this dominant 
conception in a diverse range of language philosophies, including analytic, naturalist, 
pragmatist, and Habermasian approaches. Of these variants, Shipman is closest to the 
pragmatist conception, which focuses on the practical consequences of language with a 
degree of social-scientific naïveté about the systematic causes and effects of asymmetrical 
production relations.397 
My intellectual development from the Shipmanian approach in Article I to the Marxist 
approach in Article III could be summarized as an increasing emphasis on struggle as an 
explanation of language. I still consider it correct to theorize transparency language in terms 
of practice and everyday experience, as I did in Article I with welfare language. Since 
working on Article III, however, I have also understood transparency language in connection 
to professional socializers who alleviate irreconcilable conflict by seeking compromise, 
interpreting and producing traces, and intervening in other people’s everyday life for the 
benefit of the ruling class. There are several axes of struggle and compromise here: amidst 
the people being socialized, amidst the socializers, between the ruling and the ruled, and even 
between the ruling class and its ideologists. Article I only begins to consider the dimensions 
of struggle that are embedded in the contradictions and compromises of welfare language;398 
in Article II, the struggle component is present but in a still mostly implicit manner.399 
All of my dissertation articles are based on evidence produced by ideologists, such as 
government-funded video games or corpus data dominated by professional writers. This 
                                              
396 Lecercle 2006: 64–72. This formulation is my paraphrase of Lecercle’s more elaborate account. 
397 E.g., Rorty 1998: 298. To see how such naïveté slips into ideological socialization, consider Rorty’s pleas for 
a “Mythic America” that would empower oppressed people through imaginary unity. Koivisto & Pietilä 1996: 
55. 
398 Torssonen 2015: 43. 
399 Torssonen 2017: 3. 
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means that their depictions of struggle are necessarily one-sided. As Valentin Voloshinov 
pointed out already in 1929, almost everybody uses language, and variance in people’s life-
situations imparts upon language a degree of polysemy.400 Ideological language will therefore 
probably not be representative of all language. 
I could have attempted to avoid ideology-centrism by interviewing non-ideologists or 
studying their language products. Since non-ideologists tend to be influenced by ideology, 
however, this would simply have displaced the problem. I would still have had to interpret 
ideologically-inflected language for traces of the processes in which it participates, as I have 
done now. Despite this, interviewing or observing non-ideologists, such as the players of the 
games described in Article II, might have helped me better account for the reception of 
ideology and its role in audiences’ lives. Such an approach could also have shifted attention 
away from ideological vertical socialization towards horizontal socialization (see Section 
2.2.2.3). 
In the section that follows, I conclude the dissertation by drawing together its themes in a 
consideration of what non-ideological social transparency might mean. I argue, contentiously, 
that widespread non-ideological transparency would only be possible in a non-capitalist 
society, and that such transparency may even help us move beyond the capitalist mode of 
production.
                                              
400 Voloshinov 1973: 23. 
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Within the collective society based on common ownership of the means of production, the 
producers do not exchange their products; just as little does the labour employed on the 
products appear [Erscheinen] here as the value of these products . . .. [The producer] receives a 
certificate from society that he has furnished such and such an amount of labour (after 
deducting his labour for the common funds), and with this certificate he draws from the social 
stock of means of consumption as much as the same amount of labour costs.401 
Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program 
Individualist transparency offers a way for ideologists to affect members of their audience 
without noticeably impinging on the audience’s commodity-wrought sense of autonomy. The 
European Commission, for instance, creates markets by modifying how welfare appears to 
consumers and producers, university administrators incentivize competition among 
researchers by giving scores to academic publications, and so on. 
This is not, however, the only possible or historically extant form of social transparency. In 
fact, radical socialists and communists have often produced analyses and mechanisms of 
what could be called anti-capitalist social transparency. In this section, I draw the first 
outlines of a research program that would continue this work by conceiving of social 
transparency as an element of horizontal socialization and thereby as a deterrent to 
exploitation and oppression. In contrast to the discussion in Chapter 2, this new program 
focuses on non-ideological social transparency as one element of the broader process of 
horizontal appearance planning. 
In this dissertation, I have laid the foundations of a Marxist conception of transparency. The 
basic argument has been that in societies structured around exploitation and oppression, 
appearance planning tends to be concentrated in the hands of ideologists. Furthermore, in 
societies dominated by commodity production, ideological appearance planning is affected 
by commodity fetishism, which tends to make people see themselves as independent 
individuals even in the absence of planning. Ideological appearance planning incorporates 
fetishism through individualist transparency—it works to socialize ostensibly-independent 
individuals under the pretense of direct perception. 
                                              
401 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 24, p. 86; Marx & Engels 1975–: vol. I.25, p. 13.  
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Ideological transparency is not the only form of social transparency, however, nor is all 
appearance planning ideological. I have barely scratched the surface of horizontal forms of 
appearance planning. In such forms, conscious appearance planning is conducted in and 
through people’s horizontal relations. Further research is needed on this topic. Such research 
could show how appearance planning, including transparency planning, can be organized 
horizontally in a way that undermines exploitation and oppression but still guarantees 
reproduction. 
For horizontal appearance planning to be practically realizable, its seeds must exist already 
within present society. I can think of three specific research questions that could help 
discover whether this is the case: 
1) What capacities required for horizontal appearance planning do people currently 
have, how are such capacities distributed, and why? 
2) To what degree do people disagree on appearance planning, and to what degree are 
these disagreements linked to exploitation and oppression? 
3) In what respects are social appearance processes changing, and under what conditions 
could these changes lead to a future without exploitation and oppression? 
Answering the first question would involve identifying and analyzing extant non-ideological 
aspects of appearance planning and sifting out the variants that are relevant to ending 
oppression and exploitation. Most people are capable of objectifying and modifying 
processes of appearance, which suggests that horizontal planning may be widespread. People 
block online advertisements and hide snacks from themselves, for instance, purposefully 
intervening in the preservation of traces. Groups do this, too, such as when people coordinate 
their behaviors by marking online calendars and deciding who gets to see them or who else’s 
information they want displayed. 
While people may plan appearances, appearances also strengthen or diminish people’s 
capacities for social planning, therefore explaining the capacity or incapacity for horizontal 
appearance planning. The example given above is that although prices may be transparent to 
economists, for everyone else, fetishism makes them difficult to understand. This is a 
problem for bottom-up social planning, which is only possible given that everyday life is 





organized such that most people understand society well enough to plan it.402 Markets serve 
as a cautionary example of a process of social appearance that, although essentially 
horizontal, is not conducive to horizontal socialization at the level of the entire society and 
over the long run. Research on processes of appearances should therefore identify processes 
that hinder or advance capacities for horizontal appearance planning at different scales and 
temporalities. 
The second research direction concerns the politics of appearance planning, such as the 
factors that cause disagreement about which traces should be preserved and which should not. 
Laborers often resist their employers’ efforts to monitor their productivity,403 for instance. 
Parliamentarians are often opposed to providing the public with information about their 
meetings with lobbyists.404 Subordinated wives in transnational marriages resist the efforts of 
their jealous husbands to monitor their fidelity over the internet.405 Research on such 
phenomena could shed light on which conflicts around appearance and transparency could be 
resolvable by changing the underlying conditions of exploitation and oppression. 
Some forms of transparency conflict would probably persist even without exploitation and 
oppression, as is implied by Richard Wolff’s non-perfectionist understanding of 
communism.406 Future research would therefore need to integrate transparency planning as an 
element of post-capitalist politics. For instance, Cockshott and Cottrell have outlined a 
conception of randomly selected stakeholder juries as a form of post-capitalist political 
organization.407 Appearance planning could be one task of such juries. From the point of 
view of horizontal socialization, stakeholder juries have the advantage that appearance 
                                              
402 See Ollman 1997: 42–43. Cockshott and Cottrell propose to counter the obfuscating tendencies of markets by 
basing prices directly on labor time. This would make it easier to understand issues such as public budgets, 
because it would be immediately evident how many hours per day one must work to sustain a given item of 
public expense. Cockshott & Cottrell 1993: 165–166. 
403 O’Connor 2016. 
404 FinnishNews.fi 2017; European Parliament 2016. 
405 Hannaford 2014: 50. Were the marriages not transnational, such monitoring might be conducted by private 
detectives, priests, or neighbors. 
406 Wolff 2007: 332. 
407 The members of these juries are randomly selected with limited terms in order to avoid the aristocratic 
tendency of elections and bureaucracies. Only those who have an interest in the competence of the jury are 
eligible, such as with consumers, producers, or other stakeholders. These competences are defined by the jury’s 
scope and level of aggregation, such as one school or the educational system as a whole. The juries monitor and 
make decisions related to the work of the full-time professionals within their competence, such as teachers. 
They also decide on what percentage of the labor product of their constituencies will be used to maintain the 
public services in which they are stakeholders. Due to the large number of such bodies, everyone would be a 
member of some jury at least some of the time. Only matters pertaining to the entirety of the population would 
be subject to a direct-democratic vote, and only after public deliberation. Cockshott & Cottrell 1993: 157–169. 
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planning takes place across society and over many levels of aggregation. This would require 
substantial work, however. For instance, Cockshott and Cottrell’s analysis of appearance is 
overly focused on labor values, as they themselves admit,408 reducing the labor process to just 
one of its elements. Labor values, in themselves, are an inadequate tool for social planning. 
The third research direction would investigate ongoing social and natural changes that affect 
the possible futures of social processes of appearance. The intuition here is that for horizontal 
appearance planning to become possible, the historical conjuncture must be suitable. In other 
words, society must be developing in a direction that supports conscious attempts to change 
it, and purposive politics must be attuned to this development.409 Otherwise, radical projects 
are mere wishful thinking. 
One especially interesting research direction here would be a Marxist technology studies 
approach to current technological developments that enable cost-efficient trace production 
and planning at various levels of abstraction. Such technologies are currently spreading 
rapidly. Amazon, for instance, has recently patented a wristband that tracks the location of 
employees’ hands in real time and gives haptic feedback to guide them.410 Practices of 
environmental assessment and the objectification of non-human experience are also 
expanding.411 Such measurement and feedback devices enable qualitative and quantitative 
real-time global, direct measurement of things like labor, need, and impacts on non-humans. 
The data produced by new measurement technologies can be broadcast to select segments of 
society in many ways. Commercially available data manipulation and visualization tools 
already enable effortless interpretation of large datasets.412 New bodily senses are even being 
developed and technically augmented: researchers have produced a vest that communicates 
data by actuators on the skin, and people have learned to use its prototype to feel stock 
market data.413 Perceptions and behaviors can likewise be induced by directly stimulating the 
brain,414 and they can also, conversely, be read from neural activity.415 
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At present, such technologies are being designed for societies pervaded by exploitation and 
oppression. This is most obvious in cases such as the CCTV systems that are coupled with 
automatic facial recognition and, in China, social credit scores.416 When integrated with 
swarms of tiny drones equipped with weapons and cameras,417 the oppressive potential of 
these technologies is enormous. One reaction to such dystopian developments has been to 
prohibit or greatly limit data collection,418 although I suspect these reactionary measures are 
going to fail. The new social transparency technologies are incredibly efficient as elements of 
ideological socialization and state violence, and they will probably become increasingly 
indispensable to maintaining ruling-class power. 
New transparency technologies could also be mobilized against exploitation and oppression, 
however. People’s ability to perceive labor values, rates of exploitation, human and non-
human suffering, or environmental impacts could be improved via augmented reality 
technologies. Such appearances could also replace the torrent of ideological manipulation that 
now streams forth from the likes of Facebook and Google.419 Rather than generating desire 
for commodities or loyalty to political parties, technologically preserved traces could 
generate socialized intrinsic motivation and increase planning capacity. This would arguably 
strengthen individual autonomy in the face of totalitarian tendencies, while offering the 
political advantage of mobilizing the individualist intuitions that stemmed from commodities 
in the first place. 
New tracing technologies could also be useful for replacing and grading property rights. 
Traces in people’s bodies or social lives, for instance, could be read automatically to allow 
access to scarce use values based on objectivized need, such as transportation for a commute 
or medicine for a sickness. They could also be used to mark and track items of personal 
property and facilitate their efficient use, such as broadcasting the presence of expensive and 
rarely used equipment to ease borrowing. 
Radicals of various denominations have attempted to connect technologies of appearance 
planning to broader social-natural mechanisms of differing complexities, from Marx’s 
rudimentary labor certificates420 and Gosplan’s material balances421 all the way to the 
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417 Hruska 2018. 
418 European Commission 2018. 
419 E.g., Greenfield 2018. 
420 Marx & Engels 1975–2005: vol. 24, p. 86. 
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Chilean Cybersyn422 and Soviet OGAS423 cybernetics projects, not to mention labor value 
broadcasts over the Teletext TV system.424 Such attempts illustrate how important social 
technologies of producing, preserving, and interpreting traces are to non- and anti-capitalist 
social organization. Future research would do well to update, compare, criticize, systematize, 
and horizontalize these theories and practices of anti-capitalist trace preservation and 
appearance planning. 
Above all else, the possibilities for horizontal transparency in the future depend on the 
balance of power between capital and labor. When Chilean socialists under Allende 
attempted cybernetic appearance planning, for instance, their plans were foiled by a military 
coup supported by the CIA that resulted in the slaughter of Chile’s radical left.425 Non-
ideological transparency and appearance planning would probably face similar resistance 
from most factions of the capitalist ruling class. The overall strategic situation therefore 
determines whether horizontal appearance planning is practically possible. 
A deep, multi-faceted crisis of the capitalist mode of production could substantially improve 
the prospects of horizontal appearance planning. A major crisis could weaken the ruling 
class, which in turn may be conducive to social change, for good or for ill. Several severe 
crisis developments are currently underway in the economic,426 environmental,427 and 
political428 realms that could together threaten the dominance of the capitalist class. The 
outcomes of such processes are uncertain, however, and contingent on the specifics of the 
initial conditions. 
In conclusion, while studying transparency might seem like a strange way to wage the class 
struggle, ideological transparency does socialize people into relations of exploitation and 
                                                                                                                                              
421 Davies & Khlevnyuk 1997: 32. 
422 Beer 1981: 270. 
423 Beissinger 1988: 248–249; Gerovitch 2004. Organizational cybernetics remains a highly developed branch of 
theoretical literature on using modern technology for social appearance planning. The literature is problematic, 
however, in its rudimentary theory of politics and its assumption of capitalist relations of production. For 
instance, cybernetics now tends to see conflict as merely a side effect of bad design, and works ideologically to 
increase “cohesion” and “performance” within the capitalist mode of production. See Espejo & Reyes 2014: 94; 
Espejo & Bula 2012: 344. This is a substantial step back from the revolutionary cybernetics in Allende’s Chile, 
which still had political and anti-capitalist economic aspects, although engineering-heavy ones. Beer 1981: 252; 
278–306. 
424 Cockshott & Cottrell 1993: 51–52. 
425 Devine 2014. 
426 Roberts 2018b; Roberts 2016a: 21–22; Milanovic 2016: 44; Piketty 2014: 434; International Monetary Fund 
2018; Authers 2018. 
427 Ripple et al. 2017. 
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oppression, and abolishing it is a reasonable goal of the exploited and the oppressed. The 
problem of appearance planning will not disappear, however, even if individualist 
transparency and the class divide cease to exist. Marxists cannot ignore the question of 
transparency any longer. 
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